A conceptual escape from the perils of universal grammar (original) (raw)

Noam Chomsky's notion of an innate universal grammar (see e.g. Hauser & Chomsky, 2002; Chomsky, 1976) is known to be problematic, not least for identifying recursion as the defining aspect underlying human language, given the extremely limited use of recursion in known languages and ongoing claims (see e.g. Evans & Levinson, 2009) that some languages lack recursive capacity altogether. Far more serious, perhaps, is the sense that universal grammar is delivered by a priori fiat and empirical evidence is all but completely lacking. As Evans and Levinson argue, few aspects of language, indeed, are, on closer examination, in any meaningful sense universal, which might seem to point against universal biological foundations. Although a couple decades ago Chomsky's views on language still dominated the field, recent years have seen such notions as universal grammar being increasingly called into question. Whether taking the form of a universal grammar or not, innate linguistic capacity has another consequence that might seem undesirable: by suggesting that syntactically and grammatically structured language is uniquely human, it risks creating an absolute divide between human beings and other terrestrial species-a number of which, as the burgeoning field of comparative cognition has revealed over the past couple decades, show complex cognitive abilities, including abilities, such as spontaneous tool use (e.g.,