Fiscal Federalism and National Unity (original) (raw)
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Federal and decentralized political systems vary in the extent to which sub-central governments enjoy policy authority, political independence from the center, and taxation powers. The institutionalist view of fiscal federalism holds that sub-central governments' fiscal powers are meaningful and self-enforcing only when the central government cannot undermine regional authority. Most recent empirical research on fiscal federalism has ignored the institutional foundations of the system, with adverse consequences for measurement and interpretation. A new, institutional measure of fiscal federalism is proposed. Cross-national tests using this measure for thirty-nine democracies find that more fiscally federal countries, especially those with many competing jurisdictions, have smaller government consumption and government share of gross domestic product, while expenditure decentralization increases government size, findings consistent with widely accepted institutionalist theories.
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The Andrew Young School of Policy Studies was established at Georgia State University with the objective of promoting excellence in the design, implementation, and evaluation of public policy. In addition to two academic departments (economics and public administration), the Andrew Young School houses seven leading research centers and policy programs, including the International Center for Public Policy. The mission of the International Center for Public Policy is to provide academic and professional training, applied research, and technical assistance in support of sound public policy and sustainable economic growth in developing and transitional economies.
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The contributions presented in this special issue bring to light the complexity of fiscal decentralization and consequently the need for a better understanding of the dynamics of fiscal federalism. This is precisely what that paper attempts to do by first reviewing briefly the standard arguments in favour of decentralization as well as the arguments against it. What is most missing,
A theoretical model of nations, regions and fiscal integration
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This paper analyzes how the incentives of regions differ from those of nations when choosing a supranational fiscal arrangement. Two types of fiscal arrangements are studied: a Union of nations and a Federation of nations. Under the Union, there is full fiscal integration, and under the Federation, there is only partial fiscal integration and partial insurance against local risks. We show that the claim that regions have stronger incentives than nations to form a supranational Union rather than a Federation might be true only in the case where regions have strong incentives to be part of a centralized nation.