The Indispensability of Truth (original) (raw)
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The Role and Function of Critique in the Era of the Truth CRISIS1
2020
This paper, first published in German in Le Foucaldien 4(1) 2018 and in English in Le Foucaldien 6(1) 2020, explores Bruno Latour’s critique of contemporary critical theory. According to Latour, poststructuralist conceptions of critical inquiry are becoming increasingly outdated. In our “post-factual” era, attempting to expose facts as results of power-laden processes of social construction plays into the hands of anti-scientific obscurantists. This is not to say, however, that one ought to opt for some reductionist notion of objectivity. Instead, Latour proposes a new form of critical realism. While we agree with Latour about the necessity of widening our epistemological paradigm, we deem his critique of poststructuralism unfair and exaggerated. Moreover, we argue that he fails to account for the relationship between epistemology, power, and subjectivity. Since Foucault, on the other hand, succeeds where Latour falls short and probes into this very relationship, his is a form of cr...
Heidegger and the Analytic Tradition on Truth
Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy, 1991
This paper reassesses Heidegger's account of truth. It suggests that Heidegger's thought on this topic may be very much closer to certain strands of thought in the analytic tradition, and in particular to Wittgenstein, than is generally supposed. It was originally commissioned for, and provided the opening article in, a special issue of the journal Topoi, on the theme "Continental Philosophy Analysed," edited by Kevin Mulligan
Journal of Applied Philosophy , 2024
What is the relationship between theory and practice? The interplay between theory and practice is essential for translating abstract concepts into tangible realities. This connection is integral to embodying truth in our lives, showing that understanding alone is insufficient; the application truly confirms its significance. Nonetheless, contemporary philosophical discourse often leans towards intricate conceptual frameworks and cognitive insights, sidelining the integration of theory with practical wisdom. Many philosophers seem content with constructing elaborate theories devoid of a more profound philosophy that might guide their own way of life. The book Practices of Truth in Philosophy: Historical and Comparative Perspectives serves as an asset for translating philosophical thought into living reality. The book explores the practical frameworks of William James, Michel Foucault, Frantz Fanon, and Friedrich Nietzsche, aiming to transform truth-telling into a meaningful endeavor. It also delves deeper into exploring traditional, geographical, and historical perspectives rooted in living reality. The consistent emphasis of this volume is on connecting rich philosophical insights into truth with practice. The editors are concerned with a recent trend in philosophy, noting that it has historically prioritized theoretical aspects over the practical application of philosophical thought regarding truth. However, unlike the present philosophies, the approaches developed by the contributors are not concerned with the question of theory, but rather, the question of practice (p. 1). In other words, individuals should not merely understand the philosophical concept but must actively integrate and adapt it into a distinct way of living (p. 42). The core goal of the book is to make meaningful ways to demonstrate a way of living through the philosophy of life. The book is divided into 15 chapters and has diversified approaches to engaging truthtelling with the way of life. The contributors are not limited to the praxis of the truth; instead, this book's essential concern is how one gets this practice of truth. Sandra Shapshay argues, 'The key for Schopenhauer in attaining truths through these aesthetic and moral avenues, and what fundamentally unites these two avenues, is the practice of stepping out of one's habitual egoism' (p. 138). In other words, to cultivate goodness and aesthetic contemplation, one needs to step out of self-centeredness, which harms the world. In this case, the embodied truth praxes attain the theory after having the practicality of truth. Pietro Gori's engagement with the practicality of truth, approaching the work of James, Foucault, and Nietzsche, declares that philosophical insights relate to us to make true and give meanings to them. As a result, these insights are not static but rather active for practical engagement (p. 176).
Truth, Values, and the Value of Truth
This article describes the central role played by conceptions of truth in critical IR scholarship. Two broad positions are identified. Firstly, despite their differences, Critical Theorists and poststructuralists understand truth in intersubjective terms, and its political significance as arising from its relationship to the norms and practices constitutive of political reality. In contrast, Critical Realists understand truth in terms of the cognitive relationship of subjects with an independent objective reality, and its significance as arising from the importance of accurate knowledge of that reality. The article suggests that each of these positions blocks the legitimate insights of the other. It argues that a way out of the resultant impasse can be found in Theodor Adorno's theory of truth, in which a concern with the primacy of the objective is coupled with an insistence on the connection between truth and human needs.
Exploring the Philosophical Terrain, 2013
This article surveys different philosophical theories about the nature of truth. We give much importance to truth; some demand to know it, some fear it, and others would even die for it. But what exactly is truth? What is its nature? Does it even have a nature in the first place? When do we say that some truth-bearers are true? Philosophers offer varying answers to these questions. In this article, some of these answers are explored and some of the problems raised against them are presented.
There's a certain slant of light: Three attitudes toward the political turn in analytic philosophy
Metaphilosophy, 2023
There has been a growing interest within analytic philosophy in addressing political and social issues, which has been referred to as the “political turn” in the discipline. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it discusses the very characterization of the political turn. In particular, it introduces the definition proposed by Bordonaba‐Plou, Fernández‐Castro, and Torices, suggests that we should not consider the turn a form of activism, and explores an additional benefit of the ideal/nonideal distinction for characterizing the turn. Second, it addresses the concern of what attitude we should take in the face of the different sensitivities we might have with respect to what constitutes an injustice. Which philosophical works should count as part of the political turn? The paper explores three different attitudes toward this dilemma, and favors what it calls the revisionist attitude, which emphasizes the fact that our perception of injustice is subject to error.
ANALYTICITY, TRUTHMAKING AND MATHEMATICS
A B S T R A C T. Whereas for many truths, truthmaker theory offers a plausible account , there are certain kinds of truths for which the theory seems less helpful: principally (though not exclusively) analytic truths. I argue that an augmentation of the usual idea of truthmakers can solve this problem. Moreover that once solved we are able to look afresh at the nature of mathematics, whether conceived as analytic or synthetic, necessary or contingent, and reduce the ontological options. I also argue that it was Quine's reformulation of analyticity, deployed in place of the correct Leibniz-Wolff-Kant account, that led to his holistic account of knowledge and pragmatist account of scientific revisability.
Presentism, Truthmaking, and the Nature of Truth (Analytic Philosophy)
A recent presentist strategy has been to deny that truths about the past need presently existing truthmakers. These presentists don't deny that such truths need grounding; they hold that each truth about the past is true because of how the world was, not how it is. This paper argues that this position faces two problems, one of which can be overcome by adopting a certain view of the property of truth for propositions about the past. The second problem cannot be solved. The upshot is that this form of presentism is not a theory of truthmaking for propositions about the past. Rather, it is a theory about why such truths need no present grounding that is motivated by a novel theory of truth.
How Not to Be an Anti-realist: Habermas, Truth, and Justification
McGill-Queen's University Press eBooks, 2013
This article responds to a debate in analytic philosophy between realist and antirealist conceptions of truth, as formulated by Alvin Plantinga. Whereas Plantinga recommends a return to Aquinas, I argue for a new understanding of propositional truth that grows out of Jürgen Habermas's "pragmatic realist" conception. By critically appropriating Habermas's insights, I aim to move beyond the realism/anti-realism dispute, replacing questions of independence with questions of interdependence. I claim that truth theory needs to begin with the interdependence of "mind" and "object" and with the corporeal multidimensionality of both human knowers and that about which they acquire knowledge.