The Dual-Process Turn: How recent defenses of dual-process theories of reasoning fail (original) (raw)

Two Implications and Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning

Dual-process theories of reasoning assume a fundamental difference between two cognitive systems: fast and intuitive System 1, and slow and rational System 2, grounded on rules of logical inference. Peirce's diagrammatic logic challenges the dichotomy. Both systems are based on similar inferential connections, but the former draws its conclusions as modelled in positive implicational fragment of the latter. This logical connection between two systems explains empirical results from Wason's card selection task without appeal to confirmation bias.

An Evaluation of Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2004

Current theories of reasoning (Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000) propose a distinction between unschooled automatic reasoning and deliberate analytical formal reasoning. The paper critically evaluates these theories, and suggests that there is little empirical support for qualitative differences between implicit and explicit reasoning processes. Moreover, both processes share common properties, consistent with a theoretical framework developed to account for implicit learning. The review proposes that the role implicit processing plays in reasoning needs to be re-evaluated, since current dual process theories assert claims that are not empirically supported.

Intuition & Reason: Re-assessing Dual-Process Theories with Representational Sub-Activation

Teorema, 2015

There is a prevalent distinction in the literature on reasoning, between Type-1 processes (fast, automatic, associative, heuristic and intuitive); and Type-2 processes (rulebased, analytical and reflective). In this paper, we follow up recent empirical evidence [De Neys (2006b); Osman (2013)] in favour of a unitary cognitive system. More specifically, we suggest that intuitions (T1-processes) are sub-activated representations, which are in turn influenced by the weightings of the connections between different representations. Furthermore, we explain biases by appealing to the role of attention in thinking processes. The suggested view explains reasoning and bias whilst dealing with extant problems facing dual-process accounts.

Intuition and Reason: Re-assessing dual-process theories with representational sub-activation

There is a prevalent distinction in the literature on reasoning, between Type-1 processes (fast, automatic, associative, heuristic and intuitive); and Type-2 processes (rule-based, analytical and reflective). In this paper, we follow up recent empirical evidence [De Neys (2006b); Osman (2013)] in favour of a unitary cognitive system. More specifically, we suggest that intuitions (T1-processes) are sub-activated representations, which are in turn influenced by the weightings of the connections between different representations. Furthermore, we explain biases by appealing to the role of attention in thinking processes. The suggested view explains reasoning and bias whilst dealing with extant problems facing dual-process accounts.

The Sound-Board Account of Reasoning: A one-system alternative to dual-process theory

Philosophical Psychology

In order to explain the effects found in the heuristics and biases literature, dual-process theories of reasoning claim that human reasoning is of two kinds: Type-1 processing is fast, automatic, and associative, while Type-2 reasoning is slow, controlled, and rule-based. If human reasoning is so divided, it would have important consequences for morality (Mallon & Nichols, 2011), epistemology (Nagel, 2011), and philosophy of mind (Fiala, Arico, & Nichols, 2011). Although dual-process theorists have typically argued for their position by way of an inference to the best explanation, they have generally failed to consider alternative hypotheses (Osman 2004). Worse still, it is unclear how we might test dual-process theories (see Gigerenzer, 2010; Kruglanski, 2013; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). In this paper, I offer a one-system theory, which I call the Sound-Board Account of Reasoning (S-BAR), according to which there is one reasoning system which is flexible, allowing the properties used to distinguished Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning to cross-cut one another. I empirically distinguish my theory from the two dominant versions of dual-process theory (parallel-competitive and default-interventionist dual-process theory) and argue that my theory's predictions are confirmed over both of these versions of dual-process theory.

The Dual Process Account of Reasoning: Historical Roots, Problems and Perspectives

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

Despite the great effort that has been dedicated to the attempt to redefine expected utility theory on the grounds of new assumptions, modifying or moderating some axioms, none of the alternative theories propounded so far had a statistical confirmation over the full domain of applicability. Moreover, the discrepancy between prescriptions and behaviors is not limited to expected utility theory. In two other fundamental fields, probability and logic, substantial evidence shows that human activities deviate from the prescriptions of the theoretical models. The paper suggests that the discrepancy cannot be ascribed to an imperfect axiomatic description of human choice, but to some more general features of human reasoning and assumes the "dual-process account of reasoning" as a promising explanatory key. This line of thought is based on the distinction between the process of deliberate reasoning and that of intuition; where in a first approximation, "intuition" denotes a mental activity largely automatized and inaccessible from conscious mental activity. The analysis of the interactions between these two processes provides the basis for explaining the persistence of the gap between normative and behavioral patterns. This view will be explored in the following pages: central consideration will be given to the problem of the interactions between rationality and intuition, and the correlated "modularity" of the thought.

A Case Study: Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition

Dual-process theories of higher order cognition (DPTs) have been enjoying much success, particularly since Kahneman's 2002 Nobel prize address and recent book Thinking, Fast and Slow (2009). Historically, DPTs have attempted to provide a conceptual framework that helps classify and predict differences in patterns of behavior found under some circumstances and not others in a host of reasoning, judgment, and decision-making tasks. As evidence has changed and techniques for examining behavior have moved on, so too have DPTs. Killing two birds with one stone, Evans and Stanovich (2013, this issue) respond to five main criticisms of DPTs. Along with addressing each criticism in turn, they set out to clarify the essential defining characteristics that distinguish one form of higher order cognition from the other. The aim of this commentary is to consider the defining characteristics of Type 1 and Type 2 processing that have been proposed and to suggest that the evidence can be taken to support quantitative differences rather than qualitatively distinct processes.

Alternative task construals, computational escape hatches, and dual-system theories of reasoning

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2000

Stanovich and West's dual-system proposals represent a major development in an understanding of reasoning and rationality. We feel, however, that they their notion of System-1 functioning as a computational escape hatch during the processing of complex tasks may deserve a more central role in explanations of reasoning performance. We describe examples of apparent escape-hatch processing from the reasoning and judgement literature.