Spies and Their Masters (original) (raw)

The Role and Purpose of Intelligence in a Democracy

2019

The very word "secrecy" is repugnant in a free and open society.-John Fitzgerald Kennedy 1 At the writing of this volume in early 2019, there are 146 democracies around the world-out of 195 states. 2 These countries have held free and fair elections, instituted market economies, and fostered the creation of civil societies. Some have endeavored to overhaul their intelligence agencies, 3 converting repressive state security systems into democratic intelligence communities. Even the most successful democracies face a conundrum in regard to the intelligence function, however: whereas democracy calls for political neutrality, transparency, and accountability, effective intelligence agencies must operate in secrecy. Democratic Systems In general, the literature on democracy divides democratic systems into two ideal types: electoral democracies, which are characterized by free and fair elections, and liberal democracies, which involve free and fair elections as well as the protection of individual, civil, and political rights and freedoms of the citizenry. 4 Moving from electoral to liberal democracies equates to achieving democratic consolidation,

Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2011

In all democratic systems, intelligence reform is a ''Gordian knot'' that incessantly tests decisionmakers. The onus is on them to develop and maintain intelligence systems that protect democracy and are democratically accountable, while, at the same time, engage in secret

Intelligence Oversight and Effectiveness in New Democracies

Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science

Scholarship on the inherent tension between intelligence and democracy has paid limited attention to new democracies, especially those transitioning from military regimes. There, it is more challenging to bring intelligence services under democratic control without sacrificing their efficiency in exchange for oversight. This research note analyses these challenges in the Brazilian case, contributing to the scholarship on intelligence in Latin America. The case study demonstrates that the restructuring of intelligence in Brazil resulted in a spread-out intelligence system with many agencies, aimed at avoiding monopolisation and politicisation with formal oversight mechanisms put in place. Nonetheless, Brazilian society and politicians still do not trust intelligence, and lack a clear understanding of its functions for a democratic state. While intelligence reform in Brazil still has a long way to go regarding intelligence effectiveness and efficiency, it indicates how intelligence re...

Political Leaders and Intelligence Organizations: A Typology

The strategic ability to define the country’s security goals based on their political beliefs and views. The ability to decide which are their national allies and enemies. he ability to set the extent of intelligence operations in friendly countries, in order to define the intelligence organization’s objectives. The technical ability to randomly supervise and assess the sources on which the information the supplied intelligence are based (usually through a special assistant for the purpose). The ability to have full budgetary control over the intelligence organizations. The option of having periodical meetings with the heads of the intelligence services in order to define the intelligence targets and assure success in achieving these goals. The power to demand and receive clear and concise intelligence reviews. Also,the ability to determine when the agencies use obscure phrasing to cover a lack of knowledge, or when they do not wish to give a conclusive opinion. A full ability to deny intelligence recommendations if they collide with the policymaker’s main political agenda or the mandate bestowed by the electorate. In so doing, the policymaker should know clearly that often, or perhaps even most of the time, intelligence does not have exact information concerning the intentions of the other side. Thus, using the intelligence recommendations does not guarantee better results over relevant political experience. This applies only to those cases in which the intelligence service does not have clear knowledge about the other side’s intentions. A political decisionmaker must remember that the intelligence community has no crystal ball that allows it to predict the future. . The political decisionmaker should have the ability to personally or through aides discern when the intelligence service is trying to exert pressure in order to force action, and when the service itself truly believes that a danger really deserves a clear, perhaps immediate, response. Political decisionmakers should recall that the CIA traditionally used to mesmerize U.S. leaders with stories about the enemy, and by doing so received billions of perhaps unnecessary dollars directly or indirectly. Understanding this nuance when communicating with the intelligence services could save the country vast resources and constructive energy, while maintaining a better balance with, and more effective control over, the nation’s intelligence apparatus.

Democratic Control and National Security

Varia Historia, 2023

This article delves into the vicissitudes of democratic control of government intelligence activities in the United States between 1972 and 1980. The previous phase of the Cold War (1947-1971), characterized by the intense systemic polarization between the United States and the Soviet Union, coupled with the expansion of state capacity and internal social conflicts within the US, contributed to the establishment of complex national systems of intelligence organizations and activities in both countries. In the 1970s, the strategic stabilization of US-USSR relations (détente) depended, in part, on the technological advancements in intelligence gathering from communications, signals, and imagery via satellites. Police and military surveillance of internal dissidents and the growing political crisis towards the end of the Nixon administration created the conditions for an unprecedented and consistent attempt to exert democratic external control over intelligence operations by the Legislative and Judiciary branches. The resurgence of the Cold War from 1980 onwards and the election of Reagan marked the beginning of a partial reversal of the controls. In less than a decade, a highly institutionalized democracy such as the US made great efforts and experienced difficulties regulating and controlling intelligence activities.

How Intelligence Agencies Turned into Foreign Policy Tools - Politics Today

Politics Today, 2022

In today’s world, intelligence service directors take an active role in the processes of foreign policy formulation. This new role has led intelligence services to transform themselves into structures that play a more active role in foreign policy decision-making processes, unlike the classical intelligence service activities whose scopes have long been limited to specified duties. Ali Burak Darıcılı explores the changing structure of global intelligence with the following concepts and terminology: technology-centered development, the increasing cyber espionage capacity of intelligence services, the developing relations between intelligence services and private intelligence companies, new-generation threats and risks that emerge with the rise of social media, open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection methods, and the concept of intelligence diplomacy.