Robert Knecht, Francis I and the History of the French Court (original) (raw)
Related papers
French History, 21, ii (June 2007), pp.127-46, 2007
There has been a growing interest in faction at the court of France in the sixteenth century, alongside the continuing dissection of clientelism. The later years of Francis I, until recently relatively little understood, have been revealed as a period of intensely unstable power relations at the centre of the court. This stemmed from the dominance of the Constable de Montmorency in the years 1537 – 1540, his step-by-step removal from power in 1540 – 1541and the emergence of the king’s mistress, the duchesse d’Etampes as the dominant politicalfi gure to whom all the contenders for authority: Admiral Chabot de Brion, Cardinal de Tournon and Admiral Claude d’Annebault had to adjust. This study examines these relationships, particularly in the light of the despatches of imperial ambassadors, who sought both to observe what they thought to be alarming developments in France and to encourage the dauphin, an increasingly important figure, to take a hand in the removal of the king’s mistress and the setting aside of his father.
The Civil Judicial System in Early Modern France
Frünenzeit-Info, 23, 2012: 45-52, 2012
Abstract: Civil court records have remained until recently an obscure source for historians of early modern France. These documents have been neglected and under used mostly because scholars have preferred to focus on the more colourful study of criminality. Recently, however, a new interest in local and seigneurial courts has stimulated a significant production of doctoral dissertations and manuscripts, which use and rehabilitate civil court records in historiography. This paper examines the historical value of such documents and presents recent developments and trends in historical research concerning French early modern civil courts and civil records. But more importantly, it also proposes a few new directions for research using this particular type of source, research that could enrich not only French historiography, but also the historiography of early modern justice.
The Key to Power?, 2016
There are a lot of doors in the world of the court, many of them shut. He who holds the keys controls access to the treasure within-in the case of the Chambre du Roi, the monarch himself. Entrusting a set of keys to someone involves-literally-trust. So whom did the King of France trust? Who was given authority to regulate proximity, the sine qua non for the acquisition of power and wealth? Perhaps these were the personal favourites of the monarch, men he had grown up with. Or perhaps they were men of exalted rank and ancient lineage, qualities which, as explained by Castiglione, would compel them to act in an upright manner so as not to sully family honour. 1 Or even more narrowly, perhaps the sovereign would depend on princes of his own blood, whose sense of dynastic honour was tied up even more completely with his own. Yet it would be foolish for any monarch to trust the strength of blood implicitly: numerous lessons can be learned from the continual rebellions of royal uncles in the fifteenth century to those of royal brothers and cousins in the seventeenth. 2 Yet this is precisely what was attempted in the refining of the regulations of the French court from the reigns of Henri III to Louis XIV, as has been analysed by scholars from Richard Jackson to Katia Béguin. 3 By providing the princes of the blood with a more permanent, secure function at court, the monarchy in a way disempowered them-by taking away their justification for rebellion-but also empowered them, to contribute to, rather than compete with, the overall power of the court and the dynasty. 4
‘La Maleureuse Bataille’: Fifteenth-Century French Reactions to Agincourt
French History, 2019
This article examines the military and political impact of the battle of Agincourt in France and the way in which this defeat was remembered up until the end of the Hundred Years' War. The English presented their victory as a sign of God's support for Henry V and his claims in France, but the French preferred to understand their defeat as a divine punishment for their sins. This led to debate about who had incurred God's wrath, as civilians blamed soldiers, soldiers blamed their aristocratic leaders, and partisans for the Armagnac and Burgundian factions blamed one another. But most French commentators attempted to bridge these divisions, or at least to minimize the damage by attributing the disaster to the actions of foolish young hot-heads and to cowards. This avoided the need to name and shame specific noblemen, but also meant that only the most traditional lessons were highlighted from this defeat.