The Other Relativism (original) (raw)
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Relativism: a conceptual analysis
ABSTRACT Relativism: a conceptual analysis Vittorio Villa In my paper I will try, in the first part, to give a conceptual definition of relativism, with the aim of singling out the possible basic elements common to all the most relevant relativist conceptions. In conformity with my definition, we have to qualify as “relativistic” all the conceptions according to which all or a relevant part of – cognitive, semantic, ethic, cultural, etc. - criteria and beliefs are necessary dependent on a given context (paradigm, culture, language, conceptual scheme, etc.) that is by its turn chosen as point of reference. From this point of view it is “absolutism” which stands in radical opposition to relativism. In the second part of the paper I will deal with some important critical observations which have been recurrently aroused against relativism. From this point of view, a quite serious problem arises from the fact that many relativists would like to have the chance, at least in some important cases, of expressing some objective judgments, for instance in terms of ethically “right” or “wrong”, or in terms of empirically “true” or “false”. In the third part of my paper, in order to answer to this difficulty, I will propose a sketch of a viable and coherent relativistic conception: a conception that doesn’t incorporate at all absolutist elements and that nevertheless could be able to explain the presence of a common core of criteria and beliefs in all our conceptual schemes and beliefs. Two distinctions are of particular importance here: firstly, the distinction between local conceptual schemes and long term frameworks, through which it is possible to clarify that even the most stable and consolidated beliefs common to our conceptual schemes are after all relative; secondly, the distinction between environment (the commonly shared source of our stimulations and perceptions) and world (the subject of our linguistic and theoretical representations, which is always a human construction). Through this last distinction it becomes possible, in my opinion, to speak, even inside a coherent relativist epistemological conception, of the existence of an objective reality. Vittorio Villa
Introduction (Viewpoint Relativism)
Viewpoint Relativism, 2020
Epistemological relativism is a vast field of research that is composed of the relativity of truth, knowledge, reality and rationality. In this book, I will discuss all of these fields, but this book is not meant to be a general overview of epistemological relativism. Its aim, instead, is to present a new approach to relativism that is based on the concept of points of view. For that I will present a precise definition of points of view in this book: In a point of view, an aspect represents an object for a subject. This means that points of view are always about choosing the features of an object. Viewpoint relativism is the hypothesis that epistemic questions are viewpoint-dependent. Therefore, we cannot answer, for example, whether statement p is justified without referring to a point of view. This hypothesis does not support global relativism, according to which all epistemic questions are viewpoint-dependent. The general criticism that relativism disproves itself does not apply to the local relativism that I endorse. Very often, relativism’s critics assume that according to relativism, all points of view (or frameworks) are equally as good. In reality, not many relativists support this kind of extreme relativism, and I myself reject it by demonstrating that points of view can be compared and weighed using different criteria. Relativists do accept that there are no neutral criteria with which to choose points of view.
One could say of relativism what Hermann Ebbinghaus once observed with respect to psychology: to wit, that it has a "long past but a short history" (1908, 3). Although relativistic motifs have always played a significant role in philosophy, their systematic investigation-and thus the explicit formulation of different forms and strengths of relativism-is a child only of the twentieth century. Perhaps one could even maintain that most of the really important, detailed and systematic work on relativism was done by philosophers alive today. This volume documents both the long past and the short history of relativism.
Philosophical Studies, 2007
Recent years have brought relativistic accounts of knowledge, first-person belief, and future contingents to prominence. I discuss these views, distinguish non-trivial from trivial forms of relativism, and then argue against relativism in all of its substantive varieties. ''point of assessment'' and false relative to another. Now Mark Richard (2004) argues that ''claims'' expressed with gradable adjectives demand relativistic treatment, and Mac-Farlane and Richard both advocate relativist accounts of assertions or claims of knowledge. My purpose here is to distinguish substantive forms of relativism from their insubstantial cousins and to argue against relativism in all of its substantive incarnations. Of course, a fully adequately response to the above authors would involve a defense of non-relativistic accounts of first-person belief, future contingents, and knowledge; and no single paper could hope to effectively accomplish this task. Thus, I will admit at the start that for all I will
Relativism, Perspectivism, and the Universal Epistemic Language
Philosophy of the History of Philosophy, 2024
Recent research gives perspectivism the status of a stand-alone epistemological research program. As part of this development, it must be distinguished from other epistemologies, especially relativism. Not only do relativists and perspectivists use a similar vocabulary-even the supposed tenets (features of the doctrine) seem to partially overlap. To clarify the relation between these programs, I suggest drawing two important distinctions. The first is between the (1) terminological and (2) doctrinal components of epistemologies, the second between the (2a) analytical and (2b) synthetical doctrinal elements. The method of the originalistic linguistic analysis that I introduce in this article shows that both relativism and perspectivism are using the same matrix of interconnected linguistic expressions that belong to what I call the universal epistemic language. Furthermore, this method reveals which doctrinal components necessarily follow from this linguistic basis and the terms "relativism" and "perspectivism" and which are a result of deliberate philosophical constructions. As for the linguistic basis and analytical doctrinal components, relativism and perspectivism are complementary members of one epistemology. Doctrinal additions that transform the original meaning of the terms "relativism" and "perspectivism", such as "indifferentism" and "non-absolutism", should be always explicitly mentioned to avoid confusion and strawmen debates in philosophy.