From the perception of action to the understanding of intention (original) (raw)

Thesis: Representing Action and Intention

Uithol, S (2012) Representing Action and Intention, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands , 2012

After introducing the notions of ‘representation’, ‘action’ and ‘intention’ in Chapter 1, in Chapter 2 I investigate the process of content attribution to the firing of single mirror neurons. Single cell recordings in monkeys provide strong evidence for an important role of the motor system in action understanding, but although the data acquired from single cell recordings are generally considered to be robust, several debates have shown that the interpretation of these data is far from straightforward. Chapter 2 argues that, without principled restrictions, research based on single-cell recordings allows for unlimited content attribution to single mirror neurons. A theoretical analysis of the type of processing attributed to the mirror neuron system can help formulating restrictions on what mirroring is and what cognitive functions could, in principle, be explained by a mirror mechanism. It is argued that the processing at higher levels of abstraction needs assistance of non-mirroring processes to such an extent that subsuming the processes needed to infer goals from actions under the label ‘mirroring’ is not warranted. In humans single cell recordings are problematic. Therefore, activation of the motor areas upon action observation using fMRI or EEG is studied. The finding of this so called ‘motor resonance’ is generally regarded to be supportive for motor theories of action understanding. These theories take motor resonance to be essential in the understanding of observed actions and the inference of action goals. However, Chapter 3 shows that the notions of ‘resonance’, ‘action understanding' and ‘action goal’ appear to be used ambiguously in the literature. A survey of the literature on mirror neurons and motor resonance yields two different interpretations of the term resonance, three different interpretations of action understanding, and again three different interpretations of what the goal of an action is. This entails that, unless it is specified what interpretation is used, the meaning of any statement about the relation between these concepts can differ to a great extent. By discussing Umilta et al.’s (2001) well-known experiment on mirror neurons I show that more precise definitions and use of the concepts will allow for better assessments of motor theories of action understanding and hence a more fruitful scientific debate. Lastly, I provide an example of how the discussed experimental setup could be adapted, based on the preceding analysis, to test other interpretations of the concepts. Actions are commonly thought of as structured hierarchically. Chapter 4 analyses such hierarchies. In the literature two hierarchies are often posited: The first—the action hierarchy—is a decomposition of an action into sub-actions and sub-sub-actions. The second—the control hierarchy—is a postulated hierarchy in the neural control processes that are supposed to bring about the action. A general assumption in cognitive neuroscience is that these two hierarchies are internally consistent and provide complementary descriptions of neuronal control processes. In this chapter I show that that neither hierarchy offers a complete explanation and that they cannot be reconciled in a logical or conceptual way. Furthermore, neither pays proper attention to the dynamics and temporal aspects of neural control processes. I explore an alternative hierarchical organization in which causality is inherent in the dynamics over time. Specifically, high levels of the hierarchy encode slower (goal-related) representations, while lower levels represent faster (action and motor acts) kinematics. If employed properly, a hierarchy based on this principle is not subject to the problems that plague the traditional accounts. Chapter 5 analyzes the neural applicability of the notion of ‘intention’. Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of localizing intentions in the brain, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing representations of intentions. I argue, however, that it is doubtful that the folk notion of ‘intention’ applies to any particular physical process by which the brain initiates actions. Drawing on the analysis of Chapter 4, Pacherie’s account of intentions (Pacherie, 2006, 2008), and Koechlin’s model on action control (Koechlin et al, 1999, 2003) I show that the idea of a discrete state that causes an action is deeply incompatible with the dynamic organization of the prefrontal cortex, the presumed neural locus of the causation and control of actions. Discrete representations can at best, I will claim, play a subsidiary, stabilizing role in action planning, but this role is still incompatible with the folk notion of intention. This chapter concludes by arguing that the prevalence of the folk notion, including its intuitive appeal in neuroscientific explanations, stems from the central role intentions play in constructing intuitive explanations of our own and others’ behavior. Some future directions based on the presented analysis are sketched below. Finally, in Chapter 6 the ideas, results, and analyses of the previous chapters are applied to the field of developmental psychology. Intention reading and action understanding have been reported in ever-younger infants, but these findings are highly debated. In this chapter I set out to clarify the notions of ‘action understanding’ and ‘intention attribution’ and discuss their relation. I use the various forms of ‘action understanding’ from Chapter 3 and speculate on the mechanisms that could underlie these capacities. Based on Chapter 5 I argue that these forms of action understanding do not generally result in the attribution of an intention to an observed actor. By disentangling intention attribution from action understanding, and by exposing the latter as an umbrella notion, I provide a framework that allows for better comparing findings from different experimental paradigms.

Simulation and Understanding Other Minds

Philosophical Issues, 2016

There is much disagreement about how extensive a role theoretical mindreading, behavior-reading, and simulation each have and need to have in our knowing and understanding other minds, and how each method is implemented in the brain, but less discussion of the epistemological question what it is about the products of these methods that makes them count as knowledge or understanding. This question has become especially salient recently as some have the intuition that mirror neurons can bring understanding of another’s action despite involving no higher-order processing, whereas most epistemologists writing about understanding think that it requires reflective access to one’s grounds, which is closer to the intuitions of other commenters on mirror neurons. I offer a definition of what it is that makes something understanding that is compelling independently of the context of cognition of other minds, and use it to show two things: 1) that theoretical mind-reading and simulation bring understanding in virtue of the same epistemic feature, and 2) why the kind of motor representation without propositional attitudes that is done by mirror neurons is sufficient for action understanding. I further suggest that more attention should be paid to the potential disadvantages of a simulative method of knowing. Though it can be more efficient in some cases, it can also bring vulnerability, wear and tear on one’s personal equipment, and unintended mimicry.

Intention and Practical Thought

The philosophical questons about action concern its nature, its description and its explanation. The leading question are "Waht a theory of action is possible?", "Are reasons causes?", "What are practical thoughts?" and "What is the formal logic of practical inference?". Gerhard Preyer offers new answers of some old question about the description and the explanation of action and the logical structure of deliberation or practical reasoning which results from the theory of action since the 1950s years. It is argued that a theory of agent can provide an alternative to any theory postulating actions as irreducible entities metaphysically. The author's account presents intentions as states irreducible to beliefs and desires. The analysis places also a requirement on a fruitful description of the mind-body problem. Audience: Teachers and students (graduate and advanced undergraduate) in philosophy, particulary in the filed of philosophy of action, mind and moral philosophy. Also of interest to sociologists and psychologists. Can be used as a textbook for graduate and undergraduate courses in philosophy of action. https://humanities.verlags-shop.de/philosophie/intention-and-practical-thought---296.html

Mental Simulation as Affective-Cognitive Act

Borderless Philosophy, 2018

This article defends a form of mental simulation that is primarily enabled by imagination. Following Simulation Theory (ST), the claim that humans predict or explain behaviour of others by running mental simulations of others is taken as point of departure. However, one objection to this ST is that it rests on a clear and distinct, reliable form of introspective insight, so-called ‘Cartesian introspection’, since simulation outputs must be read and interpreted. The line of thinking developed in this article questions Cartesian introspection and claims a central role for the imagination in predicting behaviour of others. The conception that Cartesian introspection plays a crucial role in simulation is questioned, and is shown to stem from presuppositions about mental processes. Moreover, the idea that mental simulation and direct introspection are inextricably entangled is rejected, and the imagination is proposed as main capacity underlying mental simulation. The imagination is discussed as an intentional act that enables human beings to quickly to represent selected aspects of someone else from a chosen perspective, a constitutive glance that has narrative features. These features allow simulators to create feasible storylines for predicting or explaining behaviour of others, integrating disparate observations into coherent narratives that serve as rough-and-ready heuristics. Drawing on David Hume’s work on sympathy, it is argued that imagination allows for having affective-cognitive mental states. These mental states combine rational and affective properties, providing simulators with theoretical information about their target, allowing them to approximate the experience of what it feels like to be in a certain physical or mental state. In turn, the affective-cognitive character enabled by imagination provides mental simulation with a high degree of fidelity that significantly differs from pure ratiocination about behaviour, as the affective aspects allow for more purposive and accurate representation of other’s intentions.

Conscious thought as simulation of behaviour and perception

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2002

A ‘simulation’ theory of cognitive function can be based on three assumptions about brain function. First, behaviour can be simulated by activating motor structures, as during an overt action but suppressing its execution. Second, perception can be simulated by internal activation of sensory cortex, as during normal perception of external stimuli. Third, both overt and covert actions can elicit perceptual simulation of their normal consequences. A large body of evidence supports these assumptions. It is argued that the simulation approach can explain the relations between motor, sensory and cognitive functions and the appearance of an inner world.