Psycholinguistics and Plato's paradoxes of the Meno (original) (raw)
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Contents ous readers for OUP. Earlier, Clerk Shaw read and commented on Chapters 1-3. Thank you all so much! In addition to talking through many of the ideas in this book with me and commenting on written versions of most of the chapters below over many years, in June 2015 Stephen Menn organized a workshop around the manuscript at the Humboldt University, Berlin. I'm grateful to him and the other participants-Alison Laywine, Hakan Genc, Ronja Hildebrandt, David Merry, Christopher Roser, and Antonio Vargas-for their comments on Chapters 1-3 and 6. Manidipa Sen organized a series of seminars on Plato's moral psychology at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, in August 2016 during which I presented the material in Chapters 1-5 of the book, and I'm thankful to the faculty and students who participated, especially Kranti Saran and Soham Shiva, for their questions and comments. Early instalments of much of the material in the book were presented to students in my seminars at the University of Arizona in spring 2013 and Cornell University in spring 2014. I am grateful to the students (especially Jeremy Reid, who later read the whole manuscript), and to Julia Annas, Tad Brennan, and Charles Brittain, who sat in on these seminars, for their thoughts about material I presented. Some of the material in Chapters 3 and 4 descends from a seminar I gave at the University of Chicago in spring 2008, and I would like to thank the students in that seminar, as well as Gabriel Richardson Lear and Jonathan Lear, who sat in, for their pointed questions about the moral psychology of the Republic. I'm grateful to André Laks, Fernando Muñiz, John Proios, and an audience at the Facultad de Filosofía at Universidad Autónoma Nacional de México for their comments on previous versions of Chapter 1. Philosophy Colloquium audiences at the
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W. George Lovell and Christopher Luz have written a reply to Marco Fonseca's critique of their translation of La patria del criollo into English. It is good that they have taken the time to read such an extensive critical review of their translation and editing of such an important work and offer their response. But it appears that the title of their response to Fonseca's critique is more exaggerated than the rest of the piece actually demonstrates. Given that they speak of "misrepresentation" in the title of their piece, it was to be expected that they would offer concrete and substantial examples drawn from Fonseca's comments that would actually demonstrate exactly in what sense Fonseca's critique is "lost in misrepresentation." Disappointingly, however, Lovell and Lutz's reply contains no proof of it. Once again, the authors formulate a purely formal apology for what they did with La patria del criollo, offer a new attempt to justify it by appealing to the popular reception that their translation has had among colleagues, some in effect "award-winning" representatives of the field of Latin American Studies, and thus essentially avoid the substantial philosophical and methodological problems raised by Fonseca's critique. What Lovell and Lutz fail to do in their reply to Fonseca, therefore, is to point out at least a single "misrepresentation" that actually deserves that name.