The complementary role of affect-based and cognitive heuristics to make decisions under conditions of ambivalence and complexity (original) (raw)
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Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 1993
Based on a two-dimensional model of affect that views Pleasantness and Arousal as affect's two primary dimensions, this study investigates the effects of emotions on choice processes and outcomes. In Study 1, subjects first described their naturally occurring emotional state and then performed two multi-attribute product choice tasks. Subjects in more pleasant mood deliberated longer, used more decision-related information, reexamined more previously examined information, and made more interdimensional moves. Subjects in more aroused mood spent less time deliberating, revealed less information, ignored more product-describing attributes, and reexamined less of previously examined information. Study 2 replicated many of these effects with experimentally manipulated emotions and using a managerial decision-making task. The results are interpreted in terms of (1) a congruency between one's hedonic state and selected decision strategy and (2) a restriction in attentional capacity induced by increased Arousal. KEY WORDS Affect and emotion Multi-attribute choice Decision processes During the last 20 years the central concern of behavioral decision research has been the effects of task characteristics and their perceptions on decision making (Abelson and Levi, 1985; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981). This interest in task features had led to the neglect of examining the influence of the decision maker's emotional state on the decision process and its outcomes. In recent years, however, the growing recognition of affect's central role in cognitive and social psychology (e.g. Bower and Cohen, 1982; Isen, 1987; Zajonc, 1980) brought a better understanding of affect's significance on decision making. To date, considerable evidence suggests that the decision maker's emotional state can have a powerful influence on decision tasks (for a review, see Isen, 1987), including estimation of risk of undesirable events (Johnson and Tversky, 1983), strategy selection in multi-attribute choice (Isen and Means, 1983), risk taking (Isen and Geva, 1987; Mano, 1993), person-judgment formation (Mano, 1992), and interpersonal preferences (Forgas and Bower, 1988). Theoretical arguments offered for affect's influence on decision making have focused on a congruency between affective state and selected decision strategy (Isen et al., 1978; Isen, 1987). To date, a series of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence have been advanced to explain the links between affect and decision making. In particular, it has been suggested that subjects induced to experience positive uflect will tend to reduce decision complexity by engaging in speedy and simplified kinds of processing (Isen, 1987), that they use their cognitive strategies and information more efficiently
The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2000
This paper reexamines the commonly observed inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived bene®t. We propose that this relationship occurs because people rely on aect when judging the risk and bene®t of speci®c hazards. Evidence supporting this proposal is obtained in two experimental studies. Study 1 investigated the inverse relationship between risk and bene®t judgments under a time-pressure condition designed to limit the use of analytic thought and enhance the reliance on aect. As expected, the inverse relationship was strengthened when time pressure was introduced. Study 2 tested and con®rmed the hypothesis that providing information designed to alter the favorability of one's overall aective evaluation of an item (say nuclear power) would systematically change the risk and bene®t judgments for that item. Both studies suggest that people seem prone to using an`aect heuristic' which improves judgmental eciency by deriving both risk and bene®t evaluations from a common source Ð aective reactions to the stimulus item. Copyright # 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. KEY WORDS aect heuristic; judgment; perception of risk; perception of bene®t Although aect has long played a key role in many behavioral theories, it has rarely been recognized as an important component of human judgment and decision making. Perhaps be®tting its rationalistic origins, the main focus of descriptive decision research has been cognitive, rather than aective. When principles of utility maximization appeared to be descriptively inadequate, Simon (1956) oriented the ®eld toward problem solving and information-processing models based upon bounded rationality and concepts such as satis®cing (as opposed to maximizing). The work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) demonstrated how boundedly rational individuals employed heuristics such as availability, representiveness, and anchoring and adjustment to make judgments and how they used simpli®ed strategies such
Rational actors or rational fools: Implications of the affect heuristic for behavioral economics
2002
This paper describes two fundamental modes of thinking. The experiential mode, is intuitive, automatic, natural, and based upon images to which positive and negative affective feelings have been attached through learning and experience. The other mode is analytic, deliberative, and reason based. I describe recent empirical research illuminating ���the affect heuristic��� wherein people rapidly consult their affective feelings, when making judgments and decisions. This heuristic enables us to be rational actors in many situations.
Rationality and Emotions in Decision Making
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems Scientific Journal, 2009
Decision making is traditionally viewed as a rational process where reason calculates the best way to achieve the goal. Investigations from different areas of cognitive science have shown that human decisions and actions are much more influenced by intuition and emotional responses then it was previously thought. In this paper I examine the role of emotion in decision making, particularly Damasio's hypothesis of somatic markers and Green's dual process theory of moral judgment. I conclude the paper with the discussion of the threat that deliberation and conscious rationality is an illusion.
The Role of Affect in Naturalistic Decision Making
Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making, 2010
The field of naturalistic decision making (NDM) assumes a "cold" cognitive model in that nonemotional, valence-neutral cues and information are predicted to influence decision making in identifiable ways. Judgment and decision-making research over the past 10 to 15 years, however, has greatly enhanced knowledge of the ways in which affect that is present at the time of decision making influences how people make decisions-specifically, how they process information, how they respond to risk, and which outcomes they prefer. The purpose of this article is to review relevant aspects of the literature on affect and decision making and to present the argument that NDM researchers need to be cognizant of the potential impact of affect on decision processes to adequately describe and predict expert decision making.
The decision-making process between rationality and emotions
2017
The decision-making process has been analyzed in several disciplines (economics, social sciences, humanities, etc.) with the aim of creating models to help decision-makers in strategy formulation. The Organizational theory takes into account both the decision-making process of individuals and groups of a company. Numerous models have been built, which include a wide range of psychological, environmental, hierarchical factors, all of which only account the notion of rationality. In time, such concept has come to be considered pragmatically unrealistic and unachievable. Emotions have recently acquired an increasingly significant position (in the academic and economic society) as important component of the decision making-process. From this point of view neuroscience, the new branch of medical sciences could play a key role in studying individual decision-making processes. This article suggests that thanks to neuroscience it is possible to overcome current limitations in economics studies, for individual's choices, which are exclusively based on the rational component.
The springs of action: Affective and analytical information processing in choice
2000
Abstract Affective processes were predicted to play a critical role in choices among complex stimuli. As hypothesized, self-report measures of individual differences in affective information processing were associated with choices in a task designed by Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, and Anderson (1994) to mimic the gains, losses, and uncertainties of real life decisions. The results were stronger when the processing of losses was considered separately from the processing of gains.