Moral Instincts and Morality (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Moral Instinct-Gumina 2-pdf.pdf
Steven Pinker's main argument in the analysis is that by understanding the evolutionary roots of morality and by studying our own moral tendencies, we are able to best subjectively understand from an out-sider's perspective our behaviors and the behaviors of those around us. This process invites readers to pursue a greater degree of empathy for changing habits of moral behavior and conflict in society.
Breakdown of Morality (Dissertation defended May 2012)
My dissertation has three main parts. In the first I develop a commitment model of moral judgment. I argue that moral judgments and the broader discourse in which they take place can be understood in terms of the operation of distinct but interacting commitment strategies. To a first approximation, these strategies operate at the levels of individual and social psychology, and biological and/or cultural evolution. All commitment strategies provide motivational stability by reducing one’s (perceived) flexibility of action. Some such strategies are undertaken deliberately, such as when an addict signs a contract forcing her to donate money to a despised organization if she is caught using. However, the commitment strategies associated with moral judgments are rarely if ever conscious or deliberate. In fact, a central aspect of my commitment model holds that the peculiar motivational power of moral judgments is importantly connected to their power to deflect attention away from our actual motivations and values, and that this motivational strategy is undermined by an awareness of its workings. A primary goal of the first part is to explain (away) belief in intrinsic (nonrelational) value and practical reasons that are metaphysically independent of any person’s actual concerns. The second part is the third chapter and provides a positive defense of a neo-Humean view of practical rationality according to which all practical reasons and values are relative to some actual concern(s). I defend this view against rationalist (anti-Humean) objections, and then disgnose a common source of confusion among some of the most prominent rationalist conceptions of practical reason, namely their reliance on an untenable near-identification of willpower with rationality. A particular strength of my account is that it naturally explains how this highly problematic claim could seem so obviously correct as not to require any real defense. The final three chapters argue that moral discourse, due to its systematic deflection of attention from our motives, threatens to commit us in ways that are both radically at odds with our actual concerns and that motivate self-deception. As part of an an effort to better promote our (highest) values, I favor investigating and evaluating our actual values rather than our ostensible moral obligations.
9 the Evolution of Moral Cognition
2018
Moral concepts, judgments, sentiments, and emotions pervade human social life. We consider certain actions obligatory, permitted, or forbidden, recognize when someone is entitled to a resource, and evaluate character using morally tinged concepts such as cheater, free rider, cooperative, and trustworthy. Attitudes, actions, laws, and institutions can strike us as fair, unjust, praiseworthy, or punishable: moral judgments. Morally relevant sentiments color our experiences—empathy for another’s pain, sympathy for their loss, disgust at their transgressions— and our decisions are influenced by feelings of loyalty, altruism, warmth, and compassion. Fullblown moral emotions organize our reactions—anger toward displays of disrespect, guilt over harming those we care about, gratitude for those who sacrifice on our behalf, outrage at those who harm others with impunity. A newly reinvigorated field, moral psychology, is investigating the genesis and content of these concepts, judgments, sent...
Moral Psychology, Volume 4, 2014
Montague proposes a computational model to understand addiction. His key idea is a special kind of reward prediction error signal in addicts. In his comments, Yaffe discusses what Montague's work on the neuroscience of addiction does and does not show about moral responsibility. Sripada then outlines how additional deficits in reflective judgments of addicts might also be relevant to their moral responsibility. Montague replies by agreeing that we need a new generation of models to capture the kinds of considerations raised by his commentators.