Competition, Innovation and Antitrust (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
1998
Abstract: This paper is the entry under" trademarks" in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. It discusses the economic function of trademarks in conveying information to consumers, as well as the various distortions that may arise in the function of trademarks.
Antitrust: The Person-centred Approach
2014
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.
Antitrust in High-Technology Industries - A Symposium Introduction.pdf
One of the most interesting and challenging phenomena of our information age is the rapid and significant change that takes place in high-technology industries. This change is shaking some of our assumptions regarding the role of technology (e.g., endogenous or exogenous), productions methods (e.g., commercial entities vs. social communities), markets (e.g., product or innovation markets), market characteristics (e.g., network industries, faster information transfer to market players and consumers), and non-market management systems. . It requires us to recognize the effects of such changes on the economic environment and to ensure that our regulatory tools secure the positive welfare effects that such changes can bring about. The papers in this special issue of the Journal of Competition Law and Economics attempt to meet this two-pronged challenge and shed light on the implications of changes in the marketplace for both the market's invisible hand and the government's visible one. In particular, they address the over-arching concerns expressed by some commentators that competition law may not be sufficiently nimble or accurate to detect and remedy competition violations in more innovative industries.
Intellectual Property Protection
Concurrent Engineering in the 21st Century, 2015
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
Patents and Antitrust: Application to Adjacent Market
We examine the intersection of patents and antitrust where a patent holder uses the monopoly power it possesses in the market for a patented product to exclude competitors in an adjacent market and attempt to monopolize or monopolize the adjacent market. The present scheme for awarding patents cannot judge when the issuance of a patent will lead to the appropriate balance between innovation and economic efficiency. Where a patent holder’s invention uses an interface with adjacent products, the patent holder may be tempted to extend its patent monopoly into adjacent markets that depend upon the interface with the patented invention. Economic theory suggests that it is inappropriate to immunize a patent holder from antitrust liability when it attempts to extend its patent monopoly into adjacent markets because it could decrease consumer surplus. Courts have expressed their reluctance to scrutinize a patent holder’s innovations and design changes because of the potential benefits of the innovations and their reluctance to second-guess the marketplace. However, applying traditional antitrust principles, courts have found that monopolists could be liable for unlawfully extending their monopoly positions into adjacent markets in the areas of computer peripherals and software applications; aftermarkets for replacement parts, service and maintenance of durable goods; design changes to medical devices; and changes in drug formulas. While the patent laws provide a spur to innovation by granting limited monopoly rights, the antitrust laws curb the excessive reach of these monopoly rights by acting as a check on excessive expansion of the scope of the patent grant. Courts are the only participants in the legal process that have the competence to ensure that patents do not cause economic stagnation and harm by permitting a patent holder to extend its monopoly into an adjacent market. Consequently, courts should be willing to apply antitrust principles to cases involving the monopolization of interfaces through design changes.