Security as a threat to development: the geopolitics of water scarcity in the Nile River basin (original) (raw)
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The terminology and theory of “regional security complexes” (RSC) may be new, yet, the underlying factors, causes and characteristics are as old as human civilization and/or the River Nile. Out of the eleven countries the Nile is flowing through, Ethiopia and Egypt – with in-between Sudan – are “hosting” the Blue Nile, which carries about 85% of all the river’s water. With both Egypt and Ethiopia trying to cope with a rapidly growing (exploding) population of already over one hundred million each, as well as the necessity of providing food and electricity, water sharing has become an imminent task and a direct threat for both. Thus, the recent – but already decade-long – hostility between Egypt and Ethiopia over the sharing of the water of the river resulted in the emergence of a new regional security sub-complex, that of the Nile basin.
The historical inter-state dispute over the allocation and utilisation of the Nile River waters has endured ever-evolving patterns of intra-basin re-lationships, multi-level dynamics of water policy making and fluctuating intensity in conflictive and cooperative interactions. The transboundary na-ture of the Nile waters reveals the interconnectedness of the Nile states, which rely upon the Nile ecosystem not only for the satisfaction of econom-ic, social and cultural needs, but also for the maintenance of peace and security in the region. The absence of an effective integrated mechanism for the man-agement of the Nile flows has resulted in the persistence of asymmetries among the riparian countries over the control and use of an essential re-source: thus, whether the conflict potential of the Nile waters could turn into a driver for potential cooperation represents the core issue of the pre-sent research. This study explores the processes that have led to the current status quo of the Nile hydropolitics, in the search for alternative in-terpretations to the mainstream perspectives emerging from the existing Literature. The case-study methodological approach aims at unveiling new empirical insights over the dynamics of transboundary water management in the Nile Basin, through the application of an original theoretical frame-work, which is built upon a multi-disciplinary focus that combines theories of International Relations and Environmental Studies. In particular, the crit-ical assessment over inter-state power asymmetries uncovers the relational process of compliance and contestation to the consolidated hy-dro-hegemonic regime in the Nile Basin, providing an original analysis over material and discursive structures that constitute both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic mechanisms of water control. In so doing, the investi-gative process formulates assumptions over the complex dynamics that shape the current Nile hydropolitics, while at the same time tracing histori-cal processes of intra-basin negotiations over the management of transboundary water resources, as well as exploring possible future sce-narios in terms of both geophysical projections and policy recommendations towards an effective integrated management of the Nile flows. Finally, providing new elements for the analysis of conflict, coop-eration and governance in international river basins, this study also contributes to the theoretical development of the emerging field of critical hydropolitics.
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This proposal aims to analyze the securitization process of water resources, taking into account the conflicts motivated by access to water in two different regions in the world. This work applies the theory of securitization, as developed by the Copenhagen School, in which the process of communication and political security, understood as a speech act, are emphasized. From the analysis of two different cases on the competition for water, namely the case of the Aral Sea basin in Central Asia, involving the post-Soviet states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and that of the Nile River basin in East Africa. The goal is to understand the different concepts and approaches related to the securitization of water resources (proposed by the Copenhagen School) in order to reflect both on the concept of security and the applicability of recent developments in the field of human security studies to understand conflicts involving water resources.
Contemporary Water Diplomacy on the Nile Basin
The Nile Basin has been experiencing process of dramatic changes since the middle of the 1990s which opens a new chapter in the hydropolitics of the Nile. Two most important features the signing and ratification of the CFA andEthiopiàs ongoing construction of the GERD characterize the hydropolitics of the Nile Basin. These contemporary developments in the Basin are signals that the old game is waning and a new Nile basin that will benefit all its riparian states and their peoples equitably and reasonably is emerging. Firstly, this process of change is a result of years of water diplomacy which involves the negotiation of the riparian states to create a permanent Nile River basin organization based on a multilateral and basin wide binding Nile water treaty that could regulate the utilization and management of the Nile waters in the Basin. Secondly such a transition is also a result of the political decision which involves by a few upstream riparian states such as Ethiopia in undertaking mega hydraulic infrastructures on the Nile which was unthinkable a few years back. EspeciallyEthiopiàs mega dam GERD has an all-encompassing hydropolitical implication to the Nile Basin and is shaping the current and future hydropolitics of the Nile Basin despite not welcomed by Egypt. How is the different implications manifested on the Basin? These are the core questions that the article attempted to answer in order to understand contemporary issues pertaining to the GERD Project of Ethiopia on the Nile Basin and its implication to the future interactions between the riparian states and argued that the Dam is a benchmark in shaping the future of the Nile Basin in a way that benefits all the riparian states of the Nile.
The Geopolitics of Water Negotiations succeeding the GERD Project in the Nile River Basin
Water politics has come to be one of the central themes of debate and concern among different academic, political and economic domains in the globalized world. Thus, water geopolitics has sought to understand and analyze how water politics is imagined spatially. Though the Nile River runs through ten African countries, the main conflict over its waters is between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Since Egypt depends on the Nile for its entire water supply, securing the downstream parts of the river has always been one of Egypt’s national priorities. The dispute between the two states, Egypt and Ethiopia, is rooted in the legacy of British imperialism in North, Northeast and Central Africa during the 20th century. As Cascão (2009) discussed a declaration from 1929 by London granted the bulk of the water of this area of the Nile to Egypt and Sudan. However, it has been less than a decade whereby Ethiopia’s bargaining power has become much greater than normally acknowledged. To be sure, it is shored up by Ethiopia’s geographic advantage as upstream riparian and provider of 85% of the Nile flows. Moreover, it is not until the last two years, where the discourse of water geopolitics moved away from being dominated by ideas like national security and power. Therefore, the paper focuses on the role of power and hegemony in particular, as a complement to the wide range of issues covered in negotiations. By doing so, the article analyzes the Egypt’s position as the hegemonic power in the horn of Africa contested by Ethiopia. In order to simplify my argument and analysis, I focused on Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt to explicate the extent of water crisis in the North Eastern part of Africa. To accomplish these tasks, a critical geopolitical approach, practical discourse, has been used to analyze the geopolitical implications of speeches of politicians and leaders. Application of critical hydro-politics is thus useful for interpretation of the power plays that grease or block the cogs of the decision-making machinery. Since practical geopolitics describes the actual practice of geopolitical strategy (i.e. foreign policy), the paper look into the country’s foreign policy in relation to the changing power relations in the Nile Basin, especially from the onset of the GERD project which witnesses tension among the three countries. Principally, the study attempts to analyze the geopolitical implications of the newly Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on regional water politics and speculated on whether it has reinforced or undermined the regional power of Egypt.