Disentangling legislative duration in coalitional presidential systems (original) (raw)
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LASA2019 Congress Papers, 2019
Today it is well documented how Brazilian presidents gather political support from the Congress and have their bills approved. However, little is known about the factors that help Brazilian congressmen take a bill forward and several times approved in a busy legislative environment. Taking into account that proposal and approval of bills are important for a legislator career, understanding who are the congressmen more prone to have legislative success matters. In this paper it is examined the approval of legislators' bills in Brazilian Chamber of Deputies considering the effects of policy substance, partisan power resources and position towards government-if a deputy belongs to government coalition or to opposition. The analysis of policy substance seeks to measure the probability of certain types of policy areas to be approved above others. In turn, partisan power resources focus on the impact of the amount of party seats on promoting a legislator legislative success. Finally, position towards government looks forward to observe if belonging to government coalition increases the chances of success. It is analyzed bills presented by deputies during the 53th Legislature (2007-2010), a period characterized by the largest legislator legislative production in Brazil post-1988.