[2023] The necessity to reexamine the definition of the human embryo adopted by the CJEU (original) (raw)
Related papers
On the origin, use and destination of human embryos
European Journal of Endocrinology, 2004
The moral acceptability or non-acceptability of the use of human embryos in research raises questions on several philosophical levels. The mixing-up of these levels results in strongly defended and endless debates. In this contribution, arguments on three levels will be discussed, the ontological, the practical and instrumental and the level of human relationships. It is concluded that, on the latter level, the moral problems of the other two are significant, but not conclusive. The decision to allow or to ban research with human embryos is charged with full human responsibility.
Re-defining the human embryo A legal perspective on the creation of embryos in research
EMBO Reports, 2024
The notion of the human embryo is not immutable. Various scientific and technological breakthroughs in reproductive biology have compelled us to revisit the definition of the human embryo during the past 2 decades. Somatic cell nuclear transfer, oocyte haploidisation and, more recently, human stem cell-derived embryo models have challenged this scientific term, which has both ethical and legal repercussions. Here, we offer a legal perspective to identify a universally accepted definition of ‘embryo’ which could help to ease and unify the regulation of such entities in different countries.
From the time that James Thomson and colleagues (1998) fi rst announced the successful derivation of human embryonic stem cell (hESC) lines, there has been a heated debate about the ethical acceptability of hESC research because this research entails the destruction of human embryos (see Prainsack et al., 2008a). In an effort to quell this debate, governments, quasi-governmental organizations, and professional organizations around the world have sought to develop ethical standards for embryo research and hESC research, and to entrench these standards in laws or research guidelines. Together, these many and varied ethical and legal standards for embryo research and hESC research currently shape the fi eld of stem cell science. Their importance can be measured by the fact that scientists consider these standards In an effort to quell ongoing debate about the ethics of human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research, there have been concerted efforts to develop ethical standards for both emb...
Is the human embryo legally defined and protected? Causes and consequences
Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law", states the article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights (1950). This article guarantees the protection of life of all persons. The human embryo, however, does not seem to be under the protection of this article, or, at least not always. The human embryo does not have a nature clearly defined and it is not considered always as person. The law protects only two categories by its ordinary regulations: things and persons. Our main objective is to find out if the human embryo is or not protected, according to the legal framework in Romania. The purpose of the paper is: (1) to familiarize professionals with current debate on the status of the human embryo; (2) to provide main legal standards and regulations concerning this specific area with examples from case reports;
The legal status of the human embryo
Reproductive BioMedicine Online, 2007
The contribution attempts to clarify the legal status of the human embryo according to basic principles of law by taking the German law as a model. Two decisions of the German Constitutional Court on abortion stipulate a constitutional right to life for every individual embryo. This inclusive interpretation of the respective articles of the German Constitution yields a principled verdict on elective abortions: according to the court, they are 'illegal, albeit not punishable'. A closer analysis, however, reveals that this ruling exhibits a self-destructive contradiction. It is shown that due to fundamental requirements of the validity of norms of law, elective abortions are legal under German law, regardless of how they are labelled. This true (as opposed to the merely alleged) legal situation is incompatible with a constitutional right to life of embryos. Hence, the question whether the ordinary law statutes regulating a comprehensive prohibition of preimplantation genetic diagnosis and of embryo research in Germany should be amended is not prejudiced by constitutional law. Ethical analysis shows that the protective duty we owe to early human embryos does not belong in the realm of the 'do no harm' principle, but corresponds to a prima facie duty of solidarity. This weak 'positive' obligation is amplified by considerations pertaining to the protection of the fundamental texture of our basic normative institutions. However, it can be outweighed by the conflicting obligations that society has vis-à-vis born human persons.
Research Use of Human in Vitro Embryos: Legal Boundaries
Wiadomości Lekarskie, 2021
The aim: The purpose of this research is to study foreign experience in the field of legal regulation of the use of embryos in vitro to suggest ways to fill the gaps in current Ukrainian legislation and bring it into line with international law. Materials and methods: The subject of the research was the legal regulation of the in vitro embryo research use, which is completely outside of the current Ukrainian legislation. That is why the European models of its regulation were analyzed. The experience of Germany and Hungary in the field of in vitro embryo research use regulation was considered as an example and was compared with the current Ukrainian regulation. Conclusion: As the use of non-implanted embryos is outside the legal field, the anatomical materials of a dead embryo, whether implanted or not, can be removed both for scientific research within the statutory framework (subject to approval by the ethics committee) and with the therapeutic purpose (for cell transplantation), s...
Some Remarks on the Legal Status of Human Embryo
Kutafin University Law Review, 2019
There is no unitary position towards the legal status of the embryo in Europe. Most International law acts discard the possibility of recognizing an absolute right to life to an embryo or foetus. The European Court of Human Rights had several occasions to express itself on this question, but has always avoided giving a clear opinion and leaves open the question whether Art.2 ECHR also covers life before birth. In the recent Parillo case it has been noted that it raises sensitive moral and ethical issues with a wide margin of appreciation for the States. Although there is no European consensus on the subject, it seems that in 21st century human embryo begins to enjoy a gradual protection and in some situations the law acknowledges some rights corresponding to it.
This article aims to bear further discussion on the disputed legal issue that centres on identifying a possible ontological qualification of the embryo. Notably, this article explores how scientific research and various medical treatments can affect the legal status of embryos. We consider, from a comparative point of view, domestic and international legal orders as well as specific legal venues such as courts, to show how the law and judicial interpretation of it can interact as legal formants to influence the legal qualification of the embryo. This article considers the law as a mere legal venue for establishing a possible uniform ontological qualification of the embryo hinging on the concept of human dignity. In fact, human dignity, as opposed to legal formants, can be used to define the internal and external limits to a proper legal qualification of the embryo. This is because human dignity informs the discourse on 'life', and we term this approach as a predetermined and unqualified connotation of life itself. Indeed, this approach can now be used to construct a possible limit to any interference, modification, or evaluation that can directly affect the legal qualification of the embryo tout court.