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The Israeli Supreme Court has an activist image, and even an image of extreme activism. This image is one that is held by the general public and academic law faculties both in Israel and abroad. Although the Supreme Court itself has no interest in declaring itself as activist, one may find hints of such self-awareness in its own verdicts. In this regard, the academic and public dispute is not about whether the Supreme Court is activist, but whether this activism is desirable.
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