Picturing the Mind: On Freud's Methodology and Metapsychology (English) (original) (raw)

The Psychic Apparatus Architecture: A Review of Freud's Centenary Mind Model

The Psychic Apparatus Architecture: A Review of Freud's Centenary Mind Model, 2023

This article presents a comprehensive literature review on the concept of the Psychic Apparatus, the research aimed to provide an organized overview of Freud's model of mental activity, while highlighting the key works that contributed to its formulation. Originally proposed by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) as a mind model to comprehend psychic activity, the Psychic Apparatus is "constructed of several parts, each of which performs a particular function, and which have a ixed, spatial relation to one another". Its development unfolded across several of his seminal works, such as "The Interpretation of Dreams" (1900), "The Unconscious" (1915), and "The Ego and the Id" (1923), leading this sophisticated concept to be frequently misunderstood or super icially comprehended even by psychologists, often overlooking, as Freud pointed out, its several parts, particular functions, and spatial relations. In this literature review, Freud's seminal works were analyzed along with relevant books and research papers obtained from open-access databases. As a result, this process enabled a systematic structuring of the Psychic Apparatus, organizing its architecture based on its distinct systems and functions, ultimately enhancing the overall comprehensibility. Remarkably, even a century after its last update, Freud's mind model remains fundamental in psychoanalytic theory, underscoring the signi icance of this review. Moreover, an organized approach also holds potential for future reinterpretations of the model, particularly within the context of contemporary neuroscience and cognitive research, considering the numerous advancements and attempts to bridge the gap between the psyche and the brain that has emerged since Freud's last works.

Metapsychology and Metaphysics of the Self

Paper presented at the Foro di Studi Avanzati Conference, Rome, 2022

In his essay “The Unconscious” in 1915, Sigmund Freud defined metapsychology as the description of a mental process. Freud introduced two metapsychologies. The first, described as topographic, defined mental processes in a triadic landscape of unconscious, preconscious, and conscious. The second, described as structural, defined mental processes in a triadic architecture of das Es or the It, das Ich or the I, and das Uber-Ich, or the over-I. English translators gave these categories the names id, ego and super-ego. The It is the other, what is alien in the psyche. For my purposes here I will focus on the topographical metapsychology, and the definition of the unconscious. The Freudian unconscious should not be seen as “merely the seat of instincts” in the words of Jacques Lacan, Freud’s most important follower. Freud considered The Interpretation of Dreams, published in 1900, to be his most important contribution to psychoanalysis. Freud rejected philosophy as a basis for understanding the human mind, and insisted that psychoanalysis is a science. The fact is that psychoanalysis is based on metapsychology, which is a metaphysical philosophy.

Psychoanalysis, Metaphor, and the Concept of Mind

Freud's work has made it possible for us to extend thinking involving such concepts as desire, belief, and phantasy, and in a way which there is good reason to take as at least partly sound. In what follows I consider how this same work also extends thinking involving symbolism and metaphor, and how in this psychoanalysis is consilient with recent work on conceptual metaphor. The main example concerns the way we think about the mind. I argue that we can see such thinking as an important part of our concept of mind, and try, following Wittgenstein, to show how it provides an approach to the mind-body problem. 1. Symbolic mapping in psychoanalysis. The development of the psychoanalytic view of the mind went hand in hand with the idea that much everyday mental life can be seen as informed by something like metaphor or symbolism. To see this let us take it that we begin with an understanding of intentional action as prompted (caused) by desire: we assume that successful action on a ...

The Platonic-Freudian Model of Mind: Defining “Self” and “Other” as Psychoinformatic Primitives

Augmented Cognition. Theoretical and Technological Approaches, 2020

As “nurtural” (rather than merely natural) kinds of human beings, people are complex and multifaceted. Any complete human science would require a complete theory of persons. Accomplishing the latter is the core objective of the present article. First, a feature list first laid out in [1] is summarized. This list is briefly critiqued. Next, the concept of person engaged with is expanded with the addition of nine novel features. These features follow from “holarchic psychoinformatics” [2], which was first propounded as a step forward from Sood’s analytic treatment of third-force, existential-humanistic psychology. Person is formalized as a function of self and other; they are also granted to be romantic, existential, humanistic, chemical, environmental, hedonic and eudaimonic (happiness-seeking), conservative, and liberal. These are in addition to persons being physical, biological, psychological, social, cultural, and spiritual. Sood’s holarchic view of persons is enlarged. Psychologically, augmented cognition as an established field of research and practice begets the formal studies of augmented affect, augmented behavior, and augmented motivation. All such interdisciplinary fields are required for the human-computer interactionist’s study of augmented mind, more broadly. Additionally, this article builds on the person-situation interaction framework formalized in [1]. It does so by adding a formalization following from the discussion of psychological situations put forward by Rauthmann, Sherman, and Funder in [3]. The formalization of psychological situations sets them as a function of cues, characteristics, and classes. Further psychological equations that follow from this article’s formalisms of person and situation, when considered along with Sood’s formulae for mind and behavior, are then presented.

Psychoanalysis & Philosophy of Mind: Unconscious Mentality in the 21st Century

Of the topics found in psychoanalytic theory it is Freud’s philosophy of mind that is at once the most contentious and enduring. Psychoanalytic theory makes bold claims about the significance of unconscious mental processes and the wish-fulfilling activity of the mind, citing their importance for understanding the nature of dreams and explaining both normal and pathological behaviour. However, since Freud’s initial work, both modern psychology and philosophy have had much to say about the merits of Freudian thinking. Developments in psychology, philosophy, and psychoanalysis raise new challenges and questions concerning Freud’s theory of mind. This book addresses the psychoanalytic concept of mind in the 21st century via a joint scientific and philosophical appraisal of psychoanalytic theory. It provides a fresh critical appraisal and reflection on Freudian concepts, as well as addressing how current evidence and scientific thinking bear upon Freudian theory. The book centres upon the major concepts in psychoanalysis, including the notion of unconscious mental processes and wish-fulfilment and their relationship to dreams, fantasy, attachment processes, and neuroscience.

Metaphilosophy of Mind: how Do Minds Investigate Minds? Refutation of the Theocentric View

Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science

I shall propose metaphilosophy of mind as the philosophy of mind investigating mind. That is to say, I pose the question of how knowledge of mind provided by cognitive science, broadly construed, is constrained by the epistemic position of the knower, i.e. by the very fact that it is undertaken by a mind. Here I would like to propose a minimal framework, based on two distinctions: (i) the standard one between empirical and conceptual analysis; (ii) a new one, between the internal questions of mind and the boundary questions of mind. I shall then combine these distinctions to arrive at several ways of investigating the mind, the brain and cognition. On this ground, I will discuss the notion of epistemological theocentrism as outlined by Henry Allison and argue against the perspective I call theocentric philosophy of mind. From this angle I will be able to address skepticism which cannot be defeated but actually can be, as I put it, disarmed. Finally, metaphilosophy of mind based on the abovementioned distinctions elicits a perspective that is not sufficiently delineated by cognitive scientists and philosophers: empirical way of addressing the boundary questions of mind.