Suing for sovereignty: property, territory, and the EU’s Cyprus problem (original) (raw)

The European courts as political actors in the Cyprus conflict

The European courts have faced on several occasions questions arising from the Cyprus Gordian knot. The judgments inter alia of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Loizidou 1 and in Xenides-Arestis 2 , of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Anastasiou saga 3 and most recently of a UK court in Orams 4 , have significantly altered the background of that ancient political conflict. The thesis of the proposed paper is that although the courts have not refrained from becoming actors in this unique political situation by adopting for example a "political question" doctrine, their jurisprudence points to the limits of an "incremental solution" through the legal process and thus proves that in issues of grave political importance it is only a more democratic and deliberative procedure that could provide for a comprehensive solution. In order to achieve its scope the paper examines thoroughly the relevant case law on the protection of human rights in the Areas not under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus and analyses the jurisprudence of the European courts on the issue of trade relations with the regime in the North.

A ‘just and lasting solution’ to the Cyprus problem: In search of institutional viability

Mediterranean Politics, 2000

This paper examines the possible nature of a 'just and lasting solution' to the Cyprus Problem. Four factors are seen to affect the viability of a solution namely, the relative capacity of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides to impose costs in the event of either breaking off from inter-ethnic cooperation , the extent to which each party perceives the solution to be fair, the continuous influence of informal rules which may promote ethnic identification and finally, the judicial enforcement and legislative maintenance of the agreed solution. The discussion generates a number of insights into several aspects of the dispute including, security guarantees, territorial adjustments, the freedom of movement and establishment and the right of property, a federal versus a confederal solution and finally, the desirable nature of the constitution of a multi-ethnic Cyprus. The origins of the Cyprus Problem lie in the second half of the 1950s when the Greek Cypriot majority (80 per cent of the total population), in tune with the decolonising and self-determination tendencies of the times fought to overthrow the colonial rule of the United Kingdom and unite Cyprus with Greece (enosis) 1. This led to a nationalist reaction on the part the Turkish Cypriot minority (18 per cent of the total population) which started

'The European Union and the Cyprus problem: a story of limited impetus'

, Eastern Journal of European Studies, 2012

This article discusses the role of the European Union (EU) in the Cyprus problem before and after accession in 2004. It is argued that, before 2004, Brussels provided limited incentives to the Greek Cypriots to contribute to resolution but, on the other hand, triggered a pro-solution/ EU trend amongst the Turkish Cypriots. On the contrary, in the post-accession era, the EU’s aptitude to contribute to a solution has further decreased: Greek Cypriots remain with inadequate EU-induced motivation to pursue resolution, while the pro-solution/ EU feelings of the Turkish Cypriots have receded, also due to Brussels’ failure to fulfill their expectations. While most of the literature on Cyprus has focused on the pre-accession period, the article offers a much needed insight into the EU’s role before and after Cyprus’ EU entry. The article draws on a variety of data, including a series of elite interviews conducted in Belgium and Cyprus.

Back to reality’: the implications of EU membership in the constitutional legal order of Cyprus

The process of integration of the new member states following the 2004 (and the 2007) enlargement is still unfolding due mainly to the numerous measures contained in the 2003 (and the 2005) Treaty of Accession arguably leading to ifferentiated integration. Differentiated or flexible integration with respect to the latest enlargement is characterised a priori by the fact that the new member states, including Cyprus, do not fully participate to all the EU policies and/or an be excluded from major policy areas while they are bound by the acquis ommunautaire from accession. The situation of Cyprus seems somehow different to the extent that, in addition to this alleged regime of differentiated integration, its integration is singled out in two distinctive Protocols annexed to the 2003 Act of Accession potentially hindering further its integration into the EU. It appears quite clearly from a brief analysis of Cyprus’ integration into the EU that Cyprus stands on its own path of European integration due to specific socio-legal and political factors which also ought to be taken into account in order to fully explain Cyprus’s integration path in the EU. On 1 May 2004, Cyprus acceded to the EU as a divided island. Although the process of accession was conducted in theory on behalf of the whole island and Cyprus joined as one country, the northern part of the island has been largely left out of the process due to the ongoing de facto division. The so-called areas of Cyprus falling ‘beyond the effective control’ of the government of the Republic of Cyprus (the ‘Areas’) have been subject since then to a special regime based on the suspension of the acquis communautaire embodied in Protocol 10 of the 2003 Treaty of Accession, even if initiatives to assist these Areas have been taken by the EU since accession. Even if it appears that EU membership may sometimes entail different implications for Cyprus due to its unique situation, it remains nevertheless that Cyprus is fully bound by the 2003 Treaty of Accession, like the other new member states which joined in 2004. As a result, many challenges associated to EU membership are common to all new member states, especially with respect to the encounter of their national legal systems with the European legal order. In this Chapter, the domestic legal systems of the new member states will be the subject of a comparative analysis focusing on Cyprus as an alleged instance of furtherance of European integration in the field of European constitutional law.

The European Union and the Cyprus problem: a story of limited impetus Article (Published version) (Refereed) The European Union and the Cyprus problem: a story of limited impetus

Original citation: Kyris, George (2012) The European Union and the Cyprus problem: a story of limited impetus. Eastern journal of European studies, 3 (1). pp. 87-99. Abstract This article discusses the role of the European Union (EU) in the Cyprus problem before and after accession in 2004. It is argued that, before 2004, Brussels provided limited incentives to the Greek Cypriots to contribute to resolution but, on the other hand, triggered a pro-solution/ EU trend amongst the Turkish Cypriots. On the contrary, in the post-accession era, the EU's aptitude to contribute to a solution has further decreased: Greek Cypriots remain with inadequate EU-induced motivation to pursue resolution, while the pro-solution/ EU feelings of the Turkish Cypriots have receded, also due to Brussels' failure to fulfill their expectations. While most of the literature on Cyprus has focused on the pre-accession period, the article offers a much needed insight into the EU's role before and after Cyprus' EU entry. The article draws on a variety of data, including a series of elite interviews conducted in Belgium and Cyprus.

Coming to Terms: The prospects and policies for (re)unifying Cyprus under a New Constitution

2016

Cyprus, a small island in the Mediterranean, with a presence of Greek and Turkish populations, has been struggling ever since 1974 to reunify its two communities under one constitution. As a former British Colony, the 1960 Constitution gave independence under a Greek leadership with rights to the Turkish minority, however after an unsuccessful Greek driven coup to take over the island, the Turkish invasion of 1974 resulted in the island split de facto in half with a sovereign state under Greek leadership in the south and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the north, which however is not recognised by the International Community. Since then, unfruitful negotiations and unsuccessful attempts to reunify have been made for the island to retain its unity under one constitution. Subsequently, the first real attempt to reunify the island was made in 2004 with the UN-backed Annan Plani which was however rejected by the Greek-Cypriot side after a nation-wide referendum. Either way, one has to question what makes this long peaceful dispute, peaceful and different from other international cases. Evidently, Cyprus is a divided nation with only two ethnic communities, an EU member state and a core part of the geostrategic interests of Europe. It is situated in the eastern part of the Mediterranean and provides a source of stability in protecting European political and economic interests in the Middle East. Thus, paradoxically, Europe’s eastern part remains divided in a very unstable region and scholars have supported that the time has come to resolve one of Europe’s contemporary dispute. On the same note, the official position of the International Community remains a viable solution which will be a product of the reunification of the island under one constitution. However, over the past few years another proposal has surfaced asserting the fact that the Cyprus issue should not be resolved, and that silently and periodically the island of Cyprus should de facto host two countries rather than one. Currently, the Cyprus dispute does not only require a new Constitution, it requires coming to terms across issues in the talks that seem insoluble on their own. These include the multi-billion euro issue of compensation for restitution of Greek Cypriot properties after the Turkish invasion of 1974, involving perhaps three quarters of the territory of the Turkish Cypriot north; the future of immigrants from Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot wish (backed by Turkey) for a continued Turkish military guarantee; and the question of how much of the 37 per cent of the island now in Turkish hands will pass to the Greek Cypriots. In effect, the purpose of this paper will not be to present a solution for the latter issues but instead, by trying to take in account the interests of both sides regarding power sharing, it will assess the foundations for a viable Constitution of a reunified Cyprus which is fundamental in resolving the dispute. Moreover, it will support that the basic structural principles for a solution exist and that the Cyprus dispute can only be resolved if both negotiating sides exclude taboos from the negotiation process and agree on a quota power sharing in the executive, legislative and judicial levels of the new state.

Why the EU Catalyst Proved Insufficient to Solve the Cyprus Problem: The Politicization of European Values

annual meeting of the International Studies …, 2006

Whereas the European Union posited itself as a "catalyst" for solving the Cyprus problem via accession, nearly two years since the act of accession, Cyprus remains divided and no negotiations have been held since the failed Annan Plan that aimed to reuninte the island was rejected by the Greek Cypriot community in a fateful referendum. This paper addresses the literature on Europeanization and conflict resolution that points to two roles of the EU in ethnonational secessionism: actor and framework. In the case of Cyprus, despite its ostensible potential for conflict transformation, the EU's "post-modern" quality has been less in evidence. Rather, intergovernmental efforts have characterized the post-accession period in such a way as to reify "modernist" conceptualizations of the conflict, which does not augur well for the immediate future. The ability of the Republic of Cyprus to shift the framework, possibly in line with a "European solution" suggests that accession may not be the panacea once thought. EU norms and derogations, thus, have provided ammunition to disputants, rather than pointing to ways that the "third tier" of governance might help Cypriots negotiate their differences constructively. Hence the EU and its norms have become part of the conflict environment.