PHYSICS, SEMIOTICS AND ONTOLOGY REALITY AND COMPLEX THINKING (original) (raw)
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It will be shown in this article that an ontological approach for some problems related to the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (QM) could emerge from a re-evaluation of the main paradox of early Greek thought: the paradox of Being and non-Being, and the solutions presented to it by Plato and Aristotle. More well known are the derivative paradoxes of Zeno: the paradox of motion and the paradox of the One and the Many. They stem from what was perceived by classical philosophy to be the fundamental enigma for thinking about the world: the seemingly contradictory results that followed from the co-incidence of being and non-being in the world of change and motion as we experience it, and the experience of absolute existence here and now. The most clear expression of both stances can be found, again following classical thought, in the thinking of Heraclitus of Ephesus and Parmenides of Elea. The problem put forward by these paradoxes reduces for both Plato and Aristotle to the possibility of the existence of stable objects as a necessary condition for knowledge. Hence the primarily ontological nature of the solutions they proposed: Plato's Theory of Forms and Aristotle's metaphysics and logic. Plato's and Aristotle's systems are argued here to do on the ontological level essentially the same: to introduce stability in the world by introducing the notion of a separable, stable object, for which a 'principle of contradiction' is valid: an object cannot be and not-be at the same place at the same time. So it becomes possible to forbid contradiction on an epistemological level, and thus to guarantee the certainty of knowledge that seemed to be threatened before. After leaving Aristotelian metaphysics, early modern science had to cope with these problems: it did so by introducing "space" as the seat of stability, and "time" as the theater of motion. But the ontological structure present in this solution remained the same. Therefore the fundamental notion 'separable system', related to the notions observation and measurement, themselves related to the modern concepts of space and time, appears to be intrinsically problematic, because it is inextricably connected to classical logic on the ontological level. We see therefore the problems dealt with by quantum logic not as merely formal, and the problem of 'non-locality' as related to it, indicating the need to re-think the notions system, entity, as well as the implications of the operation 'measurement', which is seen here as an application of classical logic (including its ontological consequences) on the material world. contradiction between the "worldviews" of Heraclitus of Ephesus and Parmenides of Elea, are in use up to the present, be it in slightly modified forms 2 . Our position will be that this classical contradiction has slipped through the ages unimpaired, but in different forms, such as to make it hardly recognisable in our present epistemological and ontological concepts, both in philosophy and in science. A revelation of this implicit presence by reconstructing the outlines of its historical pathway then becomes the necessary first step towards an approach for the tackling of problems it eventually causes in to-day's science. The argument will lead us to the conclusion that the paradoxes appearing in QM represent such a problem. A sketch of some possible strategies will complete this attempt at clarification. Methodologically therefore the arguments in this paper will be based both on scientific and philosophical grounds; even more, it can be considered our aim to show that, when it comes to a proper understanding of the significance and implications of basic "scientific" findings, both are inextricably intertwined, since science, seemingly so different, follows a path of deep conceptions laid down much earlier in the development of human consciousness. We are tempted to see the origins of the QM-paradoxes as consequences of the ontological "choices" of Plato and Aristotle. Their effort concerned the stabilisation of the world of constant change, thus saving the possibility of certain knowledge in order to escape the contradictions between stable and unstable, knowable and unknowable that appear on the level of what happens in reality, as expressed mainly by Heraclitus and Parmenides. This led to the conception of logic as a standardising rule for thinking and, much later, experiment as a standardising rule for experiencing ([34], IV: 99, p. 381). Both originated out of needs felt in the context of the macroworld, and reach now their limitations in the study of the microworld. At the moment when the interactions between things become as important as the things themselves, the separating intervention in reality, first conceptualised by Plato and Aristotle, seems to reveal itself as an illusion. For this reason in this paper no position will be taken in the debate between rationalists and empiricists. From our point of view these philosophical stances come down to the same on the level of the ontological question: all imply the metaphysical world-structure put forward by Plato and Aristotle as a solution for the ontological paradoxes raised by pre-Socratic thought.