Shattering the Single European Sky: Argument from authorities in dealing with the SES initiative (original) (raw)
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This article examines the internal decision-making process in the European Union with regard to the 2007 EU-US Open Skies Agreement. By exploring the principal-agent relation between the European Commission and the member states, it analyses the constraints and opportunities the Commission faced in avoiding an involuntary defection. Based on interviews and document research, the process-tracing in the article reveals that the main constraints for the Commission were the high degree of political sensitivity in certain member states, the struggle over external aviation competences, and an ambitious mandate. However, during the process, the Commission was able to overcome these constraints by making use of the following opportunities: closely involving the member states in its negotiation task and increasing the cost of no agreement for the member states, not at least by making an appeal to European allies, such as the Court of Justice, the Presidency, and member states with Commission-like preferences.
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The unexpected approval in 1986 of the Single European Act and its program for completing the European Community's internal market by 1992 did not, according to the historical data presented in this article, result from an elite alliance of the European Community Commission, European Parliament, and pan-European business groups. Instead, it rested on interstate bargains involving Britain, France, and Germany, for which the two essential preconditions were the convergence of European economic policy prescriptions following the French turnaround in 1983 and the bargaining leverage that France and Germany gained by threatening to create a “two-track” Europe and exclude Britain. This suggests that theories stressing supranational factors, including certain variants of neofunctionalism, should be supplanted by an “intergovernmental institutionalise” approach combining a realist emphasis on state power and national interests with a proper appreciation of the important role of domestic...
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