been largely ignored in the secondary literature . Kant's optimistic thesis about the analyticity of freedom and morality, by which the autonomous will ( Wille ) is equated to practical reason, has been mistakenly taken as Kant's last word regarding human freedom. 3 This view overlooks Kant's (original) (raw)

2009

Contemporary debates in moral philosophy have primarily been focused on meta-ethical questions about the justifi cation of morality, disregarding the ease with which perfectly justifi ed norms are displaced by non-moral considerations. 1 Given the scope, magnitude, and inventiveness of human wrongdoing, this philosophical trend seems utterly misguided. The challenge does not lie so much in how to justify morality, but in understanding how perfectly justifi ed judgments are so easily disregarded by self-serving calculations. 2 Kant's doctrine of radical evil has much to tell us about this. Against the widespread tendency to explain evil in terms of the pernicious power of natural inclinations, Kant believed that evil represented "an invisible enemy, one who hides behind reason and hence [is] all the more dangerous" (R 6: 57). The enemy is invisible, for "no matter how far back we direct our attention to our moral state, we fi nd that this state is no longer res integra " (R 6: 58n.). And it is exceptionally dangerous, for the corruption in question is self-imposed: "genuine evil consists in our will not to resist the inclinations when they invite transgression" (ibid.). Since this type of volition rests on a maxim, and maxim formation in Kant always takes place under the constraints of

Kant on Radical Evil and the Origin of Moral Responsibility

Kantian Review, 2013

The notion of radical evil plays a more important role in Kant’s moral theory than is typically recognized. In Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason, radical evil is both an innate propensity and a morally imputable act – a paradoxical status that has prompted commentators to reject it as inconsistent with the rest of Kant’s moral theory. In contrast, I argue that the notion of radical evil accounts for the beginning of moral responsibility in Kant’s theory, since the act of attributing radical evil to one’s freedom is an inauguration into the autonomous stance.

Kant’s Theodicy and its Role in the Development of Radical Evil

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2018

In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that rational beings should want to have no inclin ations. But in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, he asserts that the inclin ations are good in themselves. While many commentators hold that Kant simply wrote hyperbolically in the Groundwork and the second Critique, I argue Kant was sincere, and changed his mind about the worth of the inclinations between the second Critique and the Religion. This is because he changed his mind about the source of immorality: whereas in the Groundwork and Critique of Practical Reason Kant took our inclinations to be tempters, starting in "Miscarriage of All Phil osophical Trials in Theodicy" and concluding in the Religion, he posited a selfim posed propensity to evil as the source of immorality. Kant's reason for changing his mind about the source of immorality was partly theological: if our inclin ations were to blame for immorality, then God would also be to blame for creating us with them. The only way God could not be to blame is if our immorality were selfimposed. But Kant also concluded that looking for theoretical explanations of our immorality-whether theological or naturalistic-was itself problematic: such explanations ended up exonerating us for our immorality. Because they had this effect, I contend that Kant saw the offering of such exculpating theoret ical explanations as itself motivated by immorality. This understanding of Kant makes sense of the approaches he takes in both "Miscarriage" and Religion.

Kant on the Radical Evil of Human Nature

The Philosophical Forum, 2007

Whether the human being is good or evil, must not lie in the difference between the incentives [of self-love and morality] that he incorporates into his maxim…but in their subordination (in the form of the maxim): which of the two he makes the condition of the other. It follows that the human being (even the best) is evil only because he reverses the moral order of his incentives in incorporating them into his maxims. (6:36) An important consequence of this is that the ground of evil cannot be located in either "the sensuous nature of the human being" itself, nor in the natural inclinations which arise from it. (6:35) This is because evil only arises when we freely adopt a maxim that subordinates the incentives of morality to other non-moral interests. But why do we do this? Kant's radical evil thesis is an attempt to answer this question by locating the root of all evil maxims. However, in order to correctly understand Kant's radical evil thesis, we need to first understand the way that Kant uses three key technical terms-namely, 'predisposition' (Anlage), 'propensity' (Hang) and 'disposition' (Gesinnung). 4 Kant defines three predispositions to the good, each of which are not only negatively good, in the sense that it does not resist the moral law, but are also positively good, in the sense that compliance is required, (6:28) although only within the constraints of the moral law. Kant derives these three predispositions to the good by thinking of persons as animal, human and moral beings respectively. The first predisposition to the good is to animality. This predisposition is based on what Kant calls mechanical or physical self-love, by which he means love for which reason is not required. Specifically, this takes three forms: selfpreservation, propagation of the species through the sexual drive, and community with other beings through the social drive. The predisposition to animality, if misused, can lead to the "savagery of nature" inherent in the "bestial vices of gluttony, lust and wild lawlessness (in relation to other human beings)". (6:26-7) The second predisposition is to humanity and is based on a form of self-love which is both physical and rational, as it involves comparison, for which reason is required. Out of this self-love originates a desire But it remains the case that we do not act autonomously, in Kant's technical sense of the term, when we adopt evil maxims, even if we do so freely and spontaneously after much careful deliberation. 4 It is important to note that Kant's terms 'Anlage' and 'Gesinnung' are not as closely related as their English translations, 'predisposition' and 'disposition', might suggest. Kant and the Radical Evil of Human Nature-3-for comparison of one's own social circumstances with others, which leads to competition and the progress of humanity. However, if misused, this predisposition leads to what Kant calls the "vices of culture", which, in their "extreme degrees of malignancy" lead to the "diabolical vices" of "envy, ingratitude, [and] joy in others' misfortune". (6:27) The third predisposition is to personality, which concerns the human being solely intellectually (or rationally) and is defined as the "susceptibility to respect the moral law as of itself a sufficient incentive to the power of choice". (6:27) This last predisposition points to the 'fact of reason' that we find the moral law in itself motivating. 5

Kant on the Limits of Human Evil

Journal of Philosophical Research, 2009

Kant has often been accused of being far too 'optimistic' when it comes to the extremes of evil that humans can perpetrate upon another. In particular, Kant's supposed claim that humans cannot choose evil qua evil has struck many people as simply false. Another problem for Kant, or perhaps the same problem in another guise, is his supposed claim that all evil is done for the sake of self-love. While self-love might be a plausible way to explain some instances of evil, it seems to be an implausible way to explain instances where people imprudently act in senselessly destructive and even self-destructive ways. Can Kant handle such extreme cases of moral evil? I shall argue that Kant can handle such cases by: 1) defending Kant's denial of the possibility of a devilish human being; 2) showing how Kant can conceptually account for agents who choose evil qua evil; and 3) putting Kant's account of passions to work in order to understand self-destructive evil. Kant on the Limits of Human Evil-2-'optimistic' to consider even the very worst crimes, genocide included, as beyond humanity.

Kant on Radical Evil: A Pragmatic Reading

Tattva Journal of Philosophy, 2021

One of the primary concerns of Immanuel Kant in his major works on philosophy of religion is the doctrine of radical evil. He was greatly perplexed by the conundrums of this doctrine. Although Kant claimed it to be a universal trait, he failed to give a formal proof (evidence) supporting it. However, he asserted that the conducts of human beings are enough to demonstrate the nature of radical evil. The complexity of the doctrine is further fuelled by introducing the idea of the need of divine intervention for one to overcome such moral-religious predicament. Critical responses from both Christian and secular scholars reflect interesting take on his ethico-religious discourse. One of the prominent criticisms to Kant’s doctrine of radical evil is its relapse to religious absurdity reflecting the Christian doctrine of the ‘fall of mankind’ as narrated in the first book of the Bible. Consequently, the seriousness of the criticism not only affects the moral maxims but also the portrayal ...

Every Man Has His Price: Kant's Argument for Universal Radical Evil

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy

Kant famously claims that we have all freely chosen evil. This paper offers a novel account of the much-debated justification for this claim. I reconstruct Kant's argument from his affirmation that we all have a price-we can all succumb to temptation. I argue that this follows a priori from a theoretical principle of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely that all empirical powers have a finite, changeable degree, an intensive magnitude. Because of this, our reason can always be overpowered by sensible inclinations. Kant moreover holds that this necessary feature of our moral psychology should not have been the case: We ought to instead be like the divine human being, for whom the moral law yields a greater incentive than any possible temptation. On Kant's view, we are thus responsible for having a price, and the synthetic a priori fact that we do proves that we each made an initial choice of evil.

Nature Without Evil: The Missing Term in Kant's Moral View of the World

In this paper I examine the challenge evil poses to Kant’s moral view of the world in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Radical evil, as he conceives of it, poses a unique problem for moral philosophy, since it inheres universally in humanity (and thus belongs to human nature in some sense) but is at the same time imputable to agents (and is therefore freely chosen). Kant attempts to resolve the problem, but only at the cost of separating radical evil from any rational origin. By means of an antinomy that demonstrates the difficulties of coherently attributing evil either to nature or to freedom, I argue that understanding the problem of evil in Kant involves recognizing the origin of radical evil in diabolical evil, which must ultimately be excluded from the system of practical philosophy as incomprehensible. Thus, contrary to readings that see Kant grappling with the problem of evil in order to resolve inadequacies in either the notion of freedom or the empty formalism of the good, I argue that the real difficulty for Kant lies in understanding pure evil as an inconceivable causality outside the domain of causal law. Finally, I draw on this analysis to explain why diabolical evil does appear to sometimes play a role in human behavior.

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