Rethinking Human Rights through the Language of Capabilities: An Introduction to Capabilities Approach (original) (raw)
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Contributions from the capabilities approach to the human rights practice
V. 13, n. 02, 2020
The article analyses the contributions offered from the capabilities approach to the human rights theory. The capabilities approach is a theory developed by Martha Nussbaum, US-American philosopher, that analyses the basic capabilities (alternative combinations of functionings that a person have the possibility to achieve) every human should achieve in order to live a life with dignity. The article demonstrates that Nussbaum´s theory contributes greatly for the development of human rights, by offering a list of specific capabilities that should be guaranteed to every human being by the State, with particular concern for vulnerable groups such as women, children and elderly. Even though the theory presents indisputable contributions, criticism is also presented, based upon mostly its essentialist point of view. In order to achieve the proposed objective, the methodology applied was bibliographical review.
Human Rights and Capabilities: A Program for a Critical Sociology of Law
Critical Sociology
This article sets out the fecundity of the Capability Approach for a sociology of human rights. The author endeavors to show that four difficulties can be successfully overcome. (1) The first is epistemological in nature. Human rights are often presented as legal norms. By relying on the Putman/Habermas debate, the author maintains that Sen’s epistemology is Putnamian, allowing us to treat human rights a system of values (rather than as a system of norms), thereby enabling the construction of a system of evaluation (the “goal rights system”) that is neither consequentialist nor deontological. This system is open to public deliberation and can thus take into account the systems of evaluation of participants (in addition to that of the observer). This epistemological basis serves to remove the other obstacles. (2) By defining the individual in terms of “capabilities”, Sen avoids a methodological individualism that would produce an under-socialized version of the individual. (3) He inc...
Justice, Rights, and Capabilities
My investigation of the capabilities approach as a burgeoning theory of global justice underlies the integrated-article format of this thesis, where each chapter treats a discrete but related problem. In Chapter One I survey the rapidly growing philosophical literature on global justice, focusing on contemporary rights-based approaches. I defend capabilities as central to global justice because justice demands that individuals be well positioned to enjoy the prospects of a decent life, measured by how well individuals are actually able to convert resources and opportunities into valuable functionings. In Chapter Two I explore what I take to be the most promising alternative philosophical approach to addressing pressing global challenges in terms of justice: the ethics of care. Just as capabilities help enrich and flesh out the depth and reach rights have, making capabilities a conceptually rich ally of rights, I argue rights signify a powerful ally to an increasingly global ethic of care. In Chapter Three I consider the as yet under examined connection between rights and well-being by exploring Sen’s pioneering work on capabilities. Capabilities provide us with an appropriate measurement for justice to the extent that the rights and well-being of individuals leave them empowered to enjoy a life of dignity that has at least a minimum set of opportunities. In Chapter Four I consider Hugo Grotius’s theory of rights as an important historical basis for developing a capability-based theory of global justice. In Chapter Five I argue that the status and treatment of nonhuman animals is not and cannot be a matter of justice within the structure of John Rawls’s theory, making it inadequate to this extent. I defend capabilities theory as better able to account for why the treatment of nonhuman animals is a matter of justice.
Rights, Capabilities and Human Flourishing
Christian theorists tend to ground human rights in the nature of human beings, as people created in the Image of God, and justified on the same basis. This paper argues for a complementary view: that rights might be grounded in the idea of shalom, and justified by their relationship to human flourishing. The Capabilities Approach of Armatya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, which emphasizes the importance of people's choices about how they will live, provides fruitful as a way of relating shalom to rights. A state of shalom implies human flourishing, for which capabilities are a prerequisite. Human rights, then, are those rights necessary for enhancing capabilities. This approach can assist with the clarification of certain features that rights possess, and so in evaluating rights claims.
Person, capabilities and Human Rights. Two contemporary trends
Persona y Derecho
Contemporary theories of justice may be categorized in mainly political and natural justice theories. The jormer are generally conceived asan i11sta11ce of the Kantian philosophical tradition, whereas the latter are rooterl in classical-philosophy theories. Each of them is furthennore grounded on a di.fferent conception of the person: "political", or "ontological''. This paper aims to bring them in rapport, taking in special account Martha Nussbaum 's and Sergio Cotta' s justice theories. The paper argues that the universal respect of individuals' rights-which is at the core of Nussbaum 's theory-jinds better support in Cotta 's onto-phenomenological approach to justice, rather than in Rawls'political liberalism. Contents: 1. From a "partially comprehensive" to a "political" conception of the person, 2. Sorne theoretical and practica! limitations of Nussbaum's "political" conception of the person, 3. An "ontological" definition of the person, 4. Human capabilities within Cotta's "onto-phenomenological" approach.
Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Power
The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights. Ed. R. Cruft, M. Liao, M. Renzo
This paper explores the connections between human rights, human dignity, and power. The idea of human dignity is omnipresent in human rights discourse, but its meaning and point is not always clear. It is standardly used in two ways, to refer to (a) a normative status of persons that makes their treatment in terms of human rights a proper response, and (b) a social condition of persons in which their human rights are fulfilled. This paper pursues three tasks. First, it provides an analysis of the content and an interpretation of the role of the idea of human dignity in current human rights discourse. The interpretation includes a pluralist view of human interests and dignity that avoids a narrow focus on rational agency. Second, this paper characterizes the two aspects of human dignity in terms of capabilities. Certain general human capabilities are among the facts that ground status-dignity, and the presence of certain more specific capabilities constitutes condition-dignity. Finally, this paper explores how the pursuit of human rights and human dignity links to distributions and uses of power. Since capabilities are a form of power, and human rights are in part aimed at respecting and promoting capabilities, human rights involve empowerment. Exploring the connections between human rights, capabilities, and empowerment provides resources to defend controversial human rights such as the right to democratic political participation, and to respond to worries about the feasibility of their fulfillment. This paper also argues that empowerment must be coupled with solidaristic concern in order to respond to unavoidable facts of social dependency and vulnerability. A concluding section identifies some commonalities and differences with the approach to the ontological underpinnings of human rights presented by Carol Gould in her contribution to this volume.
CAPABILITIES AS FUNDAMENTAL ENTITLEMENTS: SEN AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
Amartya Sen has made a major contribution to the theory of social justice, and of gender justice, by arguing that capabilities are the relevant space of comparison when justice-related issues are considered. This article supports Sen's idea, arguing that capabilities supply guidance superior to that of utility and resources (the view's familiar opponents), but also to that of the social contract tradition, and at least some accounts of human rights. But I argue that capabilities can help us to construct a normative conception of social justice, with critical potential for gender issues, only if we specify a definite set of capabilities as the most important ones to protect. Sen's ''perspective of freedom'' is too vague. Some freedoms limit others; some freedoms are important, some trivial, some good, and some positively bad. Before the approach can offer a valuable normative gender perspective, we must make commitments about substance.
Justice and the Capability Approach
This paper will attempt to outline some of the concepts that make up the philosophical groundwork upon which the capability approach has been constructed. Amartya Sen's recent book The Idea of Justice (2009) proposes a new theory of justice which is inspired by, but also criticizes, Rawls' theory of justice. In particular, Sen favours a pragmatic, realization-focused comparison over “transcendental institutionalism”, and draws inspiration from Adam Smith's idea of the impartial spectator. This innovative paradigm raises new questions about what values should be given priority, and makes a significant contribution to the debate on equity, fairness and the role of moral discourse in policy-making. Specifically, this paper will focus on three problems: the critique of “transcendental” models in political philosophy, the role of public discourse, and the problem of global justice and discussion. Examining these concepts may help to break new ground for developing the capability approach.
Human Rights Human Dignity and Power OUP volume draft revised to share
This paper explores the connections between human rights, human dignity, and power. The idea of human dignity is omnipresent in human rights discourse, but its meaning and point is not always clear. It is standardly used in two ways, to refer to (a) a normative status of persons that makes their treatment in terms of human rights a proper response, and (b) a social condition of persons in which their human rights are fulfilled. This paper pursues three tasks. First, it provides an analysis of the content and an interpretation of the role of the idea of human dignity in current human rights discourse. The interpretation includes a pluralist view of human interests and dignity that avoids a narrow focus on rational agency. Second, this paper characterizes the two aspects of human dignity in terms of capabilities. Certain general human capabilities are among the facts that ground status-dignity, and the presence of certain more specific capabilities constitutes condition-dignity. Finally, this paper explores how the pursuit of human rights and human dignity links to distributions and uses of power. Since capabilities are a form of power, and human rights are in part aimed at respecting and promoting capabilities, human rights involve empowerment. Exploring the connections between human rights, capabilities, and empowerment provides resources to defend controversial human rights such as the right to democratic political participation, and to respond to worries about the feasibility of their fulfillment. This paper also argues that empowerment must be coupled with solidaristic concern in order to respond to unavoidable facts of social dependency and vulnerability. A concluding section identifies some commonalities and differences with the approach to the ontological underpinnings of human rights presented by Carol Gould in her contribution to this volume.