MYANMAR: A STRATEGY BRIEFING OF OF THE KACHIN INDEPENDENT ORGANISATION. (original) (raw)
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From Marginalization to Autonomy: The Kachin Struggle for Territorial Rights
Thant, K.; Kachin Territorial Conflicts in Myanmar, 2024
The Kachin conflict characterized by political marginalization, ethnic discriminations and historical grievances is a long struggle for the Kachin people in Myanmar. From pre-colonial, British colonization to present day conflicts, Kachin people have long demanded for greater autonomy and recognition of their territorial rights. Central to this conflict is the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and its political wing Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) which have been fighting for greater self-governance from current military regime predominantly led by Burman. It is important to understand this conflict within the framework of territorial rights to explore potential pathways to peacebuilding. People in Kachin have the historical right to claim their land and territory which has abundant natural resources. These claims are grounded in international legal principles of self-determination and indigenous rights, highlighting the need for legal frameworks that ensure their cultural preservation and self-autonomy. Addressing economic exploitation, political marginalization, and the impacts of both historical and contemporary dynamics on Kachin society is crucial for resolving the conflict, with the goal of achieving a sustainable and inclusive peace.
South East Asia Research, 2023
How do armed conflicts end? By victory or settlement, the commonsensical answer goes. But what if there are neither decisive victories nor enduring settlements? The standard answer to that question is that you have a stalemate; a fecund site of inquiry for historians and even anthropologists, but a place in which political scientists suppose that no useful answers about the outcomes of conflict are to be found. Myanmar in the 2010s was one such place. Up until then its military dictatorship had had two basic methods of meeting armed enemies: in combat and in bilateral negotiations. It brokered unstable settlements with opponents that granted them some autonomy in areas where they operated. It did not like multiparty deals. Nor did it entertain big political questions such as whether the country should be a federation, and if it should, then what? In 2011, the military relinquished some of its control over government to a partially elected legislature, which formed under the terms of the dictatorship’s 2008 Constitution. Peace negotiations went from backrooms to ballrooms. Big political questions were asked and debated. In 2015, the government of former General Thein Sein committed to a nationwide ceasefire with eight groups. The following year, Aung San Suu Kyi became the country’s de facto president. Suu Kyi’s father had made the Union of Burma a reality seven decades earlier by crafting the Panglong Agreement with representatives of Chin, Kachin and Shan peoples. Now his daughter looked to be on the cusp of forging a grand unifying pact all over again. Yet by 2021, when Senior General Min Aung Hlaing usurped power and brought Myanmar’s decade of political and social reform to an abrupt end, negotiators were hardly any closer to achieving a settlement than they had been five years before. What happened? Why was it that, despite superficially favourable conditions prior to the 2021 coup, a decade of efforts to resolve Myanmar’s many conflicts accomplished precious little? In Winning by Process, Jacques Bertrand, Alexandre Pelletier and Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung have an answer to these questions.
Conflict between Kachin and Myanmar; Minority and Majority
As Myanmar is one of the most diverse ethnic groups, ethnic conflicts happen more than six decades and ongoing armed conflicts constitute the longest running civil war in the world. Due to the high levels of historical grievance and distrust between majority and minority ethnic groups, the country is struggling with economic development and stability. Among multiethnic conflicts in Myanmar, the Kachin conflict is still unsolved and hindered in the peace process. Thus, the conflict between Kachin and Myanmar is the most intractable to be settled and destructive to be transformed into constructive due to the current ongoing fights in Kachin and Shan States.
MIARP, 2018
The Myanmar Interim Arrangements Research Project, funded by the Joint Peace Fund, was implemented between October 2017 and October 2018. Researchers spoke to more than 450 people in Shan, Karen/Kayin and Mon States, Tanintharyi Region, Naypyidaw, Yangon and Thailand. The term “Interim Arrangements” is a contested concept, meaning different things to different stakeholders. The MIARP adopted the following working definition of Interim Arrangements: “Service delivery and governance in conflict- affected areas, including the relationship between EAOs and government systems, during the period between initial ceasefires and a comprehensive political settlement.” Interim Arrangement refers to EAOs’ governance functions, administrative authority and service delivery systems. The “interim” period extends until a comprehensive political settlement has been implemented, which given recent setbacks in the peace process may take many years to achieve. Recognition of Interim Arrangements in Chapter 6 of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) reflects the government’s acknowledgement of key EAOs’ political legitimacy and administrative responsibilities. Interim Arrangements are about more than the NCA. However, Chapter 6 (Article 25) of the NCA recognizes the roles of signatory EAOs in the fields of health, education, development, environmental conservation and natural resource management, preservation and promotion of ethnic cultures and languages, security and the rule of law, and illicit drug eradication, and allows EAOs to receive international aid, in coordination with the government. For many years, Myanmar’s larger EAOs have taken on governance and administration roles in their areas of control, often delivering a wide range of services in partnership with CSOs. In the southeast, groups like the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), Karen National Union (KNU) and New Mon State Party (NMSP) are de-facto governments in relatively small pockets of territory. They also have influence and provide some services in wider areas of “mixed administration”, where EAO authority overlaps with that of the government and Myanmar Army. Between them for example, these three EAOs administer or support more than 2,000 schools, providing ethnic language teaching to vulnerable children who would otherwise often be denied an education. They also work with local partners to provide health services, access to justice and other public goods. Similar arrangements exist in other parts of the country, both in ceasefire areas where EAOs have not signed the NCA, and in areas of on-going armed conflict. For example, across much of Kachin and northern Shan States, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and other EAOs provide elements of governance, and life-saving if under resourced services to Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and other highly vulnerable communities. There are three principal rationales for supporting Interim Arrangements: 1. Effective Interim Arrangements will provide the best outcomes for vulnerable and marginalised communities in conflict-affected areas. Rather than reinventing the wheel, existing EAO and CSO service delivery systems should be supported on a case-by-case basis, recognising best practice. Meeting the government’s targets for school enrolment and universal health coverage for example, will depend on the work of EAOs and affiliated civil society actors, who should be seen as partners in meeting critical needs and achieving development goals. 2. Several of Myanmar’s EAOs (including NCA signatory and non-signatory groups) enjoy longstanding political legitimacy among the communities they seek to represent. Supporting EAO governance regimes will counter perceptions of the peace process as a vehicle for state penetration into previously autonomous areas, displacing existing EAO authorities and services, without consulting local stakeholders. In order to be conflict-sensitive, aid should be delivered in ways that do not undermine systems associated with EAOs, to the benefit of the government. Timely peace dividends can best be provided to vulnerable and marginalized communities by working with existing and trusted local service delivery systems. 3. Interim Arrangements could be a key element in building “federalism from below” in Myanmar, supporting effective local governance through equitable practices of selfdetermination. The administrative functions and services provided by key EAOs and their civil society partners should be regarded as the building blocks of federalism in Myanmar - a political solution to decades of armed conflict which key stakeholders have endorsed. There is concern among many ethnic stakeholders that international agencies, and particularly major donors, are pushing a convergence agenda, aimed at merging EAO and civil society service delivery with that of the state. While convergence between EAO and government systems may be appropriate in some scenarios and sectors, for most EAOs and CSOs Interim Arrangements are primarily about the maintenance and support of their independent systems. This is a sensitive topic, given the widespread perception that donors are intent on strengthening government capacities and systems, and extending these into previously inaccessible and/or contested conflict-affected areas. Peace-support efforts often struggle with tensions between state-centric aid and development programs, and inclusive and politically sensitive peace-building. Assumptions that weak institutional capacity is at the core of conflict, with a consequent focus on reinforcing state institutions, can result in peace-building activities which marginalise other sources of authority, such as EAOs and civil society actors. This is particularly problematicin the context of Myanmar, where the State is a party to armed conflict, and EAOs have extensive (if often contested) political legitimacy. Donors and diplomats should recognise that many of the issues structuring decades of armed conflict in Myanmar are irreducibly political. This would help to assuage ethnic stakeholders’ concerns that the government has an economic development first agenda for the peace process in Myanmar, and uses aid as a distraction from demands for political reform. Executive Summary [above] in Burmese, Shan, Sgaw Karen and Mon languages - available on my website: www.AshleySouth.co.uk & https://covenant-consult.com/2018/11/between-ceasefires-and-federalism-exploring-interim-arrangements-in-the-myanmar-peace-process/
This study uses strategic theory to examine China’s pursuit of key objectives in northern Myanmar and the impact on the ongoing conflict in the region. The conflict in Myanmar is long standing and ongoing, but has evolved significantly since independence in 1948. Additionally, China’s strategic interests in Myanmar have expanded as its economic development has progressed. Comparative case studies of the United Wa State Army, the Kachin Independence Organization, and a short case study of the Arakan Army are presented to assess how China’s engagement has impacted conflict at the local level. China’s strategic behavior is operationalized using the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic model of the instruments of national power, which generates evidence statements regarding China’s strategic behavior. These are assessed against various hypotheses regarding China’s impact on the conflict through the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses analytical framework. China’s impact has been mixed with some diplomatic efforts showing promise of reducing conflict intensity. However, engagement with key conflict actors has indirectly facilitated expansion of the conflict.