Causation in Early Modern Philosophy (original) (raw)

H ume observes in the Treatise: "There is no question, which on account of its importance, as well as difficulty, has caus' d more disputes both among antient and modem philosophers, than this concerning the efficacy of causes, or that quality which made them be followed by their effects" (1.3.14).1 In their prolonged debate about causation, modem philosophers concern themselves with two grand issues-namely, how to describe the metaphysics of causation, that is, what is really going on in causal processes, and how these processes can be known. Within these grand issues, there are four central and specific questions: (1) Do bodies act on other bodies? (2) Do minds act on bodies? (3) Do bodies act on minds? (4) What, if any, is the division oflabor between God and created things in producing change? In this extremely useful volume, editor Steven Nadler has collected ten papers each of which contributes to a better understanding of causation in early modem philosophy-especially with respect to the grand issues and central questions. The variety of topics encompassed in this volume plus the fact that the papers are relatively short-about 25 printed pages-leaves the reader asking more questions and wanting more information. Such a volume-solid in its history and provocative in its content-constitutes an excellent foundation for a seminar on causation in the early modem period. Daniel Garber's essay, "Descartes and Occasionalism," quickly reaches the conclusion that "in the material world, at least, Godis the only genuine causal agent" (p. 14). Garber argues that this conclusion is a consequence of Descartes' "doctrine of continual re-creation" or, what is the same "divine sustenance" (pp. 12-13). Garber's basic argument is that, given Descartes' view that conserving the world is equivalent to recreating (sustaining) it at each moment, Descartes is committed either to the cinematic view that at each moment of time God recreates each finite substance complete with its set of properties including its place, or the divineimpulse view that at each moment God "causes motion by impulse, by a kind of divine shove" (p. 15). On the first view, it is clear that when God recreates a material substance, God must either recreate it at the same place or a different place; hence local motion becomes a direct effect of God's will. On the second view, Garber's preferred interpretation, there may be causes of motion other than God,