Processes of believing: Where do they come from? What are they good for? [version 2; referees: 2 approved, 1 approved with reservations] (original) (raw)

Processes of believing: Where do they come from? What are they good for?

F1000Research, 2016

Despite the long scholarly discourse in Western theology and philosophy on religion, spirituality, and faith, explanations of what a belief and what believing is are still lacking. Recently, cognitive neuroscience research addressed the human capacity of believing. We present evidence suggesting that believing is a human brain function which results in probabilistic representations with attributes of personal meaning and value and thereby guides individuals’ behavior. We propose that the same mental processes operating on narratives and rituals constitute belief systems in individuals and social groups. Our theoretical model of believing is suited to account for secular and non-secular belief formation.

From Believing to Belief: A General Theoretical Model

Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 2018

Cognitive neuroscience research has begun to explore the mental processes underlying what a belief and what believing is. Recent evidence suggests that believing involves fundamental brain functions that result in meaningful probabilistic representations, called beliefs. When relatively stable, these beliefs allow for guidance of behavior in individuals and social groups. However, they are also fluid and can be modified by new relevant information, interpersonal contact, social pressure, and situational demands. We present a theoretical model of believing that can account for the formation of both empirically grounded and metaphysical beliefs.

Models and Neural Bases of the Believing Process

Journal of Behavioral and Brain Science, 2015

Departing from the long debates on the role of faith/belief, recent interdisciplinary research has turned to characterize the features of the psychophysical processes underlying believing. Here we review recent cognitive neuroscience models of the believing process and propose a conceptual framework that integrates current theoretical and empiric knowledge about the processes of believing. There are theories that elegantly explain believing as a self-organization process of cognitive and emotional elements. Adding to the component of self-organized belief representation, dual-component models assume a belief evaluation component, which is probably supported by the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and explains the stability of the belief despite the changing environment. Borrowing an idea from the neural models for the mental representation of action or situation, inclusion of both perceptive and action informations as the construct of belief representation allows the intimate relationship between a specific belief and a specific range of behaviour. Furthermore, inclusion of the personal value or affective information in the representation explains the deep impact of one's emotional and physical state on the believing process. For associating perception, action, and value in a representation, the medial frontal cortex (MFC) may play a key role. Recent neuro-cognitive models of self-cognition explain the developmental origin of such a representation and the hierarchically nested structure of three levels of complexity in the representations: basic physical level, interpersonal level, and higher social level. The integrated model provides a comprehensive perspective of the believing process which suggests the importance and future directions of this interdisciplinary approach.

Cognitive and neural foundations of religious belief

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2009

We propose an integrative cognitive neuroscience framework for understanding the cognitive and neural foundations of religious belief. Our analysis reveals 3 psychological dimensions of religious belief (God's perceived level of involvement, God's perceived emotion, and doctrinal/experiential religious knowledge), which functional MRI localizes within networks processing Theory of Mind regarding intent and emotion, abstract semantics, and imagery. Our results are unique in demonstrating that specific components of religious belief are mediated by well-known brain networks, and support contemporary psychological theories that ground religious belief within evolutionary adaptive cognitive functions.

Process of Believing as Fundamental Brain Function: the Concept of Credition

2016

Despite the long scientific discourse in Western theology and philosophy on religion, spirituality and faith, definitions of what a belief is are still virtually lacking. As events and objects in the complex outside world are transformed into probabilistic estimates with personal attributes of meaning and value by involvement of the prefrontal cortex, we argue that these probabilistic estimates represent personal beliefs. We present a model for the processes of believing - termed creditions - that is suited to describe the putative components and mental operations underlying secular and non-secular belief formation.

Processes of believing — a review and conceptual account

Reviews in the Neurosciences, 2000

Processes of believing are thought to have an important impact on the control of human behavior. Recently, neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies have shown that believe processes involve brain areas known to be involved in emotion-related and cognitive processing. But there is a discrepancy between the increasing interest in empirical research and the lack of coherent terminology and conceptualization. We will show that in processes of believing, the medial frontal cortex plays a critical role within a widespread cortico-subcortical network owing to its role in valuation of internal and external events and in subjective control of action. Also, we will describe a model of processes of believing that integrates the divergent neurophysiological and conceptual aspects as a starting point for further interdisciplinary research questions.

Disbelief in belief. On the cognitive status of supernatural beliefs.

Religious people seem to believe things that range from the somewhat peculiar to the utterly bizarre. Or do they? According to a new paper by Neil Van Leeuwen, religious “credence” is nothing like mundane factual belief. It has, he claims, more in common with fictional imaginings. Religious folk do not really “believe” – in the ordinary sense of the word – what they profess to believe. Like fictional imaginings, but unlike factual beliefs, religious credences are activated only within specific settings. We argue that Van Leeuwen’s thesis contradicts a wealth of data on religiously-motivated behavior. By and large, the faithful genuinely believe what they profess to believe. Although many religions openly embraces a sense of mystery, in general this does not prevent the attribution of beliefs to religious people. Many of the features of religious belief that Van Leeuwen alludes to (e.g., invulnerability to refutation, incoherence) are characteristic of irrational beliefs in general, and actually betray their being held as factual. We conclude with some remarks about the common failure of secular people to face the fact that some religious people really do believe wildly implausible things. Such incredulity, as evinced by Van Leeuwen and others, could be termed “disbelief in belief”.

The neural correlates of religious and nonreligious belief

2009

Background While religious faith remains one of the most significant features of human life, little is known about its relationship to ordinary belief at the level of the brain. Nor is it known whether religious believers and nonbelievers differ in how they evaluate statements of fact. Our lab previously has used functional neuroimaging to study belief as a general mode of cognition [1], and others have looked specifically at religious belief [2]. However, no research has compared these two states of mind directly.

Brain Networks Shaping Religious Belief

Brain Connectivity, 2014

We previously demonstrated with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) that religious belief depends upon three cognitive dimensions, which can be mapped to specific brain regions. In the present study, we considered these co-activated regions as nodes of three networks each one corresponding to a particular dimension, corresponding to each dimension and examined the causal flow within and between these networks to address two important hypotheses that remained untested in our previous work. First, we hypothesized that regions involved in theory of mind (ToM) are located upstream the causal flow and drive non-ToM regions, in line with theories attributing religion to the evolution of ToM. Second, we hypothesized that differences in directional connectivity are associated with differences in religiosity. To test these hypotheses, we performed a multivariate Granger causality-based directional connectivity analysis of fMRI data to demonstrate the causal flow within religious belief-related networks. Our results supported both hypotheses. Religious subjects preferentially activated a pathway from inferolateral to dorsomedial frontal cortex to monitor the intent and involvement of supernatural agents (SAs; intent-related ToM). Perception of SAs engaged pathways involved in fear regulation and affective ToM. Religious beliefs are founded both on propositional statements for doctrine, but also on episodic memory and imagery. Beliefs based on doctrine engaged a pathway from Broca's to Wernicke's language areas. Beliefs related to everyday life experiences engaged pathways involved in imagery. Beliefs implying less involved SAs and evoking imagery activated a pathway from right lateral temporal to occipital regions. This pathway was more active in non-religious compared to religious subjects, suggesting greater difficulty and procedural demands for imagining and processing the intent of SAs. Insights gained by Granger connectivity analysis inform us about the causal binding of individual regions activated during religious belief processing.