Yearnings for Foundation. The Idea of Philosophy as a Rigorous Science and Ideas I (original) (raw)
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The Idea of Rigorous Science in Husserl’s Phenomenology and its Relevance for the other Sciences
Proceedings of the International Conference “Humanities and Social Sciences Today. Classical and Contemporary Issues” – Philosophy and Other Humanities: Mihai-Dan Chiţoiu, Ioan-Alexandru Tofan (Editors), 2015
In this paper I intend to grapple with the idea of philosophy as rigorous science from the point of view of Husserl’s phenomenology in order to show that this idea may have an important contribution to the way in which the scientific character of sciences in general, and of human and social sciences in particular, is being conceived. As rigorous science, phenomenology emphasizes and investigates the a priori context of other sciences. In this way, it plays a vital role in the development of every particular eidetic upon which any sciences rely. This eidetic (or the eidetic layer of any mature science) embraces the goal and strives to reach the objective of determining the valid sense of the fundamental notions used by the scientist in his research, without, nevertheless, stirring a radical questioning of this sense and of the ultimate validity of these notions. To define them requires passing from the usual level of inquiring of that particular science (the processes of dealing with facts and experiments) to the level (or meta-level) of a radical reflection on the sense or the meaning of the basic notions of the science in question (its own foundations). Philosophy as rigorous science connects the researcher’s assertions not only to the empirical state of affairs envisaged by his work, but, moreover and in a fundamental way, to their noematic content, to their intrinsic intentional meaning. Therefore, the idea of rigorous science elaborated in Husserl’s phenomenology is heavy with the potential of clarifying the foundations and stakes of the research undertaken by the other sciences.
Husserl, Phenomenology, and Foundationalism
Inquiry 51: 194-216., 2008
Husserl is often taken, and not without reason, to endorse the view that phenomenology's task is to provide the ''absolute foundation'' of human knowledge. In this paper, I will argue that the most natural interpretation of this view, namely that all human knowledge depends for its justification, at least in part, on phenomenological knowledge, is philosophically untenable. I will also present evidence that Husserl himself held no such view, and will argue that Dan Zahavi and John Drummond, though reaching the same conclusion, reach it for the wrong reasons. In the process, I will also defend a brand of epistemological externalism according to which knowledge does not depend upon knowing the epistemic principles under which one's knowledge falls, and argue that Husserl himself held such a view. I conclude with a discussion of a few of the ways in which phenomenology positively contributes to human knowledge.
Dialogue, 2013
Book Reviews/Comptes rendus 195 Any interesting answer has to be accompanied by an explanation of why this is the right answer." [p. 135]. One does not have to embrace foundationalism (in any form), of course, but in that case it must be clear what the alternative is (as an infi nite regress is, presumably, unacceptable); might coherentism, e.g., be considered a viable approach? One may appeal to the intersection of philosophical and scientifi c issues [pp. 196, 197], but that raises the question: which matters are specifi cally philosophical? Perhaps Cappelen is drawn to a position such as naturalized epistemology. In addition, if no appeal may be made to intuitions, it is unclear how Cappelen would deal with cases in philosophy that resemble axioms in mathematics. At present, few cases are generally accepted to have such a status compared to previous periods in (Western) philosophy, when it was attempted to resolve epistemological (and metaphysical) issues by appealing to self-evident starting points, but a proposition such as '¬ (p ∧ ¬ p)' (the principle of contradiction) is still considered by some to have such a quality; would Cappelen support it by arguments and thus avoid an appeal to an intuition? He does appear to suggest that logic may have to be considered to be something separate from philosophy [p. 229], but this seems to be an argumentum ad consequentiam : 'if something needs to be supported by an intuition, it cannot be qualifi ed as philosophy'. It is of course unacceptable (or at least unproductive) to operate from one's own private notion of what constitutes 'philosophy', especially if no arguments to use that private notion are offered. To conclude, Cappelen has shown that intuitions are not decisive elements in a number of cases, but he has failed to efface their role in the justifi cation process. On the basis of the foregoing, I would answer the question of what the relevance of this work is as follows. Apart from the merit that it presents a forceful criticism of those who too easily resort to intuitions, or who don't even refl ect on their position, it must be considered a propaedeutic work in the sense that it primarily serves as a springboard for the crucial questions to come to the fore. This observation in no way derogates from the author's meticulous and elucidative analysis, which is impressive and must be commended, but merely indicates what the next step must be, whether to be undertaken by the author or others.
Renewal and Tradition: Phenomenology as “Faith Seeking Understanding” in the Work of Edmund Husserl
This paper seeks to understand the place of phenomenology within the Christian philosophical tradition. Contrary to common conceptions of phenomenology, and in spite of Husserl's own description of phenomenology as an "a-theistic" project, this paper will attempt to interpret the complex relationship of Husserl's understanding of phenomenology to the religious tradition ultimately as a function of that very tradition. In so doing, this paper will explore the philosophical concept of "vocation" in Husserl's usage, its application to the intended role of phenomenology as an agent of moral and religious "renewal," and the role played by the concept of tradition in Husserl's thought, which demands explicit reflection on Husserl's own relation to the tradition. This will allow the possibility of re-envisioning the overall sense of phenomenological discussion and its place within the tradition of philosophy, particularly in the relation of Husserlian phenomenology to the Anselmian project of "faith seeking understanding."
Husserl thought that philosophy can only be a rigorous science through a radical epoché, not only in the sense of putting any extramental really existing world into brackets, but also in that of bracketing any subject-transcendent status of necessary essences (eternal Platonic forms, divine ideas, etc.). He calls any realist phenomenology and philosophy mere Weltanschauungsphilosophie (world-view philosophy) and contrasts it with philosophy as rigorous science. The author shows that Husserl is mistaken on both counts. The self-transcendence of human knowledge wholly permits a rigorous philosophical knowledge of the really existing self and of God, thus vindicating Descartes criticized by Husserl for his "unscientific" realism. Moreover, the full transcendence of the necessary essences that can neither be created nor constituted by men or by God can be known with indubitable knowledge by a rigorous philosophical science. In fact, only realist phenomenology is rigorous philosophical science, transcendental phenomenology is self-contradictory and contradicts the results obtained by rigorous philosophical science. Finally, not being based on hypotheses, unproved and unprovable principles and foundations, philosophy is the only fully rigorous science that overcomes a Gödel-inspired skepticism and proves not only evolution science, but also physics, and even mathematics inferior to philosophy as rigorous sciences because they either do not possess absolute certainty or cannot themselves know their ultimate foundations and grounds, but need the aid of philosophy to stand on firm foot.
The Practical Reformer: On Husserl's Socrates, Husserl Studies, 2019
2019
The present essay offers a first, systematic reconstruction of Husserl's understanding of Socrates' philosophical position in the Ideengeschichte with a special focus on the Socratic method. Our goal is twofold. On the one hand, we aim to provide a clear presentation of the way in which Husserl himself conceives of the "beginning" of Western philosophy by tackling the specifically Socratic contribution to it. On the other hand, we will clarify in what sense, and to what extent, the assessment of "Husserl's Socrates" helps shed some light upon the properly Husserlian conception of philosophy, notably, his twofold notion of "rationality."