Trade Agreements and Core Labour Standards (original) (raw)
Related papers
Labour standards in international trade agreements: an assessment of the arguments
International Journal of Human Resource …, 1999
In the 1980s and 1990s organized labour in industrialized countries was hit by the demise of traditional manufacturing industries, the ever-expanding globalization of the economy and the ideological dominance of economic liberalism and free trade. Support for the introduction of labour standards in the world trade regime grew out of these conditions. This paper introduces an analytical framework for the study of labour standards in international trade agreements (LSITA) and provides a detailed examination of the individuals and organizations involved in the debate and an analysis of their arguments and activities. Experiences of LSITA fall into four categories: (i) unilateral: child and prison labour legislation and corporate codes of conduct; (ii) bilateral: the GSP programmes; (iii) multilateral: attempts in the GATT/WTO; and (iv) regional: the Social Charter of the EU and the labour side agreement of NAFTA.
Core Labour Standards in Trade Agreements: From Multilateralism to Bilateralism
Journal of World Trade, 2006
Although discussion concerning the inclusion of core labour standards has been excluded from the Doha agenda, the question continues to be debated. In fact, on an international level, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has become increasingly active since the WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration. On a regional level, social clauses are now being introduced inside preferential-trade agreements. These evolutions feed the debate regarding the link between labour standards and trade. This article takes a closer look at this debate and reassesses the traditional economic analysis, which is today more sophisticated and balanced than was the case a few years ago. Improving labour standards, in association with trade openness, might speed up development. However, governments do not necessarily choose the best way to promote social and economic development. This fact can be explained by political economic analysis. In this article, we weigh the pro-and antisocial clause arguments of interest groups both within developed and developing countries, to explain national choices concerning labour standards. The issue also concerns the stability of international trade relations. We stress that although they are excluded from multilateral arrangements, core labour standards provisions are omnipresent in bilateral or regional preferential-trade agreements. This paradox is likely to jeopardize the multilateral system. Putting aside ethical or moral considerations, we show that economic arguments can possibly allow the inclusion of a non-protectionist, realistic and reasonable trade-labour linkage. We conclude that the inclusion of such a clause in multilateral trade law is less dangerous than its non-inclusion. (ILO) and other official reports 2 reveal the persistence or the deterioration of the worst forms of exploitation, like child and forced labour. According to the ILO, more than 12% of the world's children aged between 5 and 9 are at work. The percentage rises to 23% for children from 10 to 14. 179 million children are subject to the "worst forms", such as hazardous work, forced and bonded labour, trafficking and prostitution. Faced with these facts, a demand for the respect of minimal labour standards in trade has arisen in international, regional or national caucuses. For the economist Jagdish Bhagwati, the problem with th i s " a l t r u i s t i c " d e ma n d i s n o t t h a t i t r e f l e c t s p r o t e c t i o n i s t p u r p o s e s b u t t h a t a trade labour linkage, in the form of a Social Clause at the WTO, would not do the job. By making market access conditional to the respect of a set of minimal labour standards, such clauses would create two problems: first they would legitimate the use of trade sanctions as the way to improve standards and secondly they would promote the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the international institution in charge of the job 3. This opinion calls h o we v e r f o r s o me d i s c u s s i o n. F i r s t , t h e " d e ma n d " f o r a t r a d e l a b o u r l i n k a g e c a n b e b a s e d solely on economic arguments without referring to altruism and, more generally, moral arguments 4. Second, negative trade sanctions are not the only measures enhancing labour standards: pressures from government or civil society, «positive» incentives, and international aid are other means of improving labour standards. Thirdly, although the ILO is the qualified institution to deal with labour issues, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is not excluded whenever labour standards are a matter of concern for trade. Today, labour standards are excluded from multilateral negotiations, but they are frequently mentioned in bilateral (including in the Generalized System of Preference) and regional trade agreements, which confirms the importance of the issue. Thus, keeping the WTO out of the picture might jeopardize the multilateral system. The Havana Charter of 1947 laid down a link between international trade and labour s t a n d a r d s. I t c o n s i d e r e d t h a t wo r k e r s ' r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n s we r e a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e : " (1) The Members recognize that measures relating to employment must take fully into account the rights of workers under intergovernmental declarations, conventions and agreements. They recognize that all countries have a common interest in the achievement and maintenance of fair labour standards related to productivity, and thus in the improvement of wages and working conditions as productivity may permit. The Members recognize that unfair labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties in international trade, and, accordingly, each Member shall take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory. (2) Members which are also members of the International
Labour Provisions in US Free Trade Agreements : Determinants and Adequacy
the inclusion of labor-related provisions in US Free Trade Agreements has been a contentious issue. They have been attacked both for allegedly weakening the comparative advantage of developing and emerging countries; and for being too weak and inconsistent with the recommendations of the International Labour Organization (ILO). This paper proposes a method of assessing the reality of labor rights protection in U.S. FTAs Partnercountries and gives a more precise picture of the adequacy of Labor-related provisions in those FTAs given the situation of labor rights protection in U.S FTAs Partner-countries. In doing so, it provides also a careful and original methodology to evaluate the respect of ILO Conventions and build an Index of Labour Bargaining Power, both of these constructions can be reproduced in further research and used to monitor the evolution of Labour Rights in any given country. The United States has a long standing tradition of linking labor standards and trade, dating back to the McKinley Act of 1890 and the Trade Act of 1930 which respectively restricted then prohibited imports convict or prison-made goods i . However, the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, signed on October 24 th , 2000 is the first U.S international trade agreement to include labor related provisions in the main body of the agreement ii . This practice has been followed since, in virtually every Free Trade Agreement negotiated and signed by the U.S with countries so diverse as Chile iii and Singapore iv (2003), Australia v , Bahrain vi , Costa Rica, Dominican republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua vii and Morocco viii (2004), Colombia ix , Oman x and Peru xi (2006); Korea xii and Panama xiii (2007).
International Trade Agreements and Their Relation to Core Labor Standards
Journal of Politics and Law, 2018
The research is an attempt to comprehend with these issues and enunciate an argument that international labor rights and labor standards are a pivotal component of international trade, investment, and development strategy for the well-being of the entire society not only for the wealthy nations. Section 1 of the paper lays out unanimity of labor rights and standards depicted from different sources with evoking instances showing real concerns that have originated with the development of new universal trade. Section 2 illustrates various forums where the international labor rights assertion perhaps induced, through a discourse of multiple supervision or enforcement mechanism available under such forums. Last part of the paper concludes the study and proposes future initiatives to labor rights advocates from all discussions and further recommends new allegiances to international fair labor rights and standards by government, employers, and trade unions entered into a global economy.
Regional Trade Agreements and the Spread of International Labour Standards
2016
In the last two decades, international trade agreements have driven growing economic integration increasingly inclusive of social and labour provisions. This article investigates the link between labour clauses in trade agreements and national labour standards, comparing their effects on the ratification of ILO conventions and worker rights practices. An empirical estimation using panel data for 141 countries from 1980 to 2013 suggests that labour provisions have not played a significant role in the improvement of labour practices, and that their effect has been limited to the ratification of ILO conventions. This gap highlights the importance of mechanisms that guarantee the enforceability of labour clauses included in trade agreements.
Labour Standard Enforcement through Economic Treaties
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017
Recent economic treaties contain references to labour standards with increasing specificity and stringent enforcement mechanisms. However, despite evidence for continuing massive violations of workers’ rights, forced and child labour, these mechanisms are very seldom used. This article focuses on enforcement in respect of gross and continuing violations of so-called peremptory standards i.e. those generally recognised as norms from which no derogation is permitted (cogent law or ius cogens). It looks at a number of new trade and investment agreements, and conditional tariff preferences. Goods and services produced in violation of clearly peremptory standards not only raise the question of importer involvement. These violations may also cause trade distortions against which importers may take countermeasures, sometimes explicitly in cooperation with non-state stakeholders. Sanctions may consist, for instance, in suspensions of tariff concessions or outright import bans in response to labour standard violations creating trade and investment conditions. A possible barrier against sanctions are the non-discrimination rules enshrined in all economic treaties which seem to overprotect policy space and hence to also prevent, for instance, countermeasures against social dumping. This is particularly true for the rules framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which has no social clauses, but also for economic treaties with few stringent commitments, and a dearth of case law. Adjudicators in litigation cases would then have to decide whether ius cogens does take precedence over WTO and other economic treaty rules. Even though this has never occurred, this article argues that when trade measures are taken against violations of cogent law, they will withstand legal challenges better than would appear from looking at comparable WTO cases involving public morals. At the same time, producers respecting these international bottom lines for employment policies can defend their treaty-enshrined market access rights against unilateral standard setting and protectionism in disguise. It is too early to contend that economic treaty implementation has become more holistic by adding social and environmental dumping to the list of trade distortions subject to trade remedies. Nonetheless, this article concludes that some peremptory labour standards have become easier to enforce. International Economic Treaty Law still protects against non-trade distorting sanctions. But the new venues described here can limit the race to the bottom, and contribute to sustainable employment even in countries needing ‘more’ rather than ‘better’ jobs.
Labour Standards and Trade: In Search of Impact and Alternative Instruments
Politics and Governance
Labour standards have become an almost routine feature of trade agreements. However, we have little knowledge about whether this linkage is effective; both in absolute terms but also in comparison to other instruments that promote labour standards on a global level. Such alternative instruments include public-private agreements, value chain management and procurement policies. The articles in this thematic issue will provide insights that further the debate on the effectiveness of the connection between labour rights and international trade, looking at both ‘traditional’ trade agreements and ‘alternative’ instruments.
2009
It is now common for producers (economic protectionism), consumers and social advocates (humanitarian motives) to urge for the inclusion of labour standards in international trade agreements. In spite of this, there has been little empirical work to determine whether low labour standards lead to trade distortions. This paper provides some empirical evidence pertaining to this question. Consumer groups, social advocates and traditional vested interests such as labour unions have attempted to have labour standards included in WTO disciplines. In the absence of success at the WTO, the relationship between labour standards and international trade has, however, been evolving in the areas of private standards and preferential trade agreements. Given the role that preferential trade agreements sometimes take in establishing future directions in multilateral trade agreements and the increasing dissatisfaction with the WTO's treatment of consumer issues in general, in the future labour s...