Kierkegaard's Rule of Faith (original) (raw)
Related papers
"Kierkegaardian Deconstruction and the Paradoxes of Faith"
This paper argues that a properly "Christian deconstruction" of reason, for Kierkegaard, depends on the necessity of finitude and guilt and their rootedness in an existential anthropology. That is, the paradoxes of reason (perhaps practical reason in particular) that lead to reason's own self-deconstruction are precisely exposed in an existential anthropology that conceives of the human being as spirit and thus as task, and as such, inevitably finite and (ironically) powerless vis-à-vis this task. Christian deconstruction then hinges, I argue, on Kierkegaard's existential anthropology, which in turn depends upon finitude or the essential impotency of the human being vis-à-vis an ironic task of selfhood. First, I will discuss Kierkegaard's conception of the self as task from The Sickness Unto Death, as well as the conditions for the possibility of conceiving of such a self. Then I will argue that the conditions for the task of selfhood reveal an ironic paradox at the root of the task itself, and yet this paradox enables the recognition of the impossibility of such a task, allowing for the deconstruction of the self and reason and the moment of grace and decision. Finitude qua impotency and guilt prove then to be a necessity for grace and faith.
Kierkegaard on Faith and Reason
In this chapter, Fremstedal offers a charitable reading of Kierkegaard’s view of faith and reason. First, the chapter argues that faith is above reason, not against reason. Second, it argues that faith can aid and engage reason, not just offend it. However, this implies that Kierkegaard cannot reject the Augustinian idea of faith seeking understanding. Still, he does reject accounts of faith that are overly intellectualistic and rationalistic (in the sense of trying to reduce faith to cognition and reason). It is argued that it is against this background that Kierkegaard’s approach should be understood, since it represents a corrective against intellectualistic and rationalistic accounts of faith that downplays the category of the absurd. Arguably, many of these problems result from the fact that readers tend to overlook that Kierkegaard describes faith both from internal and external perspectives, using different pseudonyms for different approaches.
The Nature and Promise of Faith in Kierkegaard
Persona y Sociedad, 2014
Con razón es Kierkegaard considerado uno de los padres del existencialismo moderno e individualista, incluso en comparación con otros pensadores del existencialismo moderno encontramos en Kierkegaard unos acentos cristianos y religiosos más claros y deliberados. La situación desfavorable del cristianismo institucionalizado en Dinamarca (desde la perspectiva teológica, socio-política y filosófica), los traumas emocionales de la infancia de Kierkegaard y su íntimo deseo incumplido de compartir la vida con su querida Regina lo llevó a la supervivencia y a la posterior articulación de su actitud interior de ansiedad, pasión y audacia (tan típicas de Kierkegaard). En su concepción de la fe está volcando su atención hacia las cuestiones fundamentales de la ética sobre las que contempla cada individuo según su experiencia interior subjetiva. Sin embargo, la fe auténtica va más allá del nivel estético y ético de la reflexión. No pasa a un estado del quietismo autocomplaciente, sino aporta el efecto movilizador a la vida del individuo con graves consecuencias éticas y sociales. A pesar de que el concepto Kierkegaardiano de la fe no tuvo ningún impacto significativo en sus contemporáneos, influyó de forma significativa los círculos intelectuales de los siglos XX y XXI. Como respuesta a la heterogénea recepción del mensaje de Kierkegaard, este estudio recomienda vincular su énfasis en la existencia auténtica del individuo haciendo hincapié en el carácter comunitario de la fe como un fenómeno teológico-sociológico, derivado de la existencia de una iglesia visible.
Faith and Reason: An Inquiry into the Concept of Faith in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling
International Journal of Indonesian Philosophy & Theology
Faith is often accused of being irrational and considered lower than reason because it is not objective and universal. In other words, at a practical level, believers cannot always obey God’s commands communicated in their inwardness. However, they must always be subject to the demands of a universal and objective reason. This elaboration attempts to counter this assumption departing from the description that Kierkegaard presented in his work, Fear and Trembling. There, Kierkegaard states that a single individual believer is higher than the ethical-rational demands that bind him. In other words, the purpose of this text is to show that faith has its rationality and is not subject to reason. Therefore, through the textual analysis method of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, this paper would like to analyze the constitutive elements of faith, how they work, and why faith is not subject to ratio. The point of view used in this elaboration is Kierkegaardian subjectivity. The analysis fi...
Søren Kierkegaard’s view of faith found in Fear and Trembling and Practice In Christianity
2016
In this paper I discuss two key works written by Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and Practice in Christianity, under the pseudonyms Johannes de Silentio and Anti-Climacus respectively. I focus on three questions: what is Johannes view of faith, what is Anti-Climacus' view of faith and how are these Kierkegaard's conclusions? I argue that stemming from Johannes' and Anti-Climacus' points of view, Kierkegaard's view of faith is the aligning of the self in a trusting relationship with the God-man. One outside of faith can perceive faith to be a paradox or find faith offensive; one must have faith to avoid offense and overcome the paradox. Chapter 1 focuses on the connection between Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms using his work The Point of View. In this chapter I map out Kierkegaard's method of communication and the purpose for his use of pseudonyms. Chapter 2 focuses on Johannes' view of faith in Fear and Trembling. Johannes says that faith is formed through a private relationship with God. One with faith is silent about this relationship from the point of view of one who is in the ethical. Johannes understands faith dialectically. Faith is a paradox to Johannes because he does not understand the justification for Abraham's action. Chapter 3 focuses on Anti-Climacus' view of faith in Practice in Christianity. Anti-Climacus presents a rigorous account of faith. He says faith is being a contemporary of the God-man and meeting the requirements of believing the God-man's words. When one becomes a contemporary with the God-man one can become offended by the God-1 Søren Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, trans.
An Enquiry into Kierkegaard's Concept of Faith
duo.uio.no
This Master’s Thesis aims at presenting a comprehensive picture of Kierkegaard’s concept of faith. It particularly stresses the fact that Kierkegaard argues for faith on an existential basis, and therefore tries to show how faith must not simply be understood as an absolute belief in God, but as a state that has a specific existential function. It argues, furthermore, that this function is to place man in a state of emotional autonomy, which it understands as a state wherein the individual is immune to being adversely affected emotionally by exterior circumstances – it is immune to angst and despair.
Faith and Knowledge: Remarks Inspired by Søren Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments
Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook
In this article, I present some reflections on the relationship between faith and knowledge in some of Kierkegaard’s works, primarily the Philosophical Fragments from 1844. I ask, what the project of Climacus consists in, and proceed to show that his opposition between faith and knowledge includes a number of decisions that are neither trivial nor particularly stable. By doing so, I want to present my own doubts as to whether the opposition between faith (by Climacus connected to history, becoming and paradox) and knowledge (connected to intellectual understanding, logic, timelessness and necessity) itself is reasonable. Based on the analysis, I argue that the texts authored by Climacus presuppose a substantial acquaintance with Christian thought and doctrine. This is only indirectly acknowledged by Climacus, and perhaps incompatible with his “thought-project.” Further, I discuss whether his denial of intellectual understanding of traditional Christian thought as a path to faith giv...
2009
Kierkegaard's writings are interspersed with remarkable stories of love, commonly understood as a literary device that illustrates the problematic nature of aesthetic and ethical forms of life, and the contrasting desirability of the life of faith. Sharon Krishek argues that for Kierkegaard the connection between love and faith is far from being merely illustrative. Rather, love and faith have a common structure, and are involved with one another in a way that makes it impossible to love well without faith. Remarkably, this applies to romantic love no less than to neighbourly love. Krishek's original and compelling interpretation of the Works of Love in the light of Kierkegaard's famous analysis of the paradoxicality of faith in Fear and Trembling shows that preferential love, and in particular romantic love, plays a much more important and positive role in his thinking than has usually been assumed.
Kierkegaard on Faith and Desire: The Limits of Christianity and the Human Heart
Kierkegaard on Faith and Desire: The Limits of Christianity and the Human Heart, 2021
This dissertation analyzes and evaluates several major productions by Danish philosopher and theologian Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855). It focuses on three works Kierkegaard authored under pseudonyms – Either / Or (1843), Fear and Trembling (1843), and Philosophical Fragments (1844) – and the non-pseudonymously authored Works of Love (1847). The dissertation argues that for Kierkegaard, Christian faith is a distinctive capacity of the individual human being that enables the individual to organize their desires and pursue the good life in a way that is qualitatively superior to what is available outside of Christianity. Through exegesis of Kierkegaard’s works, the dissertation identifies two elements of Kierkegaard’s presentation of Christian faith that recur throughout his authorship. The first is an axiom that undergirds Kierkegaard’s conception of the good life, namely that for the best possible life to be lived (that is, the Christian life), a person must ultimately be individually responsible for their own happiness or unhappiness. The second is a complex juxtaposition between Christianity and alternative, non-Christian worldviews (collectively called ‘Paganism’ by Kierkegaard) which Kierkegaard performs to provoke his reader into making the decision to affirm Christianity. If, with the assistance of God, the individual does so (that is, has faith), their desires and motivations are reorganized to enable a higher form of happiness and a new form of moral engagement (love for the neighbor). The dissertation characterizes this juxtaposition through a stagecraft analogy: the mechane, a crane that lifts a theater actor to simulate flight. The analogy highlights the relationship of asymmetrical dependence between Kierkegaard’s accounts of Christianity and non-Christian alternatives. For an actor to take flight (happiness) with the mechane (Christianity), the hoist (faith) that suspends them must be supported by a tension force from the ground (‘Paganism’). Faith requires awareness that the theological and anthropological scaffolding that makes Christian faith possible is transcendent and distinctive. But at the same time, to avoid compromising the transcendence and distinctiveness of faith, the individual cannot completely foreclose the possibility of that which Christianity negates, for example, through rational proofs or research into the historical origins of the Christian tradition.