The New Class and Right Wing Populism: The Case of Wisconsin (original) (raw)
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Forthcoming, Presidential Studies Quarterly Conventional wisdom holds that Democrats have abandoned the language of class populism. Using a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of hundreds of Democratic presidential campaign speeches over the 1932-2012 period, we revisit the received view. We provide evidence that Democratic presidential candidates have made increasingly frequent references to the wealthy; have employed a consistently adversarial tone in statements referring to the affluent; have made increasingly frequent criticisms of Republicans' alleged favoritism toward the rich; and have increasingly linked references to the wealthy to promises to assist less fortunate Americans through programmatic reforms. Our findings indicate that class populism is alive and well in Democratic presidential campaign rhetoric.
Populism, Politics, and Public Policy: 1970s Conservatism
Journal of Policy History, 1998
A quarter century and more has passed since the 1970s made its debut. History, always problematic as an objective undertaking, encourages present-mindedness when proximity to events in question governs our perspectives. This article does not pretend to have avoided this pitfall. Today the animus against government dominates political discourse. “Outsiders” who aspire to office boast of that status; “insiders” obscure theirs. All politicians design to show their commonness, their oneness with the people, the beleaguered people, victims of the socially privileged, of haughty bureaucrats, and the sundry occult forces that sustain their misery. Ours, it has been observed, has become a dominantly “populist” culture, its anti-elitism resounding from local Serb Halls in Milwaukee and elsewhere to the very chambers of the Capitol itself.
The politics of social status: economic and cultural roots of the populist right
British Journal of Sociology, 2017
This paper explores the factors that have recently increased support for candidates and causes of the populist right across the developed democracies, especially among a core group of working-class men. In the context of debates about whether the key causal factors are economic or cultural, we contend that an effective analysis must rest on understanding how economic and cultural developments interact to generate support for populism. We suggest that one way to do so is to see status anxiety as a proximate factor inducing support for populism, and economic and cultural developments as factors that combine to precipitate such anxiety. Using cross-national survey data from 20 developed democracies, we assess the viability of this approach. We show that lower levels of subjective social status are associated with support for right populist parties, identify a set of economic and cultural developments likely to have depressed the social status of men without a college education, and show that the relative social status of those men has declined since 1987 in many of the developed democracies. We conclude that status effects provide one pathway through which economic and cultural developments may combine to increase support for the populist right.
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Focusing on Germany and the United Kingdom as two most dissimilar cases in terms of labour market and political institutions, the article examines the impact of trade union membership on partisan preferences. Leveraging panel data to control for time-invariant selection effects shows that trade unions exert a small but consistent left-wing influence on wage earners who become affiliated, but they are no longer able to modify the preferences of working-class members. A longitudinal approach reveals that unions mainly attract individuals who already share the unions’ political inclinations before joining. The additional shift to the left experienced by already left-leaning new members is consistent with a value congruence mechanism triggered by interactions with even more left-leaning long-term union members. Symmetrically, working-class joiners exhibit less pronounced left-wing inclinations before becoming affiliated, a gap that widens further after they join. These findings imply that unions’ political influence and class allegiances have been both eroded and altered by changes in the labour market and political landscape.
Turning No Tides: Union Effects on Partisan Preferences and the Working-Class Metamorphosis
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Relying on panel data for Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the paper examines the impact of union membership on partisan preferences. By leveraging panel data to control for time-invariant selection effects, we show that unions exert a small consistent left‑wing influence on the average wage earner who becomes affiliated, but they are no longer able to modify the preferences of working-class members. A longitudinal approach reveals that changes in partisan preferences can be linked to members’ preexisting predispositions and to the prevalent political views within unions. Unions mainly attract individuals who already share their political inclinations before joining. These preexisting left-wing convictions allow an additional left-wing shift to take place through a value congruence mechanism provoked by interactions with long-term union members who are even more left-wing oriented than the newcomers. Symmetrically, working-class joiners exhibit less pronounced left-wing inclinations before becoming affiliated, a gap that widens further after they join as a consequence of their unmet expectations.
The Role of Post-Disciplinary Organizations and Think Tanks in the Rise of Conservatism
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Think tanks are essentially interdisciplinary and contradictory. Their interdisciplinary aspect is a good thing as long as their clear ideological commitment remains sincere and purpose-oriented. If we recognize many of them as actors in the political context then we can accept their operations. Think tanks generally target policy makers in central government and in the media. Young Republicans and Libertarian Party organizations, for instance, provided facilitating networks and experienced local leaders who could produce volunteers and local publicity. The present paper examines the role of think tanks and organizations in the recent emergence of the Tea Party movement. Think tanks such as Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation provided speakers for rallies and events, and leadership training for local organizers. Business-originated political and interest groups such as Americans for Prosperity, Citizens for a Sound Economy, and National Federation of Independent Business provided fact sheets with arguments. Sociologist and historian Charles Tilly used the term facilitation to describe assistance given to populist movements like the Tea Party. In fact, we tend to investigate how facilitation provided resources to local groups that led to promote Tea Party mobilizations and the return of populist wave in general. We finally analyze the impact of this protest movement on the Republican Party and “polity members” especially in deliberations.
The Roots of Right-Wing Populism: Donald Trump in 2016
International Journal of Political Economy, 2020
Using survey data from the American National Election Study (ANES) and aggregate data on Congressional districts, this article assesses the roles that economic and social factors played in Donald J. Trump's 2016 "populist" presidential candidacy. It shows the hollowness of claims that economic issues played little or no role. While agreeing that racial resentment and sexism were important factors, the article shows how various economic considerations helped Trump win the Republican nomination and then led significant blocs of voters to shift from supporting Democrats or abstaining in 2012 to vote for him. It also presents striking evidence of the importance of political money and Senators' "reverse coattails" in the final result.