Aristotle`s concept of the good Life (original) (raw)
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Aristotle's Pursuit of the Good Life
Aristotle's Pursuit of the Good Life , 2017
In Book I of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, three types of lives that are generally observed to be conventional permutations of ways of living are presented as candidates for the good life. They are the life of pleasure, the political life, and the life of philosophical contemplation. The life of pleasure is immediately dismissed as a viable candidate because those that equate the good with pleasure lack the essential qualities that are required for the cultivation of a good and meaningful life. The political life, i.e. a life that is centered on action and doing good deeds for the benefit of other citizens is not so easily dismissed as a candidate for the good life due to the moral virtues that are practiced in such a life. In Book X Aristotle declares that it is indeed the life of philosophical contemplation that is the best candidate for achieving the good life. The greatest good and the goal of all action is to attain eudaimonia, i.e. happiness, or well-being, which is, according to Aristotle, not a state but an activity. Choosing a life dedicated to philosophical contemplation, however, in itself, does not necessarily assure the attainment of eudaimonia, which is a permanent possession of the soul. In addition to choosing the right kind of life to live, Aristotle argues, one's life must also be comprised of partaking in good, correct actions, which, throughout time, lead to the development of virtues. Aristotle states that there are two different kinds of virtues, moral virtues and intellectual virtues, which are, respectively, developed through practice and instruction, and are, in almost all circumstances, achieved by striving for what is moderate in things and situations. Additionally, the external goods, as in sufficient material possessions, and having a few good friends are also essential constituents of the good life. This paper will examine the components required for attaining the good life according to Aristotle's arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics, and will propose that an awareness of the teleological aspect of human nature is indeed necessary for the acquisition of eudaimonia.
The main topic of both Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (NE) and his Politics (P) is the achievement of happiness ("eudaimonia") or the good life. In this essay I will briefly introduce the background of Aristotle and his Politics. Then after defining the key terms of the discussion, I will Present Aristotle's teleological argument and his argument based on the rule of law for the value of participation in politics. However I will also point out why both arguments are insufficient if the family is observed more carefully in Aristotle's conception. I will conclude by looking at the conflict between the philosophical life and the practical life and how they create an argument for the necessity of politics in achieving a good life. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) migrated from Stagira to Athens and was a student at Plato's Academy. He then founded his own school in the city, the Lyceum. It is ironic that, while he argues for the intrinsic value of participation in politics, he himself was never a citizen of Athens where he lived most of his life. 1 Ober notes that the analytical detail of the Politics might be rooted in the rare chance he had as an academic, that his ideas would be applied for the improvement of the government of the newly founded Greek colonies of Egypt and Asia. 2 This would explain Aristotle's pragmatic approach and careful attention to feasibility as opposed to Plato's idealist Republic.
Aristotle on the Essence of Happiness
Recent discussions of Aristotle's doctrine of the good often take up the question whether his doctrine is inclusive or dominant. The distinction between an "inclusive" and a "dominant" conception of the final good can be briefly explained as follows. Let us suppose, first, that A, B, and C are the only goods which are desirable for their own sake and, second, that A is more desirable than B or C. According to the "dominant" conception, the final good will be identical with A, and one who seeks to be happy should devote all of his energies to the pursuit of A. On the "inclusive" conception, the good will consist of A, B, and C together, and one can achieve a happy life only by pursuing all three of these goods, paying special attention to A on account of its superiority. W. F. R. Hardie, who first introduced this distinction some years ago, argued that Aristotle did not have a clear grasp of it, and, as a result, the discussion of the final good in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics (NE I) suffers from a basic confusion. l In some passages Aristotle speaks of the good as if it were an inclusive end, but in other places he clearly treats it as a dominant end. Hardie's view has been challenged by J. L. Ackrill, who tries to show that Aristotle's concep
The Highest Good and the Best Activity: Aristotle on the Well-Lived Life
2011
The question of how Aristotle characterizes eudaimonia, or living-well, in the Nicomachean Ethics has long been a contentious issue amongst Aristotelian scholars. The secondary literature has been roughly divided between inclusivist readers, who argue that Aristotle designates both theoria, or contemplation, and the practical virtues, and exclusivist readers, who argue that Aristotle singles out theoria alone. This thesis seeks to forge a middle ground between these two perspectives by focusing on the central claim of Book I that the eudaimonia is virtuous activity. Reading Book X in light of Book I's claim then allows one to show that both the practical virtues and theoria are able to attain eudaimonia, and that the well-lived life will be one that draws upon both activities.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia, 2019
Andrius Bielskis's book is a novel and ambitious endeavour to address the problem of the meaning of human existence-the question of the meaning of lifethat has been formulated by many modern and contemporary philosophers. To tackle this question Bielskis critically engages with a number of celebrated European thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus and Jürgen Habermas. Bielskis rejects criticisms, advanced by some analytical philosophers, that the question about the meaning of life is a nonsense question, but he, nevertheless, applies analytical argumentation throughout his book by challenging the modern and contemporary continental answers to this question. But, at the same time, Bielskis is also committed to a historical approach to philosophical analysis (and to historical materialism). He argues that the question should be posed against the historical background of the present since "the horizon of human life is history and culture," "human life is marked by temporality and historicity" and "our identities and our ability to understand ourselves are always historical." 1 Indeed, the recurrent theme of the book in all chapters is to answer the question of whether life is worth living and whether it has any meaning. This, of course, is not a new question. What is new is that the author tries to answer the question by offering a novel and critical interpretation of Aristotle's moral and political philosophy, arguing persuasively that neo-Aristotelian philosophy provides a viable answer to the questions that have been raised by the aforementioned Euro
Happiness in Aristotle's Ethics
For Aristotle, happiness corresponds to the highest kind of virtue. In Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle treats practical virtues, and in Book X, he treats theoretical contemplation as the best practice that might guarantee happiness. Thus, Aristotle might be said to have given two answers (naturalistic and theological) to the question of the nature of happiness. This is because the self-sufficient character of happiness implies its intrinsic value, and practical activities-which are deemed intrinsically valuable in Book I are treated as having secondary value, in Book X, as a means to the higher (theoretical) happiness. Some people believe that Aristotle has finally failed to remain committed to the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental good, falling into a contradiction in his definition of happiness. In this paper, in the first place, we draw on the analytic method and revisit the notion of kalon to show that the function of theo
Making the most of life: a critical analysis of the Greek metaphysical conception of the good life
Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy, 2008
Does life have meaning? If so, what Is It? Almost everybody has tried their hands at a jigsaw puzzle at one time or another. Typically, the finished picture is represented as the cover of the box. These are helpful in solving the puzzle for without a clue to what you are working towards, the individuals pieces are a chaotic and a meaningless jungle of colours and shapes. Without the big picture the individual pieces would almost represent anything. Is the same thing true with our lives? Is life made of fragments of experiences, and events-some of which are often joyous, some tragic, or are they mundane details ofour daily routine. Do these pieces ofour life contribute to our overall meaning? Do they somehow fit into the bigger picture? What is the meaning of life? Socrates In response to the Sophists of his time strove to divorce life and its true meaning from a conception entangled with skepticism and disorder which saw the fulfilment of life manifested in the acquisition of wealth and fame by whatever means possible. This paper hopes to x-ray the Western metaphysical conception of life while analyzing the existentialist position of the subject, with a view to further elucidate the past attempts at the questions put forward in the first part of this abstract, which, in other words, can be put thus "What is the good life?. What does ittakes to make the most of it?. introduction A first insight the term Philosophy draws one to the ancient conception that the Greek s associated with philosophy, and that is, "the love of wisdom". By this definition the earliest usage of the term philosophy associates it with all spheres of knowledge (branches of knowledge). By this, every field of endeavor you could think of, that had to do with one form of language or the other, is regarded as philosophy. The turn of the 19*" century however seemed to have changed all that, for various fields and branches oflearning have all gained independence living what most people will call, "more veriety ofspeculetive subjects thet do not fit into the molds ofscientific inquiry. This seeming change in the object of enquiry tends to only draw us further away with issues, questions and inquiries that demand ourserious attention and reflection, especially on fundamental issues and inquires which those otherdisciplines, now independent, may never in their life time ask.Ô ne ofsuch fundamental issues ofgreat importance is the question of "the meaningof life'
Human ability to freely choose requires knowledge of human nature and the final end of man. For Aristotle, this end is happiness or full flourishing, which involves various virtues. Modern scholarship has led to debate over which virtues are absolutely necessary. Taking into account the hierarchical nature of the soul and the fact that relationships with the divine and with others are necessary for human flourishing, it can be seen that human flourishing requires contemplation, phronesis and all the moral virtues, as perfections of the various parts of the soul. The truly happy person has actualized all of his faculties and potential relationships. Rather than taking one of the standard exclusivist or inclusivist viewpoints on this 'problem of the two lives,' this paper argues that a holistic reading of Aristotle's ethical works requires a hierarchical and relational view of the virtues, with all of them necessary for human flourishing.