Socrates: Aretē and Democracy (original) (raw)
Related papers
Killing Socrates: Plato's later thoughts on democracy
The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 2001
The paper has two main aims, one larger and one slightly narrower. The larger aim is to undermine further a tendency that has dogged the interpretation of Platonic political philosophy in modern times, despite some dissenting voices: the tendency to begin from the assumption that Plato's thinking changed and developed over time, as if we already had privileged access to his biography. The slightly narrower aim is to reply to two charges of intellectual parricide made against Plato. The first is explicit and well known: that he recommended political structures of a sort that would exclude the free-ranging philosophical inquiry sponsored by Socrates. The second is implicit in the standard reading of the Politicus, and says that Plato actually came to approve (however reluctantly) of Athens' execution of his teacher. I argue that the relevant passage (Plt. 297C - 302B) has been misunderstood, and that it is in fact fully consistent with the blanket criticism we find in the Repu...
Classical Review, 2010
Despite the worldwide economic downturn, theorising democracy continues to be a growth industry. M.'s work, one of the enterprise's latest productions, attempts to show how Thucydides and Plato, read from a particular point of view, can o ¶er correctives to modern theories of democracy, 'envisag[ing] a more extended conversation within and about democratic regimes' (p. 241) and 'serv[ing] as resources for the activities of citizens within democratic political spaces' (p. 229). His criticism of modern political theories concerning democracy focusses especially on the inability or unwillingness of such theories explicitly to address democratic outcomes and purposes (as opposed to processes and the clearing of political space for democracy) or to confront issues one might include under the (admittedly problematic) rubric 'human nature'. Thucydides and Plato, M. argues, can suggest ways to confront such problems not 'in a way that is rigid or dogmatic', but rather through 'the literary character of their texts, fostering critical re·ectiveness, engagement, and multivocality' (p. 229).
Socrates' Virtuous Practice of Athenian Politics
College of Dupage, 2023
This essay explores Socrates' unique involvement in Athenian politics, and we observe that Socrates' philosophical advice for politicians in the apocryphal dialogue Alcibiades I, which is grounded in the dialectic practice of "cultivation of the soul," embraces the belief that even if the entire city is blessed with having the most perfect technological/technē and scientific knowledge/epistēmē, "possessing all the sciences put together," it would still represent an impoverished state. For according to Socrates, there is no hope or "chance of getting any things well and beneficially done" if we do not have, in the first instance, the philosophical understanding/phronēsis of "good and evil" to inform and guide all of our so-called technical efforts and inspire our scientific achievements (Charmides 174d). In relation to Socrates' understanding of the philosopher and polis and what is required in order to envision and potentially establish a just and virtuously functioning city, what we find in three of Plato's dialogues might be classified as an "idealized" state and practice of politics in the Republic, a "paradigmatic" political model in the Statesman, and a "philosophical-propaedeutic" view of politics in the Alcibiades I. The problems associated with fully reconciling Socrates' practice of philosophy with politics are explored by Charles Griswold who claims that scholars searching for such a reconciliation often mistakenly do so by offering readings that suggest a legitimate "blueprint" for politics can be found in and drawn from the dialogues. There are also readings, he points out, that issue warnings against attempting to enact such a blueprint. Such approaches expose the difficulty or even impossibility of demanding that Socratic philosophy rise to the level of instituting a praxis of politikē, and so caution should be exercised when dealing with this issue, and it is essential that interpreters embrace the literary or dialogic dimension of the portrayal of Socratic philosophy in the dialogues. This so-called "dramatic-philosophical" dimension, as Griswold contends, breaks open a "horizon for reflection on ethics as well as politics," and in doing so, allows us to approach these issues in a more authentically Socratic manner, namely, "as open to question." Contrary to viewing this issue in terms of an "open question," J. A. Corlett argues that scholars seeking a consistent and cohesive view of Socratic politics often focus on the seeming inconsistency between Socrates' claims in the Apology regarding his disobeying the law insofar as it is unjust and potentially harmful to the life of a philosopher and Socrates' bold support of an individual's legal obligation in the Crito. Corlett finds no such contradiction to exist, and he argues against what he claims is the false assumption that the Crito espouses a Kantian or deontological conception of the laws and then portrays Socrates' unquestioned duty to them, whether or not the laws and the political institutions establishing them are corrupt and unjust. Corlett convincingly shows that it is Plato's creative/literary portrayal of the laws/nomoi that represents an authoritarian view, which is to say that it is the personified laws that express the conviction that it would be unethical and unjust to "disobey the legal authority of even a wrongful conviction." But this is not Socrates' position.
Plato's Republic and Socrate's Theory Of Apolitical Citizenship
In this paper, I revisit the text of Plato’s Republic. I do not perceive the text to be a linear continuum of sequences of dialogues in a form of vectorial progression rather, I see it as a dialectically constituted whole with the thread of the critique of democracy circulating, throughout the whole body of the text. I claim that the main challenge to the philosopher in the text of the Republic is precisely this a-nomos, an-arche’ic, alogical and “unjust” form of politics – democracy. I attempt to support this argument on two levels: first, from the more literarily-historical perspective by accentuating the settings of the very first dialogue of the text as the background where theoretical construction of Kalipolis unfolds and secondly at the theoretical level by connecting certain elements from famous critique of democracy in book VIII with elements of Socrates dialogues in books II, III and V, which delineate his argument that in the just city each has to be in his or her place and spend all of his or her time exercising one occupation exclusively. These two elements put together form the basis on which I build my claim that Socrates’ argument of everyone in his or her place doing only what he or she is aught to do is Plato’s solution to the problem of democracy on theoretical level. It presents a successful attempt of foreclosure and eradication of the theoretical polemical space where the democratic discourse could take place. As a side effect of this theoretical move we are presented with the formation of the peculiar type of citizen, the one who is indefinitely locked within the permanent state of non-politics in a form of relations of production and exchange, removed from the realm of the exercise of political decision-making in a democratic form of self-ruling, and deprived of the natural, rational, and moral grounds of ever claiming them. In other words in theoretical context of Socrates argumentation producers in the city of Kalipolis present a paradox — apolitical citizens.
DEMOKRATIA AND ARETE IN ANCIENT GREEK POLITICAL THOUGHT
POLIS, 2011
This article interprets demokratia and arete as dynamically related terms of political thought in ancient Greek culture, from Homeric times to the end of the classical era. It does so selectively, identifying three stages in which this relationship is developed: (1) from the Homeric to archaic eras; (2) fifth-century Athenian democracy , in which demokratia and arete are posed as complementary terms; and (3) the fourth century era in which philosophers used virtue to critique democracy. Relying mostly on evidence from writers who have become benchmarks in the history of Western political thought, the argument emphasizes the inherently political dimension of arete during this period of ancient Greek culture. Noting different ways in which arete is related to political power in general and democracy in particular, it also illustrates the manner in which arete is neither philosophically pristine nor merely an instrument of practical power. The effect of the research contradicts traditional and recent readings of democracy and virtue as inherently antagonistic. The aim of the article is to identify ancient Greek contributions to understanding the potential, contingencies and dangers of the relationship between democracy (as a form of power) and virtue (as a form of ethics)-one which may benefit both democracy and virtue.
Sympathy for the Devil: Socrates and the Athenian Democracy (w/ David Silverman)
Stephen Morris' article, Socratic Perspectives on American Constitutionalism 1 offers a subtle and nuanced depiction of Socrates's relation to the Athenian demos and the Athenian democracy. We agree with Morris that the essence of the complaint against Socrates derives from his association with Critias and other oligarchs, and we also agree that Socrates was in some sense a man of the people. In this essay, we will not comment on Socrates's fate under modern American First Amendment doctrine, nor on the notion that political speech in America is in danger of being controlled by villainous giant corporations. Instead, we will focus our commentary on the ancient subject matter, specifically Morris' interpretation of the Socratic and Platonic texts. Here we part company with Morris on several points. First, his article is insufficiently alert to the operation of rhetorical strategies in the Apology itself. Second, in selecting the Socrates of the Apology as his exemplar of the man as he really was, and rejecting that of the Crito, Morris gives too little weight to the settings of the two dialogues. Third, Morris collapses Socrates's affinities for Athens qua polis, the Athenians as a people, and the Athenian democracy to an insupportable extent. Finally, we prefer Josiah Ober's view that Socrates's conceptualization of the many (hoi polloi) in the Apology has more in common with that found in the Crito than Morris allows.
Socrates - Platonic Political Ideal
This essay articulates the differences and suggests the similarities between the practices of Socratic political speaking and those of Platonic political writing. The essay delineates Socratic speaking and Platonic writing as both erotically oriented toward ideals capable of transforming the lives of individuals and their relationships with one another. Besides it shows that in the Protagoras the practices of Socratic political speaking are concerned less with Protagoras than with the individual young man, Hippocrates. In the Phaedo, this ideal of a Socrates is amplified in such a way that Platonic writing itself emerges as capable of doing with readers what Socratic speaking did with those he encountered. Socrates is the Platonic political ideal. The result is a picture of the transformative political power of Socratic speaking and Platonic writing both.
The Politics of Plato and His Objection to Democracy
Annales UMCS, Politologia, 2015
Ancient Greek philosopher, Plato, had not only had political desires but had also tried to engage in active politics. But after a big frustration, especially with the trial of Socrates, he turned away from politics and criticized the political phenomena of his own time under the name of democracy. In his fascinating works we find his political ideas, ambitions, adventures, approvals and disapprovals. For Plato society or an ideal state must be organized and controlled not by masses, but by persons who really know what the norms are. The troubles of mankind will never cease until either true genuine philosophers attain political power or the rulers of states by some dispensation of providence become genuine philosophers.
Review Article — Plato and Democracy
Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought, 2004
Although its title may suggest a narrowly focused study of Plato's attitude to democracy this book is, in fact, a comprehensive examination of his political philosophy with substantial sections devoted to the Republic, to the Politicus and Timaeus-Critias and to the Laws. In these Samaras develops a distinctive interpretation not just of Plato's views on democracy but of his political philosophy as whole. One major theme concerns questions of unity and development with reference particularly to the relationship between the Republic and the Laws. Samaras rejects unitarian interpretations, which, he thinks, treat the Laws as a mere appendix to the Republic. However he sees a fundamental continuity in Plato's thought, which he calls 'a dynamic unity', that is, 'a unity within which development stands in a discernible relation to the philosopher's previous position' (p. 1). Fundamental to this interpretation is a fairly conservative reading of the metaphysics and epistemology of the Republic. Plato distinguishes between forms and sensible particulars in terms of the degree to which they really exist. Only knowledge of the forms can legitimise political power. The 'ontological transcendence of the forms' thus supports the 'unchallengeable rule of the Guardians' (p. 105), who have perfect knowledge and (as a consequence) perfect virtue. According to Samaras, Plato never abandoned his belief in transcendent forms, but from the Politicus onwards he revised his views in important respects. Because he now doubted the possibility of finding anyone with the knowledge required of an ideal ruler, he became an advocate of strict obedience to written laws. These do not replace the wisdom of the philosopher but are imitations of the truth which enable the common people to govern themselves in the best way that is practically possible. At the same time Plato abandoned his view that an understanding of the forms is essential for virtue and, with it, his Socratic belief that virtue is one. He came to hold that true opinion could be an acceptable substitute for knowledge and could form the basis for a certain
The Refutation of Democracy? Socrates in the Enlightenment
M.B. Trapp (ed.): Socrates From Antiquity to the Enlightenment (Aldershot 2007) 209-27.
The execution of Socrates, wrote the French historian Charles Rollin, 'will, through all the ages, cover Athens with infamy and reproach, that all the splendour of its glorious actions, for which it is otherwise so justly renowned, can never obliterate'. 1 Rollin's mammoth history of the ancient world, originally published in French between 1730 and 1738, 2 proved to be the standard work on the subject well into the nineteenth century, and was quickly translated. 3 His opinions of both Athens and Socrates reflected contemporary attitudes and concerns, and would influence opinion for much of the Enlightenment. In this period Socrates reached, in the words of Katharine Carson, the status of a 'sacred relic '. 4 He was established as a model of excellence in both spiritual and philosophical terms, and as such was used by a diverse range of writers and thinkers for an equally diverse range of purposes. Yet all were agreed on the central importance of his death. Indeed,