There is no “point” in decision-making: a model of transactive rationality for public policy and administration (original) (raw)
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There is no "point" in decision-making: a model of transactive rationality for public policy
2010
The hope that policy-making is a rational process lies at the heart of policy science and democratic practice. However, what constitutes rationality is not clear. In policy deliberations, scientific, democratic, moral, and ecological concerns are often at odds. Harold Lasswell, in instituting the contemporary policy sciences, found that John Dewey's pragmatist philosophy provided an integrative foundation that took into account all these considerations. As the policy sciences developed with a predominantly empirical focus on discrete aspects of policy-making, this holistic perspective was lost for a while. Contemporary theorists are reclaiming pragmatist philosophy as a framework for public policy and administration. In this article, key postulates of pragmatist philosophy are transposed to policy science by developing a new theoretical model of transactive rationality. This model is developed in light of current policy analyses, and against the backdrop of three classical policy science theories of rationality: linear and bounded rationalism; incrementalism; and mixed-scanning. Transactive rationality is a ''fourth approach'' that, by integrating scientific, democratic, moral, and ecological considerations, serves as a more holistic, explanatory, and normative guide for public policy and democratic practice.
Rationality in Policy Decision Making
Policy decisions should be rational but sometimes they are not. The same goes for policy advice, according to critics who use the word “rational” in particular ways. The task in this chapter is to build a concise yet nuanced account of rationality in policy decision making that counters shallower complaints while providing points of departure for deeper critical probing. The chapter begins by discussing implied links between policy analysis and science. It then explores the substantive and procedural dimensions of policy decision making, and the distinct roles of analysts and decision makers. It reviews progress in developing tools for rational policy analysis, confronts the normative divide between adherents of theoretical and practical reason, shows how public participation can augment the rationality of public decisions, and closes by noting that the status of rationality in public decision making is insecure.
Multiple Rationalities in Public Policymaking: Considerations for Decisionmakers
Academy of Management Proceedings, 1978
From the classical decision model of planning (Friedmann, 1969), logics of four types of decisionmakers-policymakers, program implementors, planners and evaluators-are explored within hypothetical decisionmaking contexts. Issues of high technical and political complexity are predictable arenas for conflict, suggesting the need for diagnostic skills and appropriate group processes.
Environment and Planning A, 2011
It appears that recent debates within human geography, and the broader social sciences, concerning the more-than-rational constitution of human decision making are now being paralleled by changes in the ways in which public policy makers are conceiving of and addressing human behaviour. This paper focuses on the rise of so-called Behaviour Change policies in public policy in the UK. Behaviour Change policies draw on the behavioural insights being developed within the neuro-sciences, behavioural economics, and psychology. These new behavioural theories suggest not only that human decision making relies on a previously overlooked irrational component, but that the irrationality of decision making is sufficiently consistent to enable effective public policy intervention into the varied times and spaces that surround human decisions. This paper charts the emergence of Behaviour Change policies within a range of British public policy sectors, and the political and scientific antecedents ...
Rationalism and public policy: Mode of analysis or symbolic politics?
Policy and Society, 2011
This article takes up the distinction between incremental analysis and incremental politics as elaborated by Lindblom in his 1979 article. We argue that while rationalism as a mode of analysis has lost much of its prominence, rationalism as symbolic politics is still very much alive and might even be more present today than it was back when Lindblom wrote his famous 1959 article. The recent shift to new modes of governance whereby elected officials are increasingly delegating decision-making powers to independent bureaucracies -what Majone calls the ''regulatory state'' or what the British describe as ''agencification'' or quangoisation'' -has created an important legitimacy deficit for those non-majoritarian institutions that exercise political authority without enjoying any direct link to the electoral process. In such a context -and in addition to growing public distrust towards partisan politics -rationalist politics is likely to become more rampant as independent bureaucracies lack the legitimacy to publicly recognize the fundamentally incrementalist -and thus values-laden -nature of their decision-making processes.
The Methods of Applied Philosophy and the Tools of the Policy Sciences
International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2011
In this paper I argue that applied philosophers hoping to develop a stronger role in public policy formation can begin by aligning their methods with the tools employed in the policy sciences. I proceed first by characterizing the standard view of policymaking and policy education as instrumentally oriented toward the employment of specific policy tools. I then investigate pressures internal to philosophy that nudge work in applied philosophy toward the periphery of policy debates. I capture the dynamics of these pressures by framing them as the "dilemma dilemma" and the "problem problem." Seeking a remedy, I turn to the interdisciplinarity of a unique approach to policymaking generally known as the "policy sciences." Finally, I investigate the case of bioethics, an instance where philosophy has made decent headway with policymakers. From this I draw parallels to public policy. I suggest that because the policy sciences are essentially an alchemist' s brew of academic fields, and because philosophy covers many of the foundational questions associated with these fields, it is only natural that applied philosophers should begin collaborations with other applied academics by adopting the strategies that have so successfully applied in other theoretical fields.