Paul-Henri Spaak and a paradox in Belgian foreign policy (original) (raw)

FROM "FREE HANDS" TO THE TREATY OF ROME: PAUL-HENRI SPAAK VS THE INTERNATIONALISM OF THE POB

International Conference "Nested Internationalisms: New Perspectives on Labour Activism Across Borders and Boundaries". Ghent, Belgium, 3-4 June 2022. Amsab-International Institute of Social History in association with ITH-International Conference of Labour and Social History. As Foreign Affairs minister and later prime minister, Paul-Henri Spaak considered the Spanish civil war a factor of political instability capable of threatening his coalition government with the liberals and Catholics as well as a serious threat of an outburst of European conflict. For an important part of the cadres and militancy of his party, the Belgian Workers' Party (POB), the Spanish conflict was considered an opportunity to safeguard and reaffirm the organization's internationalist identity. Another part of the POB, represented by Spaak himself, saw in the solidarity with the Spanish Republic a difficulty to consolidate, on the one hand, the neutralist foreign policy called “hands-free”, and on the other, the economic-national reformist agenda represented by the “Work Plan” of his revisionist mentor Hendrik De Man. Therefore, in its position as the government party, the POB was confronted with a dilemma that it was unable to resolve and that generated a conflict within it: respect its internationalist ideal or give priority to pragmatism in government action based on the development of a doctrine that De Man baptized as “national socialism”. Labour historiography has tended to condemn Spaak for his “betrayal” without really delving into the motives that sustained his political action. Of course, I do think he was an opportunist interested in his career. But his political action also responded to government interests. In this presentation, I will explain how Spaak sought to end the conflict within the POB by starting with the demolition of his traditional political culture -whose core was labour internationalism-, a culture that he considered inappropriate to the political circumstances of the moment. For this reason, he managed to impose the distinction between government action and party action through national and international recognition of his “hands-free” foreign policy and, with regard to Spain, amputated the solidarity campaign with the Republic to limit it to a purely humanitarian context, that is, politically harmless. In other words, Spaak succeeded in destroying the internationalism of the POB to impose a political vision based on the national withdrawal of the Belgian state, justified by the need to avoid suffering the consequences of another continental war. All in vain, as is well known. I will end with a post-war reference. When the events of World War II revealed these plausible and politically logical calculations as wrong, Spaak opportunistically embraced the new liberal internationalism. To do so, he used his political background and the use of the intellectual heritage of a discredited, reviled and condemned De Man. Thus, he served as the first president of the General Assembly of the United Nations and was an active part in the birth and early development of the European project through his contribution to the Treaty of Rome (1957) being therefore considered today as one of the founding fathers of the European Union.

Views of Belgian Exiles on the Postwar order in Europe

W. de Gruyter, 1986

, socialist trade union leader and doctor of political science, formerly chef de cabinet to P. H. Spaak; deputy secretary-general of the Belgian Confédération Générale des Travailleurs (1939). In London he was président of the Centre Syndical Belge and secretary-general of CEPAG. F. Van Cauwelaert. 'Europe no longer exists': doc. 167 below.

The Art of Compromise: Belgium as the Bridge between Germany and France

German Politics, 2021

This contribution applies the theoretical framework developed by Schoeller and Falkner (this issue) to the case of Belgium. First, it examines Belgium’s preferences and the status quo before and after the financial crisis, juxtaposed against Germany’s preferred outcomes. Belgium has traditionally favoured more integration, leading to Belgium’s strategy of co-shaping and pace-setting in regards to monetary integration through persuasion, cultivating alliances, and brokering compromises that satisfied Germany’s interests in EMU versus those of the European Commission and France. The global financial crisis changed Belgium’s strategy, as it became constrained by the effects of the crisis on its economy and the domestic political turmoil that ensued. Belgium went from a pre-crisis pace-setter to a fence-sitter, relying on the persuasion of its allies to convince Germany to agree to reform the architecture of euro area governance. Finally, this contribution considers the institutional fabric of Belgium’s relation to the hegemon. This is relatively weak between Belgium and Germany, making multilateral settings the preferred forum rather than bilateral. Nevertheless, Belgium’s famous capacity for forging compromises among disparate interests was demonstrated through the diplomacy of former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy as the European Council’s first full-time president.

The Reversal of Belgian Foreign Policy, 1936–1937

The Review of Politics, 1969

In October, 1936, the King of the Belgians, Leopold III, announced that the small Western European state planned to withdraw from her policy of alignment and adopt a policy which was “exclusively and completely Belgian.” Within six months, by the spring of 1937, Belgium signed an agreement with the French and British that replaced the defunct Locarno Pact and released her from the consultations and commitments involved in the Franco-Belgian Military Accords of 1920. The foreign policy of Belgium was altered to one of “independence” or neutrality and the two major powers of the West formally guaranteed her territorial integrity.

The Crisis of Belgian Federalism

When a people shall have become incapable of governing themselves, and fit for a master, it is of little consequence from what quarter he comes'.

Belgium: a pacification struggle and a new balance of power

VERHOEVEN, J. C. (1977) Belgium: a pacification struggle and a new balance of power. New York: The International Council on the Future of the University, 1977

When, in 1968-1969, a wave of student revolts swept through the Western European universities, Belgium did not escape. Street fights with police and occupations of university buildings were a familiar sight at some universities. Although in Belgium these revolts had to a large extent the same objectives as in the neighboring countries, one element was different. The stress of most revolts was on the demand for a new, more democratic management structure of the universities. But previously, there had already been a fierce revolt of the Flemish university community at Louvain (professors, assistants and students together) against the presence of a French-speaking university in the Flemish town of Louvain, and against the lack of self-management of the Flemish and Walloon sections of the university at Louvain. These two problems were resolved politically. The problem of the internal democratization of the universities was regulated by the act of 24 March 1971; in the universities of Brussels and Louvain it was still done before this time. This, however, did not meet with the approval of all members of parliament. Some of them thought that the universities should solve their own problems. The second problem brought more convulsion to parliament and government, to such an extent, that a government was forced to resign. The problem of Louvain had become a symbol of the Flemish emancipation struggle. The act of 28 May 1970 gave a permanent solution to this problem. This chapter is concerned with the origin of these two problems and with the effect of the political solutions given to them. A first series of questions will deal with the social framework in which the revolts took place, and which were the basis of the proposed solutions.

Expansion vs. Neutrality. How Belgian diplomats dealt with the ‘military question’, 1895-1914

This article investigates the attitude of Belgian diplomats in the debate about the creation of a stronger army in the decades before the First World War. Closely reading the writings of three members of the diplomatic corps and comparing their discourse with the words of their colleagues, it argues that the current historiographical narrative on the diplomats’ stance towards militarization is in need of revision. The Belgian diplomatic world was no monolithic block of officials whose strict interpretation of neutrality led them to oppose any reinforcement of the military until the final years before the outbreak of war. On the contrary, at least from the mid-1890s onwards, several diplomats jettisoned the reticent attitude which their professional quality required of them and took an active part in the propaganda for personal conscription. Their ideas about the purposes of militarizing the nation were conditioned by the prime importance they attached to the realization of Belgian economic and territorial expansion. They supported their argument for the strengthening of the army by appealing to a concept of patriotism that connected the military question to the need for a larger Belgian empire. This way of understanding patriotism also harbored an elitist concern for proper guidance of the masses. Whereas changes in political culture after the 1893 franchise extension had promoted in members of the upper classes a certain distaste for domestic politics, the diplomats among them had found in King Leopold II’s imperialism a motivation to deal with the politicization of the populace. In their view, the army would not only remove the social threat emanating from the lower classes by instilling discipline in their most virile members, it would also nourish their love for Belgium and, much like the colony had done for diplomats, give them pride as the defenders of a strong empire.