Dialectic and Gospel in the Development of Hegel’s Thinking (original) (raw)
2005
Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion is one of the most important resources from the nineteenth century for theology as it faces the challenges of modernity and postmodernity. A critical edition of these lectures was published in the 1980s, which makes possible a study of the text on a level of accuracy and insight hitherto unattainable. The present book (by the editor and translator of the critical edition) engages the speculative reconstruction of Christian theology that is accomplished by Hegel’s lectures, and it provides a close reading of the text as a whole. The first two chapters argue that Hegel’s philosophy of religion is a philosophical theology focused on the concept of spirit, and they provide an overview of his writings on religion prior to the philosophy of religion. The book analyses Hegel’s conception of the object and purpose of the philosophy of religion, his critique of the theology of his time, his approach to Christianity within the framework of the co...
Towards a theological interpretation of Hegel’s Master-Slave Dialectics. ‘The hill and the eye which sees it are object and subject, but between humanity and God, between spirit and spirit, there is no such cleft of objectivity subjectivity; one is to the other an other only in that one recognizes the other’ (Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, 1827) At heart Hegel suggests man is fundamentally a religious being. Religious not in a sense of fulfilling liturgical ceremonies and thus reaching apotheosis. Religion here indicates the order of the world and the self which is not in conflict, an order in real sense of its meaning. Order -where everything is clear and thus apotheosis is reached through as a form of total knowledge. In this sense Hegel is a religious man, and according to him, all men are religious in their roots, as they are part of that ethereal world order. This quest for order thus makes his philosophy a theological one.
Hegel and Phenomenology: Introduction
Hegel Bulletin, 2017
Reaction against Hegel-which leads back to Hegel. How?', we read in Merleau-Ponty's course notes from the Collège de France (Merleau-Ponty [1954-55] 2010: 63). This interrogative marks the whole history of twentieth-century phenomenology, which is clearly indebted to Hegel's thought in significant ways. Husserl's concern with the historical and cultural life-world in the Crisis of European Sciences; Heidegger's ontological interpretation of logic and concern with the historicization of human existence; Merleau-Ponty's dialectic of the visible and invisibleall involve an implicit return to Hegelian themes and strategies. Surprisingly, however, such affinity was not acknowledged by most of the representatives of the phenomenological movement. 1 At the dawn of the phenomenological movement both Husserl and Heidegger were deeply influenced by Franz Brentano, who was virulently anti-Hegelian. In his Four Phases of Philosophy of 1895, Brentano theorized that philosophy progressed in four phases, including alternating phases of abundance and different stages of decline. Brentano diagnosed his own age as one of decline, hence he advocated a renewal of philosophy as rigorous science. According to his periodization, all great periods of growth in philosophy are characterized by the preponderance of the purely theoretical interest and develop a method proper to the subject matter (Brentano 1968: 9). In this first stage philosophy is pursued as a theoretical science. After a while, theoretical activity inevitably weakens and practical interests begin to dominate, e.g., the Stoics and Epicureans in the post-Aristotelian period. This applied phase is followed by a third phase when scepticism grows, counterbalanced by the construction of sects and dogmatic philosophies (among which he included Kant). Finally, in a fourth phase, mysticism, intuitionism and irrationalist world views, 'pseudo-philosophy', and religious Schwärmerei proliferate (e.g., Plotinus; Schelling and Hegel in recent times), leading to moral and intellectual collapse (Brentano 1968: 58). Hegel, then, was seen by Brentano as a Romantic mystic who betrayed the true spirit of scientific philosophy. Husserl rarely refers to Hegel. In the 1900 Prolegomena to his 1901 Logical Investigations he repeats the common prejudice against Hegel that he rejected the Principle of Non-Contradiction (Husserl 1975: §40). The early Husserl in his
How theological is Hegel's theology? A response to Cyril O'Regan
A defence of Hegel's 'logic of reconciliation' in the light of O'Regan's critique of Hegel in /The Heterodox Hegel/ and in /The Anatomy of Misremebering I/. It is argued that Hegel makes valid claims about certain pairs of terms (e.g. thinking/being, subject/object) but over-extends them into areas where those claims do not apply (e.g. prayer, doctrine). O'Regan (and Balthasar, in his account) make valid criticisms of Hegel but over-extend them to include his entire thought. This inhibits proper appreciation of where Hegel's generativity for theology lies, namely in his investigations into logical forms.
This essay traces the relationship between Hegel and some common portrayals of modern philosophy in the nineteenth century. I explain much of the rationale behind the neo-Kantian narrative of modern philosophy, and argue that the common division of modern philosophers into rationalists and empiricists executed a principally anti-Hegelian agenda. I then trace some failed attempts by anglophone philosophers to reconcile Hegel with the neo-Kantian history, in the interest of explaining Hegel's subsequent unpopularity in England and America. Finally, I argue that recent attempts to read Hegel in Kantian terms often rest on a misguided appropriation of an anti-Hegelian historical narrative.
Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 2021
Hegel regarded his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences as the work which most fully presented the scope of his philosophical system and its method. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that some scholars regularly accord it only a secondary status. This Critical Guide seeks to change that, with sixteen newly written essays from an international group of Hegel scholars that shed much-needed light on both the whole and the parts of the Encyclopedia system. Topics include the structure and aim of the Encyclopedia system as a whole, the differences between the greater and lesser Logics, the role of nature in Hegel’s thinking, Hegel’s account of the relationship between body and soul, theory and praxis, mind and matter, his account of rational politics and the shapes of absolute spirit as art, religion and philosophy. This book will be invaluable to all students and scholars with an interest in Hegel and the history of philosophy.
Idealistic Studies, 2010
Hegel indicates toward the end of his Phenomenology of Spirit that there would be a parallelism in the categories of his later system to the various configurations of consciousness in the Phenomenology. Some general correspondences have been indicated by Otto Pöggeler and suggested by Robert Grant McRae, but I argue in this paper that there are at least four important and more specific parallels, bringing out simultaneously a similarity of content and a difference of approach and methodology in the two works: 1) in the philosophical construal of "categories"; 2) in the conceptualization of a "phenomenology"; 3) in the analysis of the dialectical relationship of religion and art; and 4) in the relationship of the history of philosophy to the Absolute.
In G.W.F. Hegel: Key Concepts, Routledge, 2014
Understood in its widest sense, the term “hermeneutics” can be taken to refer to the theory and/or practice of any interpretation aimed at uncovering the meaning of any expression, regardless of whether such expression was produced by a human or non-human source. Understood in a narrower sense, the term “hermeneutics” can be taken to refer to a particular stream of thought regarding the theory and/or practice of interpretation, developed mainly by German-speaking theorists from the late eighteenth through to the late twentieth century. “Hermeneutics” in its broadest sense dates at least as far back as the ancient Greeks and is linked etymologically to the ancient Greeks’ mythological deity Hermes, who was said to deliver and interpret messages from the gods to mortals. “Hermeneutics” in its narrower sense emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, initially for the purpose of addressing problems in the interpretation of classical and biblical tests and then later for the purpose of articulating a more “universalized” theory of interpretation of general. This chapter traces the development of hermeneutics in its narrow sense through the work of Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), and then concludes with some observations about what Hegel’s own hermeneutical thought might mean against the backdrop of this development.
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: A Reappraisal
1997
The papers by Harris and Rose were printed initially in the Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, no.29. The late Gillian Rose's paper was first prepared for the Conference on Modernism: Politics, Poetics, Practice, King's College, Cambridge, July 1993. She did not revise the paper before her death. The papers by Duquette, Jarvis, Flay and Bernstein are longer, revised versions of papers which were originally published in the Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, no.29. Hubner's paper is a revision and translation of a paper, "Problemgeschichte und systematischer Sinn der 'Phanomenologie' Hegels", which first appeared in Dialektik und Wissenschaft, (Frankfurt/Main, 1974). I am grateful for Rudiger Hubner's permission to allow this piece to be translated for this volume. I am also thankful for the excellent translation undertaken by Cara Ryan. Material for Duquette's article was drawn from an article entitled, "Civic and Political Freedom in Hegel", Southwest Philosophy Review, vo1.6, no.l, whose permission to draw on this material is gratefully acknowledged. The Comments have all been especially commissioned for this volume. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the support and good humour of all the contributors who have responded conscientiously to a stream of requests. I would also like to thank Maja de Keijzer of Kluwer, for her willingness to listen to and act upon a range of editorial requests. Thanks are also due to members of the Hegel Society of Great Britain who helped in the
The Beginning Before the Beginning: Hegel and the Activation of Philosophy
This paper suggests that it is not enough to simply account for the lsquo;beginningrsquo; in Hegelrsquo;s philosophy. To capture the speculative depth of Hegelrsquo;s thinking one must also account for the beginning of philosophy as such. That is, how or why the philosopher begins or lsquo;the beginning before the beginningrsquo;. The question of the activation of the philosophical project itself is explored through Hegelrsquo;s notion of the lsquo;need of philosophyrsquo; and the fundamental relation between the historical event of the French Revolution and philosophical thinking. This question is explored through a critical discussion of those thinkers who are also concerned with the philosophy/revolution relation but are critical of Hegelrsquo;s approach. It is suggested that these critical readings employ a thematic approach to both Hegel and philosophy more generally. This approach renders them unable to appreciate Hegelrsquo;s philosophy speculatively and as a consequence the relation between philosophy and freedom, via the revolution, is misconstrued. In contradistinction to these readings the question of how one encounters Hegelrsquo;s thought non-thematically is explored through an analysis of the willingness of the would-be philosopher to activate themselves into the philosophical project and dwell with Hegel in the lsquo;wersquo;. Rather than providing answers to the questions raised, this paper seeks to act as a provocation for a renewed encounter with Hegelrsquo;s philosophy
Why Turn to Hegel Today? An Introduction
Ethics in Progress, 2024
This brief introduction sets the stage for the central aim of this issue of Ethics in Progress devoted to Hegel: to underscore the enduring relevance of his thought, in particular his Philosophy of Nature and his Realphilosophie, in addressing contemporary challenges. While Hegel may appear to some as an abstract thinker, seemingly surpassed by the demands of our era, the core elements of his philosophy – particularly the dialectical method, his reflections on the complex relationship between Natur (nature) and Geist (spirit), and key concepts such as Anerkennung (recognition) and Wille (will) – continue to provide a vital conceptual framework for addressing pressing issues of our time. These include the environmental crisis and the evolving dynamics between humanity, nature, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence. Consequently, this issue strives to approach Hegel through the lens of our contemporary experience, not to distort or “denaturalize” his thought, nor to fall into the trap of anachronism, but to breathe new life into the concept. By doing so, it invites the reader to listen anew to what Hegel’s philosophy might still teach us today.
Hegel's Phenomenology : Reverberations in His Later System
Idealistic Studies, 2010
Hegel indicates toward the end of his Phenomenology of Spirit that there would be a parallelism in the categories of his later system to the various configurations of consciousness in the Phenomenology. Some general correspondences have been indicated by Otto Pöggeler and suggested by Robert Grant McRae, but I argue in this paper that there are at least four important and more specific parallels, bringing out simultaneously a similarity of content and a difference of approach and methodology in the two works: 1) in the philosophical construal of "categories"; 2) in the conceptualization of a "phenomenology"; 3) in the analysis of the dialectical relationship of religion and art; and 4) in the relationship of the history of philosophy to the Absolute.
The Self and Its Body in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
"This treatise makes an outstandingly important contribution to the interpretation of the Phenomenology." --H.S. Harris, The Owl of Minerva A major criticism of Hegel's philosophy is that it fails to comprehend the experience of the body. In this book, John Russon shows that there is in fact a philosophy of embodiment implicit in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Russon argues that Hegel has not only taken account of the body, but has done so in a way that integrates both modern work on embodiment and the approach to the body found in ancient Greek philosophy. Although Russon approaches Hegel's Phenomenology from a contemporary standpoint, he places both this standpoint and Hegel's work within a classical tradition. Using the Aristotelian terms of 'nature' and 'habit,' Russon refers to the classical distinction between biological nature and a cultural 'second nature.' It is this second nature that constitutes, in Russon's reading of Hegel, the true embodiment of human intersubjectivity. The development of spirit, as mapped out by Hegel, is interpreted here as a process by which the self establishes for itself an embodiment in a set of social and political institutions in which it can recognize and satisfy its rational needs. Russon concludes by arguing that self-expression and self-interpretation are the ultimate needs of the human spirit, and that it is the degree to which these needs are satisfied that is the ultimate measure of the adequacy of the institutions that embody human life. This link with classicism - in itself a serious contribution to the history of philosophy -provides an excellent point of access into the Hegelian system. Russon's work, which will prove interesting reading for any Hegel scholar, provides a solid and reliable introduction to the study of Hegel.
In the Spirit of Critique. Critical Theory in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
This dissertation is a reconstruction of Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit that establishes its underlying continuity with “Frankfurt School” thought. In three parts, it shows how Hegel’s early text expounds the “inner cells” of a unified and defensible critical theory. Part I shows that the Phenomenology obeys an exacting model of “immanent critique” – a philosophical method that promotes a self-reflexive transformation in “spirit.” I additionally connect Hegel’s discussion of “speculative sentences” to this immanent method. Part II develops an interpretation of the “object” corresponding to this method, so-called “natural consciousness.” I claim that the Phenomenology exhibits natural consciousness as the bearer of a “second nature” that must be “defetishized” through Hegel’s critical procedure. Further, I show that, in the “blindness” suffered by natural consciousness, Hegel has constructed an early model of “ideological delusion.” Part III advances the view that the entire Phenomenology can be read as a derivation of the immanent-critical standpoint, as it subverts all standpoints that remain “external” to their objects. The Phenomenology suggests, in fact, that this structure of “externality” is at the core of three modern “rational pathologies”: namely, “instrumental reason,” “nihilistic disenchantment,” and “moralizing criticism.” The Conclusion recollects the various “cells” isolated in the preceding discussion and integrates them into a Hegelian Critical Theory. The dissertation ends by contemplating several intellectual-historical questions regarding Hegel’s own intentions for such a critically transformative philosophy.