Causation, from a human point of view (original) (raw)
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Manipulation Theory of Causation: J. Woodward
The main focus of this thesis is to observe and analyze the main attempt of James Woodward to construct a dual foundation of scientific explanation. First, we will see and analyze the first foundation which is the account of causation and then we will proceed to the second one which is that of causal explanation. It will be given more emphasis to the first foundation and its problems providing illustrations, examples of everyday life, further explications of various notions that Woodward uses (such as the notion of ‘intervention’, ‘counterfactuals’, ’truth conditions’ and ‘invariance’) in connection with scientific claims which are crucial to the whole construction of his causal theory. Subsequently, by analyzing the second foundation which is that of causal explanation, we will see how the causal theorizing applies in order to explain phenomena in a causal deductive way. Therefore, having elaborated these two theoretical systems we will end up in a clear picture of how the first foundation structures the other.
Concrete Causation: About the Structures of Causal Knowledge
2012
Concrete Causation centers about theories of causation, their interpretation, and their embedding in metaphysical-ontological questions, as well as the application of such theories in the context of science and decision theory. The dissertation is divided into four chapters, that firstly undertake the historical-systematic localization of central problems (chapter 1) to then give a rendition of the concepts and the formalisms underlying David Lewis' and Judea Pearl's theories (chapter 2). After philosophically motivated conceptual deliberations Pearl's mathematical-technical framework is drawn on for an epistemic interpretation and for emphasizing the knowledge-organizing aspect of causality in an extension of the interventionist Bayes net account of causation (chapter 3). Integrating causal and non-causal knowledge in unified structures ultimately leads to an approach towards solving problems of (causal) decision theory and at the same time facilitates the representation of logical-mathematical, synonymical, as well as reductive relationships in efficiently structured, operational nets of belief propagation (chapter 4).
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2006
The paper builds on the basically Humean idea that A is a cause of B iff A and B both occur, A precedes B, and A raises the metaphysical or epistemic status of B given the obtaining circumstances. It argues that in pursuit of a theory of deterministic causation this 'status raising' is best explicated not in regularity or counterfactual terms, but in terms of ranking functions. On this basis, it constructs a rigorous theory of deterministic causation that successfully deals with cases of overdetermination and pre-emption. It finally indicates how the account's profound epistemic relativization induced by ranking theory can be undone. 1 Introduction 2 Variables, propositions, time 3 Induction first 4 Causation 5 Redundant causation 6 Objectivization 1 The major cycles have been produced by David Lewis himself. See Lewis ([1973b], [1986], [2000]). Hints to further cycles may be found there. 2 It is first presented in (Spohn [unpublished]). 3 See, e.g. the April issue of the Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000), or the collection by Collins et al. ([2004]). See also the many references therein, mostly referring to papers since 1995.
A survey of Woodward's counterfactual theory of causation
2011
In his book Making Things Happen (2003), James Woodward proposes aninterventionist account of causation. Such account requires the adoption of a counterfactual analysis of causal claims. However, how should counterfactual claims be understood and interpreted from an interventionist standpoint? I will try to answer this question taking as a guide the influent ial account of counterfactuals presented by David Lewis in his famous paper "Causation" (1979). The aim of this paper is to outline some general considerations that show how Woodward's counterfactual analys is differs from Lewis's, thus gaining immunity against classical objections to Lewis's analysis, and to present some difficulties of Woodward's own approach. The paper is divided in three parts. First, I will present briefly the main ideas of the manipulability theory of causation; in the second part, I will introduce the necessity of adopting a counterfactual analysis in such an account, followed by...
Causal Reasoning: Initial Report of a Naturalistic Study of Causal Inferences
Electronic Workshops in Computing, 2009
Motivation-This paper describes the initial results of a naturalistic inquiry into the way people derive causal inferences. Research approach-We examined media accounts of economic, political, military, and sports incidents to determine the types of causal explanations that are commonly invoked. Findings-We found two interacting processes at work: the identification of potential causes and the framing of these causes into explanations. Explanations took several forms: abstractions, events, lists (undifferentiated collections of partial causes), conditions, and stories (complex mechanisms linking several causes). Originality-Causal reasoning in "the real world" is both different from and far richer than the formal causal accounts found in philosophy, and from the determinate search for causes during scientific problem solving. Takeaway message-By understanding the way causal reasoning is done in natural settings we should be better able to help decision makers diagnose problems and anticipate consequences.
Causation and the Objectification of Agency (PhD Dissertation)
Causation and the Objectification of Agency, 2015
This dissertation defends the so-called 'agency-approach' to causation, which attempts to ground the causal relation in the cause's role of being a means to bring about its effect. The defence is confined to a conceptual interpretation of this theory, pertaining to the concept of causation as it appears in a causal judgement. However, causal judgements are not seen as limited to specific domains, and they are not exclusively attributed to human agents alone. As a methodological framework to describe the different perspectives of causal judgments, a method taken from the philosophy of information is made use of – the so-called 'method of abstraction'. According to this method, levels of abstraction are devised for the subjective perspective of the acting agent, for the agent as observer during the observation of other agents’ actions, and for the agent that judges efficient causation. As a further piece of propaedeutic work, a class of similar (yet not agency-centred) approaches to causation is considered, and their modelling paradigms – Bayesian networks and interventions objectively construed – will be criticised. The dissertation then proceeds to the defence of the agency-approach, the first part of which is a defence against the objection of conceptual circularity, which holds that agency analyses causation in causal terms. While the circularity-objection is rebutted, I rely at that stage on a set of subjective concepts, i.e. concepts that are eligible to the description of the agent’s own experience while performing actions. In order to give a further, positive corroboration of the agency-approach, an investigation into the natural origins and constraints of the concept of agency is made in the central chapter six of the dissertation. The thermodynamic account developed in that part affords a third-person perspective on actions, which has as its core element a cybernetic feedback cycle. At that point, the stage is set to analyse the relation between the first- and the third-person perspectives on actions previously assumed. A dual-aspect interpretation of the cybernetic-thermodynamic picture developed in chapter six will be directly applied to the levels of abstraction proposed earlier. The level of abstraction that underpins judgments of efficient causation, the kind of causation seemingly devoid of agency, will appear as a derived scheme produced by and dependent on the concept of agency. This account of efficient causation, the ‘objectification of agency’, affords the rebuttal of a second objection against the agency-approach, which claims that the approach is inappropriately anthropomorphic. The dissertation concludes with an account of single-case, or token level, causation, and with an examination of the impact of the causal concept on the validity of causal models.