Content normativity and the interdependency of belief and desire (original) (raw)
Related papers
Dose the Conceptual Interdependency of Belief and Desire Undermine the Normativity of Content
2015
The normativity of mental content thesis appears to have been influential in contemporary philosophy of mind. Paul Boghossian (2003, 2005) has developed an argument for the normativity of mental content on the basis of two premises, i.e. firstly, the normativity of the notion of belief and secondly, the priority of the notion of belief to the notion of desire. In his recent article Alexander Miller (2008) has criticised Boghossian’s argument for the normativity of mental content. To make the objection against the normativity of content, Miller has argued that the second premise of Boghossian’s argument is mistaken since belief and desire are conceptually interdependent. My purpose in this paper is to show that content normativity thesis prevails Miller's attack. In order to establish the claim I will argue that content is normative even if belief and desire are conceptually interdependent.
Rules of Belief and the Normativity of Intentional Content
Acta Analytica, 2020
Mental content normativists hold that the mind’s conceptual contents are essentially normative. Many hold the view because they think facts of the form ‘subject S possesses concept C’ imply that S is enjoined (i.e., bound or genuinely obligated) by rules concerning the application of C in theoretical judgments. Some opponents independently raise an intuitive objection: even if there are such rules, S’s possession of the concept is not the source of the enjoinment. Hence these rules do not support mental content normativism. Call this the ‘Source Objection’. This paper refutes the Source Objection, outlining a key strand of the relationship between judgments and their contents in the process. Theoretical judgment and mental conceptual content are equally the source of enjoinment; norms for judging with contents do not derive from one at the expense of the other.
The Prescriptive Normativity of Mental Content
This paper offers an argument for content normativism, the view that the mind's intentional contents are essentially, prescriptively normative entities. The argument shows that the most prominent objection to the view is unsound. To make this argument, the paper advances a new conception of prescriptive normativity. If this conception is correct, there are three notable consequences. First, the aforementioned objection fails: it rests on a (pervasive) misunderstanding of the requirements for being prescriptively normative (section 2). Second, facts of the form 'subject S possesses concept C' imply that S ought to accord with some conceptual rules, described in the paper, that genuinely prescribe acts that involve C (section 3). Third, it becomes much easier to show, as the last section of the paper does (section 4), that S's obligation to accord with these rules is an essential part of what it is to possess C, and does not follow from other sources of obligation.
Philosophical Explorations, 2005
I describe and defend the view in a philosophy of mind that I call ‘Normative Essentialism’, according to which propositional attitudes have normative essences. Those normative essences are ‘horizontal’ rational requirements, by which I mean the requirement to have certain propositional attitudes given other propositional attitudes. Different propositional attitudes impose different horizontal rational requirements. I distinguish a stronger and a weaker version of this doctrine and argue for the weaker version. I explore the consequences for knowledge of mind, and I then consider objections to the view from mental causation, from empirical psychology, and from animals and small children.
1999
This paper attempts to describe why it is not possible to account for normative phenomena in non-normative terms. It argues that Papineau’s attempt to locate norms of judgement ‘outside’ content, grounded in an individual’s desires or reasons, mislocates the normativity that is thought to resist appropriation within a ‘world that conceives nature as the realm of law’. It agrees, however, that a theory of content that locates norms ‘inside’ content will not be forthcoming—at least if this is to require fashioning the norms that in some sense govern judgment or thought into individually necessary conditions for contentful states.
Value and Epistemic Normativity
Many writers have sought to ground epistemic normativity in the value of knowledge or truth or else in the value of successful agency. Here it is proposed that epistemic norms derive their authority from the fact that it is good for us to subject ourselves to such norms by forming beliefs. And being subject to the relevant norms may be good for us whether or not conformity to those norms is good for us. In particular, beliefs serve our interest in being subject to the norms that govern our emotions. Unless I believe that John stole my bike, whilst I can hope or fear that he did but I cannot be pleased or angry that he did. Having the capacity for this sort of emotional engagement with things that matter to us is a human good, even though we may suffer from the exercise of that capacity.
Belief, Knowledge and the Origins of Content
Dialectica, 2005
Virtually all discussions of the propositional attitudes centre around belief. I suggest that, when one takes a broad look at the kinds of constraint which affect our attributions of attitude, this is a mistake. Not only is belief not properly representative of the propositional attitudes generally, but, more seriously, taking it to be representative can be positively distorting. In this paper I offer reasons why we should give knowledge a more central role in discussions of the propositional attitudes and suggest that its almost complete neglect in current philosophy of mind is unjustified. In essence, I argue that we should consider knowledge to be the central attitude and think of belief as a later and special development of the attitude scheme. In place of the usual explanation of knowledge as belief plus something, we should think of belief as knowledge minus something. The final sections choose Kripke's puzzle about belief as an example of where the conventional wisdom leads us astray. ' Of course, Smith might have been reading about the Battle and have had some kind of fear of how the story would end. I don't think this would be a counterexample, but, given the purpose of the example, there isn't much point in arguing about it here.
Some Remarks on Beliefs and Normativity
2023
Some Remarks on Beliefs and Normativity The aim of this work is to present some recent observations in Cognitive Science about beliefs and the way they are able to originate chains of actions and condition behaviors. It is not my aim to evaluate reliabilist views on beliefs in Philosophical Epistemology, but only to point out that certain scientific observations about the process of belief formation can help us to build an interesting theory. Contemporaneity brings many important challenges to traditional philosophical questions that can potentially broaden our knowledge, hence the importance of considering them in some detail. Some peculiarities of scientific investigation will be presented, some classifications to better understand the phenomenon of study, some difficulties that are imposed on scientific investigation and, finally, some considerations about the normative role of beliefs will be presented.