Dewey : ' scientific method ' in the May Fourth era – China 1919 and after (original) (raw)

In the post-structuralist climate of 'Against Theory' and' Against Method', it seems more trendy and secure to deal with' theoretical anarchism' than those dated' law-and-order alternatives '. 1 This is what the late Paul de Man has to say about the incompatibility between truth and method: A question arises only if a tension develops between methods of understanding and the knowledge which those methods allow one to reach. If there is indeed something about literature, as such, which allows for a discrepancy between truth and method, between Wahrheit and Methode, then scholarship and theory are no longer compatible... For a method that cannot be made to suit the' truth' of its object can only teach delusion. 2 (Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory, p. 4) Here de Man echoes no doubt a strong critique of the ravishment of Geisteswissenschaften by the 'scientific method' since the nineteenth century, 3 in addition to his own reflection on the inherent aporia of literary language. However, given the essential prejudicial nature of human knowledge, it remains moot whether there can be any discrepancy between truth and method, whether there is Truth beyond a method, and indeed whether any method can be made otherwise than to suit its own truth. Let the argument stand unresolved and let me for the moment turn to Hu Shih (1891-1962). Why Hu Shih (yet once more!)? 4 The only sensible question today ought to be 'How not to talk about Hu Shih?' rather than' How to talk about him?' Everything that can be said has already been said. A little consciousness is surely a dangerous thing-talking about Hu Shih is tantamount to putting into one's mouth the same rhetoric of history /modernity 5 which had once implicated the revolutionary Hu Shih himself. That is, one is forever caught up in a Romantic irony, driven and derided by the desire to be unprecedented, as well as the fear of deja lu, of having already been forestalled. But when one is called upon to address a distinguished gathering on the suicidal topic of 'Research Methods in the May Fourth Era', whom else to begin with but Hu Shih who has insisted, consistently, on the use of an ill-defined scientific method? 6 Hu characterises his novum organum as experiential (which should be distinguished from empirical in the Deweyan context), inductive, verificatory, and evo lutionary. This' lucid' and' discriminating' new method has been variously labelled as pragmatism, instrumentalism, experimentalism, empiricism, positivism and utilitarianism. The confusion of terms results sometimes from Hu's own translation, e.g. 'empiricism' as shiyan pai 7 but 'pragmatism' as shiyan zhuyi; 8 sometimes from critics' difficulty in restoring from the Chinese the exact English terms Hu uses or has in mind on various occasions. A notable example is lishi taidu (the historical attitude) which only when Hu bothers to provide the source can one realise refers to 'the genetic method'. Since none of the aforementioned terms is of native Chinese origin, perhaps one should tackle the issue via Hu Shih's favourable attitude towards imported concepts. In July 1919, he remarks: 'I am all for the enterprise of importing doctrines and intellectual trends' (HSWC, II, 274). He specifically outlines the methodology of importation as involving the knowledge of (1) the milieu in which the doctrine originated, (2) the life and intellectual heritage of the person responsible for this doctrine, and (3) the effects (consequences) of the doctrine. The fulfillment of these three conditions constitutes the historical attitude (ibid., 378), in Hu's words, 'the genetic method' (HSWC, 1,296), which curiously is a 'product of the pragmatist's application of evolutionism to philosophy' (ibid.). In his introduction to American pragmatism (HSWC, I, 291-341), Hu focusses on the consequences and relevancy of concepts in both Charles S. Peirce and William James, and highlights the experimental and creative nature of experience in John Dewey. With Hu Shih, Dewey's methodology of pragmatism consists of the historical (genetic?) method and the experimental method. The latter always starts working from concrete facts and situations, and is based on the assumption that all theories are hypothetical in nature and as such can only be verified through practice (HSWC, I, 381). This experimental method is based on 'experimental thinking' or 'scientific reasoning', a 'conjoint process of analysis and synthesis '. 9 It is an enquiry procedure which is progressive, purposive, and essentially practical in orientation. 10 Since praxis is the ultimate arbiter of theoria, one may question the very usefulness of doing theory at all. This familiar topic has recently involved a dozen American critics from opposing camps11 although, after two generations which have witnessed at least two major paradigm shifts, viz. analytical philosophy and perhaps deconstruction, none of the new pragmatists-most of whom being literary critics rather than philosophers by profession-would subscribe to the scientific (in Richard Rorty's word, 'scientistic' 12) method coupled with evolutionism. Dewey himself has