Illiberalism as Constitutional Identity – the Case of Hungary (original) (raw)
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Chapter 6: Constitutional Identity? The Hungarian Model of Illiberal Democracy
Springer eBooks, 2016
By connecting to ongoing scholarly discussions on conceptualizing "illiberal democracy" and analyzing the phenomenon of anti-democratic backlash in post-2010 Hungary, this chapter seeks to provide a description and an analysis of the "Hungarian model of illiberal democracy". Throughout this text, "illiberal" is understood as a privative prefix, referring to a constitutional and political condition that creates a unique middle ground between a constitutional democracy and an autocracy. It is argued that that the "Hungarian illiberal democracy" is neither a construct of constitutional philosophy, nor is it a principle for constitutional design, nor is it characteristically illiberal within the interpretative framework of political theory. Rather, it is a tool to channel, define and dominate general political discourse and to provide a discursive framework for political identification and ideologically biased, yet divergent and ad hoc legislation. It is argued that "illiberalism" is actually a form of constitutional identity, the discursive framework of this new political community that the Orbán-regime claims to have established. The morphosis of this Hungarian model for illiberal democracy manifests itself normatively through value preferences expressed in the new constitution, as well as in a quasi-normative political declaration that serves as a manifesto for the new political community it envisages. Terminology and conceptualization In his seminal essay in which he argues that liberalism, either as a conception of political liberty or as a doctrine about economic policy, does not necessarily coincide with democracy, Fareed Zakaria (1997) defines liberal democracy as a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by rule of law, separation of powers, and the protections of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property. Scholarly discussion on definitions has burgeoned in the past years. As Rupnik and Zielonka (2013) and Collier and Levitsky (1997) argue, authors often qualify the term democracy by adding adjectives such as liberal (or illiberal), deliberative, representative, participatory, delegative, façade, direct (or indirect), electoral, hybrid, Western, Islamic, managed (Anderson 2007), et cetera. Others refer to electoral or competitive autocracies (Shevtsova, 2000; Levitsky and Way, 2010). Following Mill (1993) and Huntington (1991) in their recent analysis, which serves as a starting point for this assessment, Csillag and Szelényi (2015) define liberalism and democracy as two distinct dimensions of good governance, identifying "liberalism" with separation of powers and the security of private property rights, and "democracy" as majoritarian rule. They do not explicitly define illiberal democracy, but describe the features of the "emergent illiberal postcommunist systems" in political terms, and claim that as long as democratic institutions operate and leaders are elected to office, the ruling elites of these "illiberal democracies need a legitimating ideology which can appeal to a broader electorate". In their genealogy of what they call "post-communist managed illiberal democracy", where property relations shift from private property and market capitalism to neo-patrimonial and eventually neo-prebendal property relations, they argue that the core distinguishing feature is this ideology, which they call post-communist traditionalist or neo-conservative (pp. 21-22).
Illiberal Democracies in the EU: the Visegrad Group and the Risk of Disintegration., 2017
Since 2010, Hungarian democracy has been fundamentally transformed, and most observers agree that the quality has decreased in this time. Most critics of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, of the Fidesz party, felt vindicated when, in a major speech in 2014, he outlined his vision of building an “illiberal democracy” in Hungary. The goal of this study is to analyse some of the factors that made it possible that the Orbán government could go on its illiberal way relatively easily. Therefore, the first part of the study presents the Hungarian public attitudes concerning socioeconomic changes twenty-five years on from the country’s regime change and also tries to explain how shifting perceptions of the systemic changes, democracy and capitalism laid the foundation for the implementation of illiberal domestic policies following 2010. This will be followed by the description of some of the key moves of the Hungarian government since 2010 that indicate what the building process of an illiberal democracy looks like in practice. The third section will analyse whether the Eurosceptic standpoint of Viktor Orbán’s government has had an influence on the attitudes of the Hungarian population towards the European Union. Finally, there will be discussion of what conclusions can be drawn from the general disappointment of the Hungarians with the regime change, democracy and capitalism, and how trust in democracy could be improved in Hungary in the future.
The identitarian roots of Hungarian illiberalism
Jean Monnet Chair Working Papers in Political Sociology 3, Jean Monnet Project EUPOLSOC, 2020
The study examines Hungary’s “illiberal turn” and the new-old geopolitical imaginaries which its rulers have been constructing. Since its landslide victory in 2010, the Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance, led by the charismatic prime minister Viktor Orbán has been transforming Hungary’s political system in ways that have drawn significant international criticism. Orbán clashed with the European Union on issues of domestic constitutional change as well as on the migrant redistribution quotas during the 2015 European migration crisis. Over the years he has become one of Europe’s key ideologues of Euroskepticism and antiliberalism. His vision of an illiberal Europe has also gained traction with audiences outside of Hungary.
This MA thesis draws on insights from the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to examine how in 2010-2011 the Hungarian government unilaterally rewrote the country's constitution as a prelude to the creation of an "illiberal" regime. Focusing mainly on the constitution's preamble or "National Avowal", it is argued that the text forms a hybrid textual construct that draws upon elements from both pluralist "constitutions" and value-monistic religious "creeds". Uncharacteristically for a constitutional text, the National Avowal also employs ambiguous language and thinly-veiled allusion that allows party politicians to create legal uncertainty and equivocate before multi-various audiences. In this way, the text positively asserts the ruling party’s democratic legitimacy, but also suggests an engagement in identity politics and the reorganization of the citizenry along illiberal lines of inclusion and exclusion. The analysis refers mostly to the text's official English translation, but where necessary details problems of equivalence that affect interpretation and analysis.
Orbánism: The Culture of Illiberalism in Hungary
Ethnologia Europaea , 2020
The 2016 election victory of Donald Trump and the UK referendum on 23 June 2016 to leave the European Union (Brexit) both signal tremendous alterations in global politics. What really connects these international changes to the steady popularity of Viktor Orbán in Hungary? This article describes how a newly emerging and growing transnational political process known as illiberal democracy has influenced Hungary and other states since the late 1990s. By utilizing fieldwork materials from the mid-to late-2010s, it is asserted that both the process of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump have boosted not only the legitimacy of extreme right but contributed to the solidification of illiberalism in Hungary.
The paper deals with recent deviations from the shared values of constitutionalism towards a kind of 'populist, illiberal constitutionalism' introduced by Hungary's new constitution in 2011. The populism of FIDESZ was directed against all elites, including the ones that designed the 1989 constitutional system (in which FIDESZ also participated), claiming that it was time for a new revolution. This is why PM Viktor Orbán characterized the results of the 2010 elections as a 'revolution of the ballot boxes'. His intention with this revolution was to eliminate all checks and balances, and even the parliamentary rotation of governing parties. His vision for a new constitutional order-one in which his political party occupies the centre stage of Hungarian political life and puts an end to debates over values-has now been entrenched in the new constitution. The paper argues that this current Hungarian constitutional system was made possible by FIDESZ' anti-pluralist nationalist populism, but is not necessarily based on a true commitment to expressing the will of the people via 'illiberal constitutionalism'. The populist government rather misuses the country's lack of constitutional culture. Adherence to constitutional patriotism would mean that FIDESZ would have to endorse what John Rawls once called 'constitutional essentials'. The core of this kind of constitutional patriotism is a constitutional culture centred on universalist liberal-democratic norms and values. Instead, the current Hungarian constitutional system is confronted with unconstitutional patriotism, a kind of nationalism that violates constitutional essentials in the name of 'national constitutional identity'.
Hungarian Nationalist Populism and Illiberalism
This paper is dealing with the case of Hungarian nationalist populism and illiberalism which gained its last landslide electoral success in April 2018. I am investigating the contemporary nationalist populism in Hungary in the context of agonizing liberal democracy. I am convinced that the organic crisis of liberal democracy before 2010 has lead the creation of hybrid political regime in Hungary which is based on the permanent state of exception. This paper based on the political theoretical, social and critical theoretical literature. The Hungarian nationalist populism cannot be understood without the situation behind, that is why I am investigating in the first part of this paper the historical tradition of the regime and the wide context as the collapse of liberal democracy and the era of populism. After that I will analyze the political theories of the Orbán’s regime: the concept of Carl Schmitt, the leader democracy and political constitutionalism. In the third part the “System of National Cooperation” has been detailed analyzed: its electoral success (2010, 2014, 2018), the main characteristics and consequences. Concluding the paper, I will rise the question: what can the EU do with such a nationalist-populist and illiberal system? Dealing with this problem the theoretical (the EU as an externally coordinator) and practical (EU Rule of Law Mechanisms) assumption will be investigated here. My main concern is that without a serious political turn in Hungary (creating an anti-hegemony against the Orbán’s regime) the EU would not achieve success fighting for rule of law.
Illiberal Constitutionalism? The Hungarian Constitution in a European Perspective
The paper deasl with recent deviations from the shared values of rule of law and democracy – the ‘basic structure’ of Europe – in Hungary. The starting point of deviation is Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union, which demands “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and […] human rights including the rights of minorities”. The current Hungarian constitutional system, the paper argues constitutes a new, hybrid type of regime, between the ideal of a full-fledged democracy and a totalitarian regime. The problem with this is that the country is currently member of the European Union, which considers itself to be a union based on the principles of liberal democratic constitutionalism.