Transmission cost allocation by cooperative games and coalition formation (original) (raw)
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Under a context of transmission open access, a methodology to define a common transmission trunk system using economic and technical criteria is proposed. A transmission trunk system is defined as a unique and common system constituted by electrical lines and substations that are economically efficient and necessary to allow the development of an electrical market and the supply of demand in the respective electrical system at a minimum cost and in an efficient manner. The principles of cooperation and interaction between agents that are the base for the cooperative games theory are used. Simple games and the Shapley Value approach are used. The proposal responds to the need to identify a common main system, common to supply and demand agents, needed in system open access schemes in electricity markets.
Transmission expansion cost allocation based on cooperative game theory for congestion relief
International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 2005
In conventional power systems, upstream and downstream of power were distinct. However, due to the competition, power injection and sink can appear at unexpected locations, and cost sharing for such a new power system configuration must be considered. This paper proposes a scheme for transmission expansion cost allocation among electric market participants by using Core and Nucleolus concepts of game theory, which are developed particularly for the transmission users. A solution of the n-person cooperative game is adopted to distribute the line transmission expansion cost among the players. Congestion is assumed to be the transmission constraint, and expansion of transmission line is expected to relieve transmission congestion. A case study is illustrated to demonstrate the proposed method.
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From the social perspective, transmission planning has been broadly studied developing models that minimize expansion costs, subject to technical-economical restrictions that guarantee system security and stability. In a deregulated electric market, planning must allow the optimal development of the network at a minimum cost, based on economic and technical efficiency incentives, with proper reliability and quality of service levels, and adapted to the requirements of generation companies and consumers. This work studies the expansion of transmission systems from the private perspective, developing a static expansion model based on the interaction of market agents using cooperative game theory. The major results are the expanded transmission system and the agents involved in the expansion. It is illustrated for a small system and applied to the IEEE 24-bus system 1 . R
An Effective Transmission Network Expansion Cost Allocation Based on Game Theory
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2007
The expansion of transmission systems impacts many entities in the market environment. Each entity may fare better or worse as a result of congestion relief in the presence of new investments. Negatively affected firms exert their influence to prevent the expansion from taking place. The opposition of these firms and the lack of appropriate incentives results in insufficient investments in transmission assets. The network is being frequently used at its maximum limits, leading to economic inefficiencies and reduced reliability. Hence, there is a need for effective incentive schemes for network expansion.
A cooperative game theory analysis for transmission loss allocation
Electric Power Systems Research, 2008
This paper presents an analysis and discussion, based on cooperative game theory, for the allocation of the cost of losses to generators and demands in transmission systems. We construct a cooperative game theory model in which the players are represented by equivalent bilateral exchanges and we search for a unique loss allocation solution, the Core. Other solution concepts, such as the Shapley Value, the Bilateral Shapley Value and the Kernel are also explored. Our main objective is to illustrate why is not possible to find an optimal solution for allocating the cost of losses to the users of a network. Results and relevant conclusions are presented for a 4-bus system and a 14-bus system.
International Review of Electrical Engineering-iree, 2013
In deregulated electricity markets there is a strong need for effective allocation of fixed costs to market participants. The conventional usage based methods currently employed in market scenario may fail to send right economic signals. Hence in this paper, cooperative game theory is applied for power system fixed cost allocation. Increasing competition in the energy market can help maximize customers’ payoffs. This can be achieved by applying game theory. In this regard, two solution methodologies such as Nucleolus and Shapley value are adopted in a Multi-lateral market. Both the methods have their pros and cons, while it can be inferred that Shapley value is a more preferable method when the solution is in the core of the game. In this paper, these methods are applied in case of IEEE 14 bus, New England 39 bus and Indian 75 bus power system and the results obtained are compared with the conventional usage based methods
Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy, 2019
This paper proposes a new method to allocate the transmission fixed costs among the network participants in a pool-based electricity market. The allocation process relies on the circuit laws, utilizes the modified impedance matrix and is performed in two individual steps for the generators and loads. To determine the partial branch power flows due to the participants, the equal sharing principle is used and validated by the Shapley and Aumann-Shapley values as two preferred game-theoretic solutions. The proposed approach is also applied to determine the generators' contributions into the loads, and a new concept, named circuit-theory-based equivalent bilateral exchange (EBE), is introduced. Using the proposed method, fairly stable tariffs are provided for the participants. Cross-subsidies are reduced and a fair competition is made by the proposed method due to the counter-flows being alleviated compared with the well-known Z-bus method. Numerical results are reported and discussed to validate the proposed cost allocation method. Comparative analysis reveals that the method satisfies all conditions desired in a fair and efficient cost allocation method. Finally, the developed technique has been implemented successfully on the 2383-bus Polish power system to emphasize that the method is applicable to very large systems.