Turkey: How the Coup Failed (original) (raw)

Coup in Turkey 10.2016 Revised

Everybody knows her, but nonetheless, it's embarrassing to meet her in the street. The truth is like the town whore. -Borchert Our paper, it will particularly focus on the AKP government's discourse on national consensus, and the restructuring of the military and the field of security. In order to examine this conflict within by examining both the domestic and international spheres, this paper will, firstly, briefly discuss civil-military relations in Turkey in accordance with its theoretical framework drawn from Marxism. Secondly, it will briefly discuss the relationship between the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi -Justice and Development Party) government and the Gulen movement since the coup plotters were allegedly disciples and allies of the Gulen movement (Gulenists) according to their own confessions. Thirdly, it will discuss the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in relation to the hegemonic project of neoliberal-Islamism. Finally, it will conclude that the secular and democratic Republican regime with the rule of law should be defended, and that the class antagonisms and ill-doings of capitalism should be collectively voiced. However, the failed coup revealed the fierce and prolonged conflict within the state apparatus which can be dated back to the Ergenekon (named after a Turkish saga of re-birth) and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) trials. On 15 July 2016, Turkey saw a failed coup attempt, which was undertaken by certain factions of the military, and which saw more than three-hundred killed, more than a thousand wounded, and thousands detained.

Coup in Turkey

Our paper, it will particularly focus on the AKP government's discourse on national consensus, and the restructuring of the military and the field of security. In order to examine this conflict within by examining both the domestic and international spheres, this paper will, firstly, briefly discuss civil-military relations in Turkey in accordance with its theoretical framework drawn from Marxism. Thirdly, it will discuss the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in relation to the hegemonic project of neoliberal-Islamism. Secondly, it will briefly discuss the relationship between the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi – Justice and Development Party) government and the Gulen movement since the coup plotters were allegedly disciples and allies of the Gulen movement (Gulenists) according to their own confessions. Finally, it will conclude that the secular and democratic Republican regime with the rule of law should be defended, and that the class antagonisms and ill-doings of capitalism should be collectively voiced. However, the failed coup revealed the fierce and prolonged conflict within the state apparatus which can be dated back to the Ergenekon (named after a Turkish saga of rebirth) and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) trials. On 15 July 2016, Turkey saw a failed coup attempt, which was undertaken by certain factions of the military, and which saw more than three-hundred killed, more than a thousand wounded, and thousands detained. Therefore, contrary to the hegemonic liberal-conservative paradigm that has portrayed the military as an elitist institution with a pro-coup mind-set (Heper, 2012; Mardin, 1973), this paper considers civil-military relations as a field of class struggle. Regarding civil-military relations in Turkey, since the relationship between the military and the civilian sphere can be regarded as a response to and a result of the changes in relations of production, the Turkish military intervened in politics as an intermediary in moments of hegemonic crisis to restructure the pattern(s) of capital accumulation and class relations in the last instance in order to maintain the capitalist mode of production after having acquired consent of particular social class(es).

Explaining the end of military tutelary regime and the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey

Journal of Cultural Economy

What were the dynamics behind the July 15 2016 coup attempt in Turkey? At a time when academic literature has been focusing on the dissolution of the country's military tutelary regime, how can this military coup attempt be explained? As an early response to this unanticipated puzzle, I argue that the success of civilian moves towards the dissolution of the military's political power contributedparadoxicallyboth to the emergence and to the failure of a coup organized by a junta of Gulenist officers and their collaborators. Through a description of the historical evolution of civil-military relations, I explain the dissolution of the military tutelary regime with reference to a combination of push and pull factors. The interaction of these push and pull factors presents the historical context behind the emergence and failure of the July 15 failed coup in Turkey.

MAKING SENSE OF FAILED COUP D'ETAT IN TURKEY AND ITS AFTERMATH

Coup d'etat was not a new phenomenon for Turkey because several successful coups previously had happened led by military to protect the Kemalism in Turkey. However, what happened in the night of 16 July 2016 was very historical for Turkey, because the coup d'etat attempt was successfully defeated. This time, nevertheless, although done by a military junta, Erdoğan believes that the master mind of the coup was his former ally, Fethullah Gülen, leader of cultural Islamic based organization (Gülen Movement). This claim was very interesting, despite the fact that both parties are known for their deeply Islamic roots and former allies. Therefore, this paper tends to make sense of what actually had happened between both parties, hence Gülen Movement was alleged as the coup plotters. Why the coup attempt failed and what is the aftermath of the coup?.

Turkey: The Oscillation Between «State» and «Regime» (1/3

This three part series of articles -- based on extensive fieldwork research in Turkey since 2010, and which appeared in Almasry Alyoum in July 2016 following the Turkish attempted coup -- analyze why the attempt itself was predictable, based on detected politicization and agitation of the mid-rank level within the Turkish Armed Forces, due to subjective promotions and loyalism under Erdogan's regime. The articles also explain why the failure of the attempt was also equally foreseen, given that the mutiny within the army, against the political leadership was not a broad-base societally-supported move, due to a public weary of a history of military interventions. In the end, the articles argue, the Turkey is currently undergoing a transformation from a State to a Regime, and the prediction is an eventual ousting of the Erodgan Regime at the 2023/24-25 juncture.

Review of Turkey's July 15th Coup, What Happened and Why, edited by M Hakan Yavuz and Bayram Balci (LSE Review of Books)

Two years after the event, the collection Turkey’s July 15 Coup: What Happened and Why, edited by M. Hakan Yavuz and Bayram Balci, brings together contributors to unpack the historical, political, religious and ideological dimensions of the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. The volume offers insightful historical insight into the deteriorating relationship between AKP leader and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Gülen movement and its ultimate impact on the events of 15 July 2016, writes Serhun Al.

Mateusz Chudziak: The coup as a founding myth. The ideological pillars of the New Turkey. OSW Point of View no 66, October 2017

The Republic of Turkey has been undergoing a thorough transformation since 2002 under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). On the ideological level this transformation entered a decisive stage after the coup of 15 July 2016 which was thwarted by the government’s supporters. The coup is treated as a modern political myth that has been employed by the government to build a comprehensive story of a Turkey it governs, and to define the fundamental values and identity of the state. Turkey is becoming an even more difficult partner for the West after the failed coup. Inherent in its founding myth is a strong anti-Western and anti-liberal trend based on a political system strongly relying on one leader. However, this does not mean that a Turkey with a government model of this kind will automatically become a close ally of other anti-Western countries (such as Russia and Iran) and build a camp with them that would be in competition with the West. In this context, Turkey above all emphasises its own sovereignty. Furthermore, it is not looking for points of reference in other countries because it is a model for itself.