Review of Olúfemi O Táíwò’s Reconsidering Reparations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022, x + 261 pp. (original) (raw)
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Reconsidering Reparations is a book about global justice. Its central philosophical argument claims that a just world would be one in which everyone enjoys the capabilities that they need to relate to one another as equals; maintains that realising this vision (in the right way) would serve as reparation for the injustices of transAtlantic slavery and colonialism; and warns that this project is threatened by the climate crisis. The book is part of OUP's Philosophy of Race series, edited by Linda Martín Alcoff and Chike Jeffers. It is a cross-disciplinary work, with the philosophical argument buttressed by material of a more historical or sociological nature. The content is pitched at 'a general audience' (p.8), and should serve this audience well. Táíwò is an accessible writer and skilled storyteller, whose fascination with the past and its ongoing significance shines in the historical narratives that are woven through the book. Táíwò's main goal is to defend his 'constructive view' of reparations, designed specifically for the injustices of TransAtlantic slavery and colonialism (pp.74-5). Chapter One is an introduction. Chapter Two is historical in nature. It is also the longest chapter. This is understandable given that it aims to provide a world history of how 'slavery and colonialism built the world we know' (p.18); leaving behind a global order that continues to distribute advantages and disadvantages along racist and colonial lines. Drawing inspiration from Charles Mills' theorisation of 'global white supremacy', and Cedric Robinson's work on 'racial capitalism', Táíwò terms this system the 'Global Racial Empire'. Chapter Three articulates Táíwò's vision of global justice and its relation to the reparative project. Chapter Four defends the constructive view over other accounts of reparations. The philosophical literature on reparations is substantial, and it is not possible to do it justice in the twenty pages that Táíwò devotes to this task. I suspect that proponents of these alternatives may therefore not be convinced by Táíwò's objections. However, he does not intend this critique to be decisive (p.124), and it will not be the focus of this review. Chapter Five links reparations to the pursuit of climate justice. And the final chapter presents an inspirational perspective on intergenerational justice, as a project of cross-generational cooperation in which we 'choose to relate to the world as ancestors' (p.11). The constructive approach to reparations Táíwò's account of reparative justice is inspired by the thought of Nkechi Taifa, Robin D G Kelley, and Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor; and by social movements, including the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America, and the Caribbean Community Reparations Commission (CRC) (pp.3-5). Two key messages drawn from these sources are that reparations: 1. cannot merely be symbolic, but 'should make tangible differences in the material conditions of people's lives' (p.140); and 2. shouldn't consist in financial transfers alone, but must bring about the structural change necessary for realising social justice. In Táíwò's words, this is a vision of reparative justice as a 'construction project' (p.4). Though Táíwò does not describe it as such, the constructive view resembles a structural injustice approach, in the vein of Iris Marion Young (2011), and Catherine Lu (2017)-who applies Young's
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The paper assesses current rising reparations claims for the Maafa/ Maangamizi (‘African holocaust,’ comprising transatlantic slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism) from two angles. First, it explores the connectivity of reparations and global justice, peace and security. Second, it discusses how the claim is justified in international law. The concept of reparations in international law is also explored, revealing that reparations cannot be limited to financial compensation due to the nature of the damage and international law prescriptions. Comprehensive reparations based in international law require the removal of structures built on centuries of illegal acts and aggression, in the forms of transatlantic slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism. Reparations must also lead to the restitution of sovereignty to African and indigenous peoples globally. They are indispensable to halt the destruction of the earth as human habitat, caused by the violent European cultural, political, ...
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