Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa (original) (raw)
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Resource rents, democracy and corruption: evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa
We examine the effect of the interaction between resource rents and democracy on corruption for a panel of 29 Sub-Saharan countries during the period from 1985 to 2007. We find that higher resource rents lead to more corruption and that the effect is significantly stronger in less democratic countries. Surprisingly, we also find that higher resource rents lead to fewer internal conflicts and that less democratic countries face not a higher but a lower likelihood of conflicts following an increase in resource rents. We argue that these findings can be explained by the ability of the political elites in less democratic countries to more effectively quell the masses through redistribution of rents to the public. We support our argument by documenting that higher resource rents lead to more (less) government spending in less (more) democratic countries. Our findings suggest that the mechanisms through which resource rents affect corruption cannot be separated from political systems. JEL-Code: C330, D730, D740, D720, H210.
The Rise of Autocracy in the Sahel of Africa: Insights from Resource Curse Theory
Research in social change, 2023
The countries in the Sahel, aside from being located in the same geopolitical region, also share similar socioeconomic and sociopolitical challenges. This includes political instability, insecurity, poor governance, climate change and democratic erosion-among others. The corrosion of the democratic gains recorded since the spread of democracy in the 1990s and the rise of autocratic regimes has become prevalent in the last decade. The subversion of the electoral process, limited freedom and military takeovers are an indication of the spread of autocracy in Africa (generally) and the Sahel (specifically). The paper which is anchored on the resource curse theory argues that the Sahel is rich in natural resources that when not properly managed breed corruption and increase the chances of conflict and the likelihood of military takeover. More so, faced with weak institutions, autocrats take advantage of abundant resources to increase patronage networks at the expense of development and democratic growth. The paper found that the rise of illiberal regimes is on the rise in Africa; suggesting a wave of autocracy. This is evident in the spate of autocratic and highly defective democracies in the region; one-party dominance; re-emergence of military coups; and circumvention of term limits. It is therefore concluded that electoral autocracy is on the rise in Africa and is a common phenomenon in the Sahel. This is given impetus by weak institutions which makes it difficult for rulers to utilize resource wealth for human capital development. To this end, the paper adopts a qualitative approach that relies on secondary data sourced from peer-reviewed journal articles, government reports, briefs and internet sources.
Natural Resources, Governance, and Economic Growth in Africa
East Asian Economic Review, 2006
Development economists have found evidence that an abundance in natural resources hinders economic growth, contrary to conventional expectations. This finding is called the resource curse hypothesis. The major questions this paper addresses are: does the resource curse hypothesis apply to Africa? If so, what are its major channels? Our hypothesis is that governance is much more important in Africa than in other regions because of non-democratic and unstable political environments, which are closely associated with natural resources in African countries and hinder economic growth. We find empirical evidence for this argument using GMM with endogenous governance. Our findings shed light on the deleterious role of natural resources in governance and economic growth in Africa.
Sociology International Journal, 2018
During the 1990s, many sub-Sahara African states started the process of regime change so as to join what was referred to as the third wave of democratization. Almost three decades after, apart from South Africa, very few if not none of them have consolidated democracy. The dominant discourses in explaining sub-Sahara African states' 'resistance' to liberal democracy emphasize the inadequacy of their social structures, their low economic development, and the grab of 'big men' in power. Drawing evidence from history, this article contends that foreign interests can also be an impending factor to democratic development. The study concerns the relationships between France and her former colonies in Central Africa. The data used is obtained mainly through documents analysis.
Democratic Institutions, Natural Resource Governance, and Ghana’s Oil Wealth
Social Sciences, 2017
The literature on natural resources is endowed with works on countries that have experienced slow economic performance despite their abundant natural resources (resource curse), with the exception of Norway and other few countries. Strong institutions and good governance practices have been underscored as some of the explanatory factors to the high performance of the outlier countries. Ghana's oil discovery in the era of its advancing democratic practices has led some to argue that the country might escape the resource curse phenomenon. While recognizing the importance of this argument, this article, however, argues that Ghana's likelihood of escaping the resource curse could be problematic due to its exclusive emphasis on democratic governance without greater focus on oil sector governance. Drawing on the theory of agenda setting and the existing literature, the article makes the case for agenda shift in the debate on Ghana's oil wealth and development. It stresses the need for a dualistic governance (the democratic and the oil sector) approach in the broader discourse on how Ghana can escape the resource curse.
Journal of Economic Development
Rents generated by natural resources are usually thought to weaken the quality of institutions, particularly in developing countries. Our hypothesis is that this effect may differ depending on the types of natural resources characterized by their different degree of appropriability. We test this hypothesis using panel data covering 90 developing countries for the period 1970-2010. We find that total rents weaken the quality of institutions. However, while oil rents have a significant negative effect, forest and mineral rents do not, after controlling for the other relevant determinants of institutional quality, institutional persistence, neighbor effect, and endogeneity of rents.
The paradox of governance and natural resource rents in Sub-Saharan Africa
European Xtramile Centre of African Studies WP/22/020, 2022
In this study, nexuses between governance and natural resource rents are assessed in 44 sub-Saharan African countries using data for the period 1996-2016. The empirical evidence is based on Tobit regressions. The findings show that political governance (entailing "voice & accountability" and political stability) and institutional governance (consisting of the rule of law and corruption control) have a negative effect on resource rents. However, if the conception and definition of attendant governance variables are understood within the framework that such variables are negatively skewed, it becomes apparent that bad governance reduces resource rents. This conclusion clarifies the paradox because negatively skewed governance variables are understood to be representing poor governance. By extension, the negative effect of the rule of law or corruption control on natural resource rents should be the negative effect of the absence of the rule of law or lack of corruption control on natural resource rents. The paradox is further clarified in the light of specific components of the governance dynamics. While the clarification of the paradox is relative, especially if the sample is compared with countries for which governance indicators are largely skewed in the positive direction, from an absolute perspective (i.e. exclusively from the sampled countries), the indicators of the World Bank are standardized such that negative skewness does not affect the estimated results. Another worthwhile argument with which to explain the paradox is that governance has more impact on the nonresource component of GDP.
Public Administration and Development, 2003
Decentralisation reforms are taking place across Africa. In decentralisation concerning natural resources, local institutions being chosen to receive powers and the degree and form of power transfers, however, do not establish conditions for more efficient or equitable use and management. A combination of locally accountable representation and discretionary powers are also needed. This combined condition is rarely established. Alternative local institutions are chosen even when democratic local bodies exist. This choice and the failure to transfer discretionary powers can undermine local democratic bodies and concentrate powers in the executive branch. The choices being made around natural resources appear to reflect a broad resistance of central governments to local democratisation and decentralisation of powers. Five measures may ameliorate the situation: (1) focus first on establishing democratic local government; (2) apply multiple accountability measures, in addition to elections, to support democratic local institutions; (3) engage local populations by transferring discretionary powers before transferring management burdens; (4) transfer powers before capacity building; and (5) shift from an oversight and management-planing model to a minimum-standards model in order to help create greater local autonomy nested within national objectives.
Oil Wealth, Resource Curse and Development: Any Lessons for Ghana?
Article, 2015
Ghana's new status as an oil-producing country has invigorated the scholarly debate on the resource curse theory, which assumes that countries with vast natural resource wealth like oil, diamond and gold are likely to experience slow economic growth and development as compared to countries with scarce natural resources. Although the development literature is well endowed with cases of countries with huge natural resources that have experienced slow economic growth, the literature is also clear on few other countries with enormous natural resources that continue to experience high economic growth due to strong political institutions and democratic practices. Norway and Botswana are two good examples. This paper employs the resource curse theory to examine the central research question of whether Ghana's democratic institutions and governance practices can help the country escape the resource curse. While Ghana's democratic institutions appear to provide a solid foundation for its new oil wealth, this paper argues that Ghana can only escape the resource curse if oil sector governance practices are accorded the same or higher attention as democratic governance practices. Clearly, the central argument by the authors to shift the debate toward oil sector governance is particularly important to the ongoing discourse on Ghana's oil wealth.