Letter to the Editor: More Comments on the Book Near-Death Experiences by Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin (original) (raw)

E-Physicalism. A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness - Table of Contents & Introduction

Bernal, R. J. (2012). E-physicalism. A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. Frankfurt : Ontos Verlag/De Gruyter. , 2013

This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with original causal powers, with respect to the micro-constituents of the conscious entity. Fifthly, he addresses the “zombie argument” and the “supervenience argument” within the e-physicalism framework. Finally, he elaborates on the claim that phenomenal properties are physical and discusses the “knowledge argument”.

IS NON-REDUCTIVE PHYSICALISM A PLAUSIBLE THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS?

2018

According to the non-reductive physicalist, mental properties are not identical to physical properties. In order to distinguish non-reductive physicalism from epiphenomenalism, the non-reductive physicalist considers mental properties as not just a by-product of physical processes but posits that mental properties can cause physical events thereby violating the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain. The problem which this thesis seeks to investigate, therefore, is that, if physicalism suggests that the only reality is the physical kind and that all other things including the mental depend on the physical domain then is the position of the non-reductive physicalist with respect to the independence of mental properties and their causal powers consistent with physicalism? I posit in this thesis that non-reductive physicalism is a plausible theory of consciousness by clarifying concepts such as monism, physical, physicalism and materialism. I also assert the plausibility of non-reductive physicalism by showing that non-reductive physicalism upholds the principle of the causal closure of the physical against Kim’s (1993) criticism that it does not.

Challenging Physicalism - a First-Personal Defence of Phenomenal Consciousness

In this paper I challenge the physicalist claim, that everything that exists in the universe can be reduced to a physical explanation, and hence, consciousness is reducible to a physicalist explanation as well. I show some of the weaknesses of this argument, and introduce some classic objections to it, but also argue that such objections are not enough to overthrow physicalism and that something more is needed. In the second part of the paper I attempt to show what that something more could be, and show how we can study consciousness from a first-person perspective through methods such as introspection and phenomenology. In the third and last part, I take on naturalized phenomenology in the form of neurophenomenology, and argue that although we can, and should, study consciousness from a first-person perspective if we want a complete picture, or theory, of consciousness, we still can't bridge the explanatory gap, due to problems and differences in terminology between the third-personal (objective) sciences, and the first-personal (subjective) sciences.

Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism

This paper is an introductory overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or “qualia,” which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows a discussion of various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple realizability, and the explanatory gap argument. None of the arguments is found to be very convincing. It does not necessarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual and methodological reflection is required, alongside ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogmatism and naivety. Keywords: Consciousness, philosophy of mind, qualia, reductionism, knowledge argument, conceivability argument, multiple realization, explanatory gap, relation between philosophy and neuroscience

The Conscious Mind Violates Physical Laws: A New Argument against Physicalism

According to the laws of physics, the state of a physical system can only be measured by another system (usually a particular measuring device) via a physical interaction. However, when our brain is in a conscious mental state, it can in principle output its physical state based on the psycho-physical correspondance between the mental state and the physical state. It is arguable that this indicates that the conscious mind violates physical laws and it is not physical as physicalism claims.