Anarchy and the Problems of Power Sharing in Africa (original) (raw)

2005, McGill-Queen's University Press eBooks

Power sharing has been repeatedly advocated as a method of postconflict governance in Africa. In virtually all cases, however, the results have been the same: inclusive power-sharing agreements have been resisted by local leaders or, if accepted, have rarely been fully implemented or adhered to over the long term. Given this unimpressive record, it is remarkable that power sharing nevertheless continues to be the centrepiece of so many African peace initiatives. To expect power sharing to work in Africa is to expect it to work under the most difficult conditions, and this, in fact, is part of the problem. For the conditions of anarchy 1 that accompany civil war and state collapse often require solutions that are prior to, or in addition to, power sharing-or ones that exclude power sharing altogether. Power sharing is admittedly a broad term and can involve a number of different approaches and models. As used here, following Timothy D. Sisk, it refers to "practices and institutions that result in broadbased governing coalitions generally inclusive of all major ethnic groups in society." 2 In Africa, however, in many cases, the allocation of power to representatives of broadly defined ethnic groups has led to the exclusion of the specific parties, movements, or "liberation fronts" that were involved in the conflict-and whose continued existence poses a direct threat to the peace process. 3 Providing political voice to disenfranchised ethnic groups, in other words, does not necessarily mean the end of violent conflict. In cases where power sharing is determined 9