Olgunlaşma Teorisi Bağlamında PKK ile Barış Sürecinin (2013-2015) Başarısızlığının Analizi (original) (raw)
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The conflict between the Turkish State the PKK (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan; Kurdistan Workers' Party) has existed since the commencement of their armed struggle for independence in August 1984. The PKK founder and leader Abdullah Öcalan narrowed the groups demand to include only autonomy in 1999, a stance which remains until today. This case study will examine the “Democratic/Kurdish Opening” initiated by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to increase democratic rights for Kurds in a renewed attempt to solve the conflict, whereby a secret peace process, dubbed the “Oslo Talks”, took place between 2009–2011. Moreover, it will examine the most recent attempts at a peace process, recommenced in October 2012, and ongoing at the time of writing.