Draft Deterring States and Non State Actors: Lessons for Hamas (original) (raw)

Abstract

How do battlefield outcomes convert to strategic deterrence stability? Does the use of traditional tools of conventional deterrence, tools such as punishment, denial, or cumulative deterrence, lead to strategically successful deterrence outcomes against states and non-state actors, or does such an outcome depend on battlefield victory? And, if the latter, under what circumstances? Policy makers and scholars interested in how conventional deterrence works against states and non-state actors (NSAs) cannot provide a reassuring answer. Israeli policy makers have long been puzzled

FAQs

AI

What new insights does longitudinal analysis provide on deterrence success?add

The study reveals that understanding deterrence success requires analyzing historical rivalries longitudinally, highlighting critical shifts in dynamics. Successful deterrence often arises from battlefield victories that shape adversaries' perceptions over time.

How does the credibility problem impact deterrence effectiveness against NSAs?add

The research indicates that the credibility problem must be resolved through significant military victories to achieve effective deterrence against non-state actors. If the adversary doubts the defender's resolve, it continues to challenge regardless of threats.

What causal mechanisms lead to strategic deterrence stability according to the findings?add

The paper identifies three pathways to stability: major escalations establishing credibility, strategic disengagement to avoid attrition, and targeted counter-strategies against challengers. These elements collectively facilitate the transformation of deterrence dynamics.

How have previous military operations influenced Israel's deterrence strategy against Hamas?add

Operations like Protective Walls exemplify ongoing failures in achieving deterrence, prompting shifts to cumulative strategies focused on denial. This evolution suggests a persistent lack of long-term deterrence stability against Hamas despite military engagements.

What challenges have states encountered in applying cumulative deterrence theory?add

The research highlights that reliance on cumulative deterrence often leads to attrition traps, undermining overall effectiveness. Continuous tactical denial has frequently failed to produce lasting deterrence outcomes against versatile non-state actors.

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