Merging the Great Patriotic War and Russian warfare in Ukraine. A case-study of Russian military patriotic clubs in (original) (raw)
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Weaponizing History. Russia's War in Ukraine and the Role of Historical Narratives.
Weaponizing History. Russia's War in Ukraine and the Role of Historical Narratives., 2022
This paper deals with Weaponizing History in the Russo-Ukranian War in diachronic perspective focusing on the events of 2014 and 2022. It shall be demonstrated that in 2014 it was medieval narratives that were the main focus: For instance, in the presidential speech addressed to the Federal Assembly on December 4, 2014, the annexation of Crimea was legitimized by the disputed "Korsun Legend". This firmly established narrative has made it possible to proclaim Crimea to be the cradle of the Russian nation and a sacred place. In the recent war Putin invokes the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) which has been developed into a central place of remembrance in his regime and according to which Ukraine is to be denazified and delegitimized as a product of Bolshevism. It is significant to note that these narratives synchronize and harmonize rather well with one another in the collective historical consciousness of Russians. Keywords (ab)uses of historical memory-politicization of history-history wars-Russkiy Mir-Putinism-annexation of Crimea-Russo-Ukrainian War
Soviet mythology and memory of WWII as an instruments of Russian propaganda
2016
The Soviet Union’s victory in World War II has become a cornerstone of Russian national identity building process, especially under the rule of Putin, which has actively exploited it to mobilize support for the current political regime in the Kremlin. The heritage of victory in 1945 is the basis used to represent Russia as a great power and claim a special position for it in Europe. History and the past are symbolic resources, which have become instruments for achieving political goals and strongly influence politics in Russia. Russian propaganda has actively utilized Soviet mythology and the narrative of the Cold War to frame cur-rent events in Ukraine. Any challenge to the myth of victory in World War II amounts to a threat to Russian hegemony in the post-Soviet space and, even more directly, as a danger to the existence of Russia as a state.
Naming the War and Framing the Nation in Russian Public Discussion
Canadian Slavonic Papers, 2012
War have led to a new competition of hegemonic interpretations of history and national memory. In particular this has happened in the former socialist Eastern European countries (notably in the Baltic States, Poland, and Western Ukraine) where there has been a big demand to establish a new state identity distancing these countries from the socialist past. For the Russian socio-cultural and political environment the given identity political demand has created a challenging terrain in which symbolic, and irrevocably political, resources for national identity are forced to be calibrated in line with domestic and its ramifications has been the most notable manifestation, which exhibits the political significance of history in these identity debates. In order to grasp the manifestations of this significance, this article (Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina T Vtoraia mirovaia voina, VMV) in the Russian mainstream media over the course of the last ten years. For this purpose the Integrum databases (Russian-language media corpus of more than 400 million documents) provide a productive tool for specified queries related to VOV and VMV allowing the examination of major themes that these two terms activate in the Russian public discourse. We argue that whereas canonized framework for discussing the war within society, it is the VMV which figures discussion. In relation to broader identity political context, the study expands the question of how the era of the Second World War is treated in Russia, and the potential limits of this discussion.
Fundamental changes in Europe's political map following the end of the Cold War have led to a new competition of hegemonic interpretations of history and national memory. In particular this has happened in the former socialist Eastern European countries (notably in the Baltic States, Poland, and Western Ukraine) where there has been a big demand to establish a new state identity distancing these countries from the socialist past. For the Russian socio-cultural and political environment the given identity political demand has created a challenging terrain in which symbolic, and irrevocably political, resources for national identity are forced to be calibrated in line with domestic and foreign policy concerns. In this regard, the public usage of " The Great Patriotic War " and its ramifications has been the most notable manifestation, which exhibits the political significance of history in these identity debates. In order to grasp the manifestations of this significance, this article examines the uses of the terms " The Great Patriotic War " (Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina, VOV) and " The Second World War " (Vtoraia mirovaia voina, VMV) in the Russian mainstream media over the course of the last ten years. For this purpose the Integrum databases (Russian-language media corpus of more than 400 million documents) provide a productive tool for specified queries related to VOV and VMV allowing the examination of major themes that these two terms activate in the Russian public discourse. We argue that whereas the VOV signifies the " inner " canonized framework for discussing the war within society, it is the VMV which figures as VOV's counterpoint in terms of activating " outer " frameworks for the war's public discussion. In relation to the broader identity political context, the study expands the question of how the era of the Second World War is treated in Russia, and the potential limits of this discussion.
A Foundation for Russia? Memories of World War II for Young Russians
Nationalities Papers, 2022
How do young Russians relate to World War II and the violence of the wartime period? This article explores the degree to which societal and elite-driven narratives about history converge in the context of a crucial historical anniversary. We demonstrate that the memory of World War II serves as an integrative historical event for an abstract, temporally transcendent idea of Russia. Our analysis draws on focus groups conducted among young people of different political orientation in June 2019, survey data targeting urban youth, conducted over three consecutive years (2018-2020), and cultural artifacts such as film and literature. There is significant overlap between the views that young people express about victory and commemoration and the prevailing cultural, political, educational, and historical discourses. However, there is significant controversy when it comes to the actual ways in which the current political regime remembers the victory, the role of Stalin, and how to understand violence against the civilian population. The shared historical view that the Putin regime has created therefore remains contested. Disagreement limits the extent to which memory can be a foundation for today's political Russia as young respondents differentiate between their support for an abstract ideal of Russia and the existing political system.
Political Invasions into Collective Memories: Russia
This article analyzes the political manipulations of Vladimir Putin’s regime using the collective memory of World War II to undermine protest potential within Russian society in 2013–2015. In light of the unfolding Ukrainian protests against former president Viktor Yanukovych’s rule, Putin’s government has launched a massive propaganda campaign presenting the Ukrainian political resistance as a neofascist initiative. Given the close relationship between Russia and Ukraine and Putin’s low rating at the beginning of 2013, the political changes in Ukraine could provoke a similar public response and inspire anti-Putin insurgencies. The Russian media has established a strong correlation between fascist war crimes committed during World War II and the activities of protesters, thus trying to manipulate the Russian collective memory. Emphasizing the negative experience while repressing positive memories, media outlets have selectively presented historical events and facts in order to establish a negative image of the situation in modern Ukraine. Whereas propaganda associates Putin with war winners and the Soviet legacy, Ukrainian protesters are depicted as the ancestors of the defeated Nazi regime.
Introduction: War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus
Julie Fedor, Markku Kangaspuro, Jussi Lassila, and Tatiana Zhurzhenko (eds), War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2017
This introductory essay begins with a discussion of World War II memory in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, in light of the recent and ongoing war in Ukraine. It outlines the main contours of the interplay between “memory wars” and real war, and the important “post-Crimean” qualitative shift in local memory cultures in this connection. Next, the essay sketches out the specifics of the war memory landscapes of the region, and then of each of the three individual countries, before moving on to introduce the key organizing themes and findings of the book.
Digital War, 2022
The participatory affordances of digital media allow a broad spectrum of new forms of participation in conflicts that go beyond the information domain (Boichak in Battlefront volunteers: mapping and deconstructing civilian resilience networks in Ukraine. #SMSociety'17, July 28-30, 2017). This article explores the factors that shape forms of digitally mediated participation in warfare. It highlights the association between narratives of statehood and forms of conflict-related mobilization of volunteers that rely on digital platforms. Rooted in an analysis of a dataset of digital platforms that mediated engagement in the warfare and 31 in-depth interviews with Ukrainian digital activists, it offers a model that helps to explain the diversity of modes of connective mobilization in the context of the war and the shifts in the role of digitally mediated conflict-related mobilization. The analysis does not aim to provide a linear model that explains the forms of mobilization but rather seeks to develop a framework that helps us understand the changes taking place in the scope and forms of participation in wars relying on digital platforms. The model suggests that the strengthening of narratives of statehood is associated with a transformation of conflict-related mobilization away from crowdsourcing and towards the emergence of organizations offering warfarerelated outsourcing services and in some cases the incorporation of digital resources into state institutions (insourcing).