Evolution and the production of rules—Some preliminary remarks (original) (raw)
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Cultural evolution, the propagation and transfer of ideas from generation to generation, as well as from one person to another and from one culture to another, is much faster then normal, genetic evolution. This could account for the speedy proliferation of humankind on this planet, at the expense of other life forms.
The evolution, appropriation, and composition of rules
Synthese, 2014
This paper concerns how rule-following behavior might evolve in the context of a variety of Skyrms-Lewis signaling game[13][15], how such rules might subsequently evolve to be used in new contexts, and how such appropriation allows for the composition of evolved rules. We will also consider how the composition of simpler rules to form more complex rules may be significantly more efficient than evolving the complex rules directly. And we will review an example of rule following by pinyon and scrub jays [11] as an illustration of the appropriation of a rule to a new context [4][3]. The proposal here is that the composition of rules might occur in a way that is precisely analogous to such simple appropriation. Finally, we will briefly consider how any finite truthfunctional operation might evolve by the sequential appropriation of simpler rules.
The Problem of Rule-Choice Redux
The Journal of the Philosophy of History, 2018
In this paper, we tackle the contribution that history of science can make to the problem of rule-choice, i.e., the choice from among competing methodological rules. Taking our cue from Larry Laudan's writings, we extensively discuss what we call historicist natural-ism, i.e., the view that history of science plays a pivotal role in the justification of rules, since it is one source of the evidence required to settle methodological controversies. As we illustrate, there are cases of rule-choice that depend on conceptual considerations alone, and in which history of science does not factor. Moreover, there are cases in which methodological change is prompted – and explained – by empirical information that is not historical in nature: as suggested by what we call scientific naturalism, the justification of methodological choices comes from our knowledge of the structure of the world, as expressed by our currently accepted scientific theories. As we argue, due to its backward-looking character, historicist naturalism does not satisfactorily deal with the case of newly introduced rules, for which no evidence concerning their past performance is available. In sum, we conclude, the contribution that history of science can make to rule-choice is more modest than Laudan suggests. Keywords methodological change – justification of methodological rules – normative naturalism – history of science
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2013
This paper develops a model with endogenously coarse rules. A principal hires an agent to take an action. The principal knows the optimal state-contingent action, but cannot communicate it perfectly due to communication constraints. The principal can use previously realized states as examples to define rules of varying breadth. We analyze how rules are chosen under several assumptions about how rules can be amended. We explore the inefficiencies that arise and how they depend on the ability to refine rules, the principal's time horizon and patience, and other factors. Our model exhibits path dependence in that the efficacy of rule development depends on the sequence of realizations of the state. We interpret this as providing a foundation for persistent performance differences between similar organizations and explore the role of different delegation structures in ameliorating the effects of bounded communication.