Norm emergency through argumentation (original) (raw)

Dialogue Model Using Arguments for Consensus Decision Making Through Common Knowledge Formation

Computing and Informatics

Argumentation plays an important role in reasoning and allows the justification of opinions, especially when applied to collaborative decision making. Reaching consensus is not a trivial task where arguments exchanged in a dialogue and common knowledge are important for consensus. This paper presents a model of argumentative dialogue to support the formation of common knowledge in a group of agents that communicate by sending arguments, and proposes a semantics for consensus decision making. The output of the model is a weighted argumentation graph in which semantics is used to decide the preference of the group.

Management of Norms and their Conflicts in Multi-Agent Systems

Abstract Norms (permissions, obligations and prohibitions) offer a useful and powerful abstraction with which to capture social constraints in multi-agent systems. Norms are designed to exclude disruptive or antisocial behaviour without prescribing the design of individual agents or restricting their autonomy.

A dialogue mechanism for public argumentation using conversation policies

2009

In this paper, we propose a flexible dialogue mechanism through which a set of agents can establish a coherent set of public beliefs. Flexibility and coherence are achieved by decomposing the dialogue mechanism into two parts, a backbone protocol and a set of conversation policies. The backbone protocol maintains the set of arguments put forward by the agents, and each agent uses a pre-agreed argumentation theory to extract a set of public beliefs from this set of arguments.

A Dialogue Game Protocol for Multi-Agent Argument over Proposals for Action

2005

We present the syntax and semantics for a multi-agent dialogue game protocol which permits argument over proposals for action. The protocol, called the Persuasive Argument for Multiple Agents (PARMA) Protocol, embodies an earlier theory by the authors of persuasion over action which enables participants to rationally propose, attack, and defend, an action or course of actions (or inaction).