Counterfactuals, Control, and Causation: Why Knowledgeable People Get Blamed More (original) (raw)
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The role of counterfactual reasoning and the assignment of blame within a context involving product failure, personal injury, and luck was examined. In the first study, it was determined that directing attention to the focal individual in an event increased the perceived mutability of that individual's actions in an exceptional circumstance but not in a common circumstance. Study 2 explored how the availability of different counterfactual alternatives influenced assignments of blame for a negative outcome. The results of this experiment showed that presenting information that directed attention to the focal individual increased the mutability of that individual's actions, which in turn, increased the blame observers assigned to that individual. However, this assertion needs to be qualified; when attention was already focused on the focal individual, directing further attention to that person seemed to have little additional impact.
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Cognitive factors are known to influence lay assessments of causality and blame for negative side effects of intentional actions but specific social determinants of such assessments remain relatively unexplored. In a full-factorial, intraindividual experiment using two blocks of analogous vignettes constructed for two particular institutional action domains (“medical” and “corporate dress code”), we tested the propositions that causality and blame judgments differ between (a) domains and depend on (b) the type of action originator; (c) the type of damage; and (d) the “remoteness” of damage from the originator. Our data demonstrate a significant difference between two institutional action domains: actors in “medical”-related vignettes are generally estimated to be more causally effective and blameworthy than actors in “dress code”–related vignettes. In addition to the pronounced main effects of institutional domain as a factor influencing cause and blame judgments, we revealed few si...
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Blame is a moral judgment that has a cognitive and a social nature. In this paper we first focus on the cognitive side and introduce a new theoretical model of blame that integrates insights and evidence from extant research. Within this model, we demonstrate the critical role of such concepts as agent, intentionality, and obligation—all of which are grounded in people’s theory of mind. We then contrast two views on the ordering of blame and theory of mind based inferences: blame-late models, which claim that blame follows mental state inferences; and blame-early models, which claim that the opposite order holds. After integrating these two views within our model, we turn to two eminently social questions on moral judgment: blaming as a social act; and blaming of group agents. We suggest that our model of blame provides a fruitful framework for both of these questions, thus highlighting the intimate connection between blame as a cognitive phenomenon and blame as a social phenomenon.
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The effects of counterfactual thinking and causal attribution on accident-related judgments were investigated. Subjects read about a couple who died in an automobile accident where mutability of the outcome was varied. Mutability refers to the extent that a factual event can be mentally altered, with mutable outcomes more easily imagined otherwise than immutable outcomes. In comparison to the immutable scenario, participants reading the mutable scenario saw the accident as more avoidable, ascribed a greater causal role to the accident perpetrator, and perceived the perpetrator having more causal control over the couple's deaths. In addition to increased anger, a harsher financial penalty was levied against the accident perpetrator by participants in the mutable than in the immutable condition. Multiple regression analysis supported the efficacy of attribution theory to explain the affective and behavioral consequences of counterfactual thinking in accident-related judgments.
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Moral, cognitive, and social: The nature of blame
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For one thing, blame is grounded in the capacity to have a “theory of mind” 1—a system of concepts and processes that aid a human social perceiver in inferring mental states from behavior. To blame an agent people must know a set of norms, observe an agent's normviolating behavior, and infer a manifold of mental states that underlie the behavior. Without the latter, an organism may still be able to punish; but the organism would not be able to blame. A second unique feature of blame is that it has not only a cognitive side— ...
Do Bad People Know More? Interactions Between Attributions of Knowledge and Blame
A central topic in experimental epistemology has been the ways that nonepistemic evaluations of an agent’s actions can affect whether the agent is taken to have certain kinds of knowledge. Several scholars have found that the positive or negative valence of an action can influence attributions of knowledge to the agent. These evaluative effects on knowledge attributions are commonly seen as performance errors, failing to reflect individuals’ genuine conceptual competence with knows. In the present article, I report the results of a series of studies designed to test the leading version of this view, which appeals to the allegedly distorting influence of individuals' motivation to blame. I argue that the data pose significant challenges to such a view.
Wins above replacement: Responsibility attributions as counterfactual replacements
In order to be held responsible, a person's action has to have made some sort of difference to the outcome. In this paper, we propose a counterfactual replacement model according to which people attribute responsibility by comparing their prior expectation about how an agent was going to act in a given situation, with their posterior expectation after having observed the agent's action. The model predicts blame if the posterior expectation is worse than the prior expectation and credit if it is better. In a novel experiment, we manipulate people's prior expectations by changing the framing of a structurally isomorphic task. As predicted by our counterfactual replacement model, people's prior expectations significantly influenced their responsibility attributions. We also show how our model can capture Johnson and Rips's (2013) findings that an agent is attributed less responsibility for bringing about a positive outcome when their action was suboptimal rather than optimal.